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Abstract
The High Redundancy Actuator project investigates a novel approach to fault tolerant actu-
ation, which uses a relatively high number of small actuation elements, assembled in series
and parallel in order to form a single actuator which has intrinsic fault tolerance. Faults in
elements will aﬀect the maximum capability of the overall actuator, but through control tech-
niques, the required performance can be maintained. This allows higher levels of reliability to
be attained in exchange for less over-dimensioning in comparison to conventional redundancy
techniques. In addition, the combination of both serial and parallel elements allows for the
intrinsic accommodation of both lock-up (loss of travel) and loose (loss of force) faults.
Research to date has concentrated on high redundancy actuators based on electromechani-
cal technology, of relatively low order (4 elements), which are controlled through passive fault
tolerant control methods. The objective of this thesis is to expand upon this work. High
redundancy actuator conﬁgurations of higher order (16-100 elements), formed from electro-
magnetic actuators are considered. An element model for a moving coil actuator is derived
from ﬁrst principles and veriﬁed experimentally. This element model is then used to form
high-order, non-linear high redundancy actuator models for simulation, and reduced-order
representations for control design purposes.
A simple, passive fault tolerant control design is then made for the high redundancy
actuation conﬁgurations, the results of which are compared to a decentralised, multiple-model,
gain-scheduling approach applied through a framework based upon multi-agent concepts. The
results of this comparison indicate that limited fault tolerance can be achieved through simple
passive control methods, however, performance degradation occurs, and requirements are not
met under theoretically tolerable fault levels. The active fault tolerant control approach, which
detects faults in elements and reconﬁgures the control within the remaining active elements,
oﬀers substantial performance improvements, meeting the requirements of the system under
the vast majority of theoretically tolerable fault scenarios. However, these improvements are
made at the cost of increased system complexity and a performance that relies upon the
accuracy of the fault detection.
Fault detection and health monitoring of the high redundancy actuator is also explored. A
simple rule-based approach to fault detection and diagnosis, for use within the decentralised
active fault tolerant control method, is described and simulated. An interacting multiple
model fault detection approach is also examined, which is more suitable for health monitoring
within a centralised passive control scheme. Both of these methods provide the required level
of fault information for their respective purposes. However, they achieve this through the in-
troduction of complexity. The rule-based method increases system complexity, requiring high
levels of instrumentation, and conversely the interacting multiple model approach involves
complexity of design and computation.
Finally, the development of a software demonstrator is described. Experimental rigs at the
current project phase are restricted to relatively low numbers of elements (4-16) for practical
reasons such as cost, space and technological limitations. Hence, a software demonstrator
has been developed which provides a visual representation of high redundancy actuators with
larger numbers of elements, and varied conﬁguration for further demonstration of this concept.
The software demonstrator is developed in Matlab/Simulink and includes features such as
animated visualisation of the system and health monitoring, real-time fault injection, input
and disturbance controls, and controller choice.
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Fault Tolerance Terminology
Active fault tolerant control - A control strategy that allows the system to remain opera-
tional in the presence of faults through reconﬁguration of control in response to detected
faults. This reconﬁguration may be achieved through online synthesis or online selection.
Adaptive control - Online modiﬁcation of controller parameters, in response to variations
in system parameters, in order to achieve control objectives.
Analytical redundancy - The generation of residuals using two or more methods to deter-
mine a variable, where at least one method uses a mathematical process.
Availability - Probability that a system will be fully operational at any point in time.
Error - The deviation between a measure or analytically derived value of an output variable
and its true speciﬁed or theoretical value.
Disturbance - An unknown and uncontrolled input acting on a system.
Fail-safe - The ability of a system to fail to a state that is considered safe in the context of
the application.
Failure - A permanent interruption of a system's ability to perform a required function.
Fault - The deviation of at least one of the characteristic properties or parameters of the
system from the standard conditions.
Fault detection - The determination of faults present in a system and the time of detection.
xii
LIST OF TABLES
Fault diagnosis - Determination of the type, magnitude, location and time of detection of
a fault. Involves fault identiﬁcation and isolation.
Fault identiﬁcation - Determination of the magnitude and time-variant behaviour of a
fault. Follows fault isolation.
Fault isolation - Determination of the fault type, location and time following the detection
of a fault.
Fault tolerance - The ability of a controlled system to achieve optimal, or acceptably de-
graded levels of performance, despite the occurrence of a fault.
FDI - Fault Detection and Isolation.
Monitoring - A continuous real-time task of determining the conditions of a physical system,
by recording information, recognising and indicating anomalies in the behaviour.
Online selection - Reconﬁguration of control in response to faults by selecting between a
set of pre-designed control algorithms.
Online synthesis - Reconﬁguration of control in response to faults through online adapta-
tion of the control law.
Partial actuator fault - A sub-class of actuator faults where the force or travel capability
of the actuator is reduced, but not completely lost.
Passive fault tolerant control - A control strategy that allows the system to remain op-
erational in the presence of faults through robust control design i.e. a single controller
is designed to accommodate all fault conditions.
Physical redundancy - The generation of residuals through the comparison of two or more
sets of measured data determined through hardware replication.
Reconﬁguration - Modiﬁcations made to the controller in response to faults.
Reliability - Ability of a system to perform a required function, under stated conditions
during a given period of time.
Residual - A fault indicator based on the deviation either between two or more sets of
measurements or a measurement and analytical computations.
Robust control - The control of unknown plants with unknown dynamics subject to un-
known disturbances.
Supervision - Monitoring a physical system and taking appropriate actions to maintain
operation in the case of faults.
Symptom - A deviation from nominal behaviour of an observable quantity, that is used for
fault diagnosis.
Uncertainties - Unknown dynamics or eﬀects acting on a system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Over the past 40 years, automatic control systems have become widespread throughout the
aerospace and automotive industries, manufacturing, and critical infrastructures, and the
complexity of these systems is increasing. Control system theory is well established, and able
to ensure a stable, pre-deﬁned performance, given that the components within these systems
are operating correctly. Unfortunately, all components, regardless of the reliability of their
design or frequency of maintenance, are subject to faults. As automated systems are closely
coupled, faults in individual components are likely to aﬀect the operation of the system at
large. In safety-critical systems, faults may result in damage to the system, its environment,
or people within its vicinity. Faults within non-safety critical systems can have profound eco-
nomic impacts, increasing down-time and life-cycle costs. Hence, the development of systems
that are able to tolerate faults is of great signiﬁcance for many applications, and consequently,
fault tolerant system design has developed into a major area of research in the past 30 years.
Actuators and sensors are key to the operation of automated systems, as they provide the
means of controlling and observing the system. Consequently, a common method of achieving
the required reliability of these instruments has been to employ some redundancy (Figure 1.1).
Typically, 3 or 4 sensors/actuators are used in parallel, and their output is combined through
Figure 1.1: Conventional sensor and actuator redundancy.
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voting (in the case of sensors) or mechanical consolidation (in the case of actuators). If faults
occur within these instruments, then one alone could provide the necessary function.
However, this over-engineering incurs penalties as cost and weight are increased, and
subsequently, the eﬃciency reduced. Parallel actuator redundancy is also problematic, as
jamming (lock-up) faults in actuators eﬀectively lock the whole actuation assembly in place,
rendering the redundancy useless. Research has produced many methods of mitigating the
need for redundant sensors through analytical replication. However, these strategies are not
applicable to actuators, as actuation force is an unavoidable necessity to keep the system
in control and bring it to the desired state (1). Hence, research in this area has mainly
concentrated on compensating a small sub-class of actuator faults where the capability of the
actuator is only reduced1, as opposed to where the capability is completely lost as is the case
in loose or lock-up faults.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation
The high redundancy actuator concept is a novel approach to fault tolerant actuation. Fig-
ure 1.2 provides a representation of a high redundancy actuator, which comprises many small
actuator elements arranged in both series and parallel. Each actuation element provides only
a small contribution to the required force and travel of the actuator. As the capability of
each element is small, the eﬀect of faults within individual elements on the overall actuator is
also small, and as such, faults in elements can be intrinsically accommodated. This concept
is inspired by biological muscles, which are composed of many individual cells, each of which
providing only a minute contribution to the force and the travel of the muscle. These prop-
erties allow the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient to substantial levels of cell damage.
High redundancy actuation alleviates the problems incurred by conventional redundancy
schemes, as the extent of over-engineering is reduced. For example, a high redundancy ac-
tuator may employ 100 actuation elements, but the speciﬁed operation may only require 80.
1These types of faults are termed 'partial' faults within the literature, as they only partially aﬀect the
actuator.
Figure 1.2: High redundancy actuation.
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Thus, the high redundancy actuator in this case is only 20% over-engineered in comparison
to a triplex or quadruplex scheme which are 200% and 300% over-engineered respectively.
Issues with lock-up faults are resolved as they are inherently tolerated by the inclusion
of serial actuation. The manner in which the high redundancy actuator degrades is also of
advantage. Instead of large changes of capability, like that witnessed in parallel redundancy
systems where the system may change from fully operational to total failure within a short
period, a high redundancy actuator will decrease in capability more gradually i.e. it will
gracefully degrade.
1.3 Thesis Motivation
The high redundancy actuation concept poses a number of research questions:
• In what conﬁguration should actuation elements be arranged, and how can the reliability
of these conﬁgurations be quantiﬁed?
• How should high redundancy actuation be controlled in order to provide fault tolerance?
• How can health monitoring for the system be provided for maintenance purposes?
• Which actuation technologies are most suitable for forming high redundancy actuators?
Several of these questions have been addressed to various extents. Work on the high redun-
dancy actuator project thus far has involved several investigators. The ﬁrst phase of the
project was conducted by Xinli Du, a PhD student, and investigated the feasibility of the
high redundancy actuation concept. Based upon these studies, a second project phase has
been funded through a EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) grant.
This second phase has been concerned with progressing the control and reliability studies
associated with the high redundancy actuator, and has been mainly conducted by the author
and Thomas Steﬀen, a research associate. Hence, the work contained within this thesis forms
a contribution to the project at large, and does not aim to address all the research questions
posed by the concept. A discussion of current progress in addressing each research challenge
follows.
High Redundancy Actuation Conﬁguration and Reliability
There are many ways in which actuation elements can be arranged to form a high redundancy
actuator. The way in which elements are conﬁgured aﬀects the tolerance of the system
to particular faults. There are two major fault modes that are common to many types of
actuators:
1. lock-up faults, where the actuator jams in place, and,
2. loose faults, where the actuator loses the ability to exert a force between its end-points.
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Figure 1.3: High redundancy actuator conﬁgurations under fault.
These two actuator fault types are the focus of the studies presented within this thesis.
Elements arranged in series provide tolerance to lock-up faults, as serial actuators are
available to provide travel in the case of an element fault. However, purely serial elements
are intolerant to loose faults, as the force capability of the whole system will be lost if one
element becomes loose. Conversely, parallel elements oﬀer tolerance to loose faults, but are
susceptible to lock-up faults. This idea is summarised in Figure 1.3.
Hence, combinations of parallel and serial elements will provide tolerance to each fault
type. Two major conﬁguration types emerge when this problem is considered: parallel ele-
ments connected in series (parallel-in-series) and serial elements connected in parallel (series-
in-parallel). These conﬁgurations are illustrated in Figure 1.3. Series-in-parallel conﬁgurations
provide a greater tolerance to lock-up faults, and a degree of tolerance to loose faults. Parallel-
in-series conﬁgurations provide a greater tolerance to loose faults, and a degree of tolerance
to lock-up faults. The choice of conﬁguration, and the number of elements therein, will be
dictated by the likelihood of each fault mode in the actuator technology and the requirements
of the application, hence, no deﬁnitive conﬁguration can be made.
A method of analysing the reliability of these conﬁgurations has been addressed in (2).
This work also proves that high redundancy actuation can provide higher levels of reliability
in comparison to traditional parallel redundancy. These forms of analysis are not considered
within this thesis.
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Previous studies have concentrated on a 2× 2 series in parallel high redundancy actuator
(containing 4 elements) (3; 4; 5; 6; 7). This is a relatively low number of elements for a high
redundancy actuator: it is envisaged that a high redundancy actuator suitable for industrial
use may contain hundreds of elements. The number of elements will aﬀect the operational
characteristics of high redundancy actuators. Hence, this thesis extends the previous work
and considers two levels of element redundancy and two conﬁgurations. Two 4×4 parallel-in-
series and series-in-parallel systems (containing 16 elements) are analysed alongside a 10× 10
parallel in series high redundancy actuator (containing 100 elements). These systems will
provide an indication of the characteristics of high redundancy actuation at two levels of
redundancy and in the two main conﬁguration types.
Control of High Redundancy Actuators
Control research thus far has concentrated on passive fault tolerant control techniques where
a single robust controller is designed which provides a suitable performance under all fault
conditions. Extensive theoretical research and practical implementation of passive fault tol-
erant control has been conducted using a 2×2 electro-mechanical conﬁguration (3; 4; 5; 6; 7).
This work has proved the viability of the high redundancy actuation concept and shown that
a passive approach can provide fault tolerance within this structure.
Passive fault tolerant control does not require faults in the system to be detected, or the
control law to be altered. This simplicity and constancy make passive fault tolerant control
an attractive solution for the high redundancy actuator, as its operation is easier to verify
for high integrity applications. However, a passive fault tolerant controller must encompass
a large system operation region, and as such, the resultant performance can be conservative.
This problem is negated to some extent within the high redundancy actuator, as the change
in system behaviour is reduced by having many low capability elements.
Active fault tolerant control, where the control is changed in response to faults, oﬀers the
possibility of improved performance of the system in nominal or fault conditions, and increased
levels of fault tolerance. Active fault tolerant control of high redundancy actuation has not
been explored previously. One aim of this thesis is to investigate an active fault tolerant
control approach for the high redundancy actuator and assess any performance improvements
that may be gained, whilst also considering the costs in terms of the associated complexity
and uncertainty.
Health Monitoring of High Redundancy Actuation
From an operational perspective, some form of health monitoring of the high redundancy
actuator is a necessity. It is envisaged that the high redundancy actuator will continue to
operate within an acceptable performance region under element fault conditions, up until a
point where the capability (be it travel or force) falls below that required by the application.
At this point, or just before it, maintenance will be required to replace the high redundancy
actuation unit. Hence, health monitoring is needed to provide an indication of the high redun-
dancy actuator's capability for maintenance purposes. Additionally, this health information
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could be used to make operational decisions.
Thorough research into providing health monitoring for the high redundancy actuator has
not yet been completed. However, one possible method of providing health information is
examined within this thesis.
High Redundancy Actuator Technology
The identiﬁcation of technologies that are suitable for use as actuation elements within high
redundancy actuators has not been seriously addressed to date. This is because research is
at a proof of concept stage. Technology used within concept demonstrators so far has aimed
to illustrate the increased reliability and control properties aﬀorded by the topology of a
high redundancy actuator, rather than form a product suitable for industrial use2. A 2 × 2
demonstrator was previously developed using electromechanical actuators and a 4 × 4 high
redundancy actuator that uses electromagnetic actuators is in the ﬁnal stages of development.
Hence, the work within this thesis considers the use of electromagnetic actuation and is
applicable to this latest demonstrator.
This 4 × 4 system is still some way short of the (element) levels of redundancy intended
for use within a high redundancy actuator. Thus, another objective of the work within this
thesis is to provide a software demonstrator that will visually illustrate the operation of high
redundancy actuators with greater numbers of elements.
1.4 Thesis Objectives
Given the discussions of the previous section, the main objectives of this thesis may be sum-
marised as follows:
1. to investigate the use of moving coil actuators as elements in the high redundancy actu-
ation scheme, including the modelling of an element and assemblies, model veriﬁcation
and modelling of lock-up and loose actuation element faults.
2. to investigate active fault tolerant control strategies based upon multi-agent system
concepts for use within the HRA, and compare its performance to a passive fault tolerant
controlled system under lock-up and loose actuation element fault conditions.
3. to explore two fault detection and health monitoring methods for the high redundancy
actuator.
4. to develop a software demonstrator which illustrates the operation of high redundancy
actuation systems that comprise many elements.
2Progress on the next phase of the project concerning technology identiﬁcation is in the initial stages, and a
report on the suitability of piezoelectric actuators for use within a high redundancy actuator has been written
by the author. The interested reader is directed towards Appendix A, where a copy of this report is included.
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1.5 Thesis Overview
The objectives stated in 1.4 are achieved through the following methodology.
1.5.1 Background & Literature Review
Firstly, background information and a survey of relevant literature is provided, which forms
a foundation for the work that follows. The design of fault tolerant systems is addressed
and methods of fault tolerant control and fault diagnosis are discussed. An introduction to
multi-agent systems is also given, as these concepts form the basis of the active fault tolerant
control framework presented later in the thesis.
1.5.2 Modelling of High Redundancy Actuation
The main contributions of the thesis begin in Chapter 3 with the modelling of electro-magnetic
high redundancy actuation, as producing a representation of the system upon which the
control and fault detection methods can be designed is the ﬁrst logical step. Modelling of
a moving coil actuator based on ﬁrst principles is presented, which is subsequently veriﬁed
experimentally. Two types of actuator are modelled. Firstly, a moving coil actuator with a
closed bobbin, as this was the ﬁrst actuator used within the project. This arrangement is
atypical, leading to an unconventional model. The second actuator has a cut bobbin, which
is more archetypal and as such the model produced is fairly standard. Full-order non-linear
and linear reduced-order versions of the model are presented for both actuator types, which
are to be used for simulation and control design purposes respectively.
A methodology for assembling these element models into high redundancy actuation struc-
tures is then described, and a procedure for representing faults in high redundancy conﬁgu-
rations given.
This chapter addresses the ﬁrst objective as described in Section 1.4.
1.5.3 Application Example
In order to illustrate the various characteristics of high redundancy conﬁgurations, three
example systems are deﬁned for use in the control studies in Chapter 4. Two 4 × 4 systems
are created, one in a series-in-parallel, and the other in a parallel-in-series conﬁguration.
This will allow a comparison between the two main conﬁgurations. The third system is a
10× 10 parallel-in-series system, which illustrates the consequences of increasing the number
of elements in the high redundancy actuator. These example systems are based upon real
application requirements to add weight to the control studies that follow. Performance criteria
are also deﬁned for use within the control studies.
1.5.4 Passive Fault Tolerant Control of High Redundancy Actuation
Having established simulation and control design models, and deﬁned a number of example
systems, the eﬀects of faults on these systems are analysed and subsequently, passive fault
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tolerant control is designed using classical methods in Chapter 5. The performance of the
system is then considered under nominal and fault conditions. This control performance acts
as a benchmark, against which the active fault tolerant control results can be compared.
1.5.5 Fault Detection and Health Monitoring
Chapter 6 addresses objective 3 of section 1.4. Fault detection is required by the active fault
tolerant control design, hence it is described within this chapter. A decentralised rule-based
approach is proposed as this complements the localised nature of the active fault tolerant
control strategy presented. Health monitoring using interacting multiple model fault detection
is also described, which illustrates an approach to estimating the health state of a more
centralised scheme for maintenance purposes. Both fault detection approaches are simulated
and their results are compared and discussed.
1.5.6 Active Fault Tolerant Control of High Redundancy Actuation
The fault detection described in the previous chapter is utilised within the active fault toler-
ant control strategy described in Chapter 7. This control strategy is based upon multi-agent
concepts. A motivation for using multi-agent system ideas in the design of active fault tol-
erant control for the high redundancy actuator is established. The design of the multi-agent
control approach is then described. Simulation results are presented and the performance of
this scheme is compared to the benchmark passive fault tolerant control performance. This
chapter, in combination with Chapter 5, satisﬁes objective 2.
1.5.7 Software Demonstrator
The development and functionality of a software demonstrator that illustrates the operation
of high redundancy actuation conﬁgurations containing large numbers of elements is described
within Chapter 8. This work addresses the ﬁnal aim of this thesis: objective 4.
1.5.8 Conclusions
Finally, conclusions are made in Chapter 9. Further extensions to the work are then suggested.
1.6 Contributions
As the high redundancy actuator is a new approach to fault tolerant actuation, there is much
originality in the research that is associated with it. The main contributions made within this
thesis are as follows:
Modelling Contributions As stated earlier, the closed-bobbin moving coil actuator de-
scribed in Chapter 3 is a non-standard arrangement. This closed-bobbin actuator has been
modelled previously in (8). However, the model presented there approximates the electrical
characteristics with a third order transfer function ﬁtted to experimental data. The model
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derived here is done so from ﬁrst principles, maintaining the physical relevance of the param-
eters. This approach has not been found within the literature. Hence, this model and its
subsequent reductions and extensions form an original contribution to knowledge.
The fault modelling presented in Chapter 3 also forms some contribution to knowledge.
The use of actuators in series is unusual and thus faults in serial actuators are not commonly
covered in the literature, whereas this conﬁguration is a particular feature of the HRA concept.
The fault types included here in serial actuation have been previously covered in the work
of (7). However, these faults were introduced into an electromechanical system, and thus
consideration of these fault types within electromagnetic actuation forms a new contribution
to the project.
Control Contributions The active fault tolerant control presented in Chapter 7 forms the
main contribution of this thesis. Prior to these studies, only passive fault tolerant control
techniques have been investigated for use with the high redundancy actuator.
In addition to the application of active fault tolerant control to the high redundancy
actuator problem, the nature of the active fault tolerant control presented also oﬀers a degree
of novelty. In the studies made in Chapter 2, no previous work was found where control
and management of redundant actuators for fault tolerance purposes was achieved through
the application of multi-agent concepts, and as such Chapter 7 may be considered a novel
approach to this problem.
The passive control described in Chapter 5 forms a smaller contribution to knowledge.
Whilst classical passive control of electro-mechanical actuators has been investigated previ-
ously, simple passive control of electro-magnetic HRAs has not been widely addressed, par-
ticularly control of series-in-parallel structures, and as such, these control studies provide a
contribution.
Fault Detection and Health Monitoring Contributions Fault detection of lock-up
and loose faults in the high redundancy actuator has not been addressed previously, as much
emphasis has been put on passive fault tolerant control research, where fault detection is
not critical. Health monitoring for high redundancy actuators has also not been addressed
previously within the project. Thus whilst the methods used to achieve fault detection and
health monitoring in Chapter 6 are not original, their application to this problem is novel.
Software Demonstrator The ﬁnal contribution of this thesis is the development of a
software demonstrator to illustrate the operation of a larger range of high redundancy actuator
conﬁgurations and sizes than is available through experimental demonstration.
1.6.1 Publications
A number of papers have been published (or are currently under review) in connection to the
work outlined in this thesis (copies of the papers where the author is stated as ﬁrst author
are available within Appendix F):
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Chapter 2
Background & Literature Review
This literature review provides a general outline of design of high integrity systems, with
special emphasis on redundancy, and a brief overview of approaches to fault tolerant control.
A summary of multi-agent concepts is also made, as these are used in the development of an
active fault tolerant control framework in Chapter 7.
2.1 Terminology
Unfortunately, much of the terminology used within the fault-tolerant control ﬁeld is used
with inconsistent meaning. This incoherence makes it diﬃcult to understand the objectives
of contributions and to compare the diﬀerent approaches to fault tolerance. This problem
has been acknowledged frequently within the fault tolerant community and is discussed in
(9; 10; 11; 12). The terminology used throughout this literature review is consistent with
the terminology used within (9) and the IFAC SAFEPROCESS terminology as found in (10).
Deﬁnitions of the most important terms are provided in the glossary.
2.2 Faults, Failures and Fault Tolerance
A fault is a defect that occurs in the hardware or software of a system, which may be located
in the controller, power supply, actuators or sensors of the system, or indeed in the plant
itself. Faults often result in unexpected or undesirable behaviour changes of the system, and
where faults result in the system being unable to complete an expected action, the system is
said to have failed.
This concept is expressed in Figure 2.1. The nominal system behaviour, bn lies within a
region of acceptable system behaviour where the system is operational. Inevitably, a bound
of uncertainty for the system surrounds this point, representing parameter uncertainties that
may exist between actuator units, and system input uncertainties. Faults will change the
system behaviour, and thus the position of the faulty system behaviours within this diagram
will diﬀer to that of the nominal. A range of fault system behaviours (represented by {bf})
may lie within the acceptable region, and as such the system is considered tolerant to these
particular faults. However, if a fault behaviour lies outside this region, then the system will
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Figure 2.1: Behavioural representation of nominal and faulty systems.
be unable to complete expected actions and the fault has led to system failure.
The consequences of failures in engineering systems can include loss of revenue, damage
to the plant and its environment, and in extremis, loss of life. A fault tolerant system is able
to avoid failures and achieve adequate system performance in the presence of faults. Fault
tolerance is important in safety-critical systems such as aeroplanes, trains and road vehicles
and this importance is increasing as these industries move from mechanical to electronic
solutions in X-by-wire strategies, and safety cannot be ensured through mechanical component
integrity alone. However, fault tolerance can also be of importance for non safety-critical
systems, such as machine tools and production robots, where increased reliability can increase
operation times and reduce maintenance and life-cycle costs.
2.3 Fault Tolerant System Design
The most eﬀective means of achieving fault tolerance is through systematic analysis and inte-
grated design. An understanding of the system's structure, the reliability of its components
and its current redundancies should be developed and analysed to determine vulnerable areas,
and how fault tolerance could be provided. A representation of this process used by NASA in
programmes such as Voyager, and Cassini as a preferred code of practice is given in Figure 2.2
(13). Whilst this ﬂow chart is not exhaustive in the types of analyses that may be conducted,
it captures the essence of the design approach.
The process usually starts with highly domain speciﬁc analysis of the system's components
to identify possible fault modes. A Failure Modes, Eﬀects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
is then conducted, where the eﬀects of each possible failure mode is evaluated at the local
and intermediate system level, and the severity of their eﬀect on overall system operation is
assessed.
A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) may also be completed, which complements the FMECA
by starting with a top level failure eﬀect and tracing this to potential faults that may induce
that failure. FTA is aimed at analysing how multiple low-level faults can combine to cause
system-level failures.
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Figure 2.2: Process ﬂow diagram for fault tolerant design(13).
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The information from the FMECA and FTA can then be used to identify critical faults and
decide whether to take measures that reduce the probability of failure (i.e. through strength-
ening components), prevent the propagation of failures (i.e. include fail-safe measures), or
compensate for the eﬀects of failures (i.e. through control reconﬁguration) (14). This process
is iterative, and ceases when either the cost of the next design iteration (in terms of added
weight, volume, time or money constraints) is unacceptable or when the risk is reduced below
a stated goal.
2.3.1 Fault Tolerant Actuation
Whilst faults can occur in many areas of the system, faults within the actuation components
of a system are the impetus of this work. Actuation fault tolerance is central to the integrity
of safety-critical systems as they are the eﬀectors of control within a system.
As previously noted, there are several ways in which the reliability of the system can be
increased including:
• Increase the reliability of individual components,
• Introduce redundancy,
• Add fail-safe mechanisms,
• Incorporate fault tolerant control strategies.
There are occasions where some of these options are not feasible, particularly for actuators.
Development and testing may prove that critical components cannot provide the required
reliability, and fail-safe mechanisms are not a good solution for systems that cannot aﬀord
to cease operating (such as primary control surfaces in naturally unstable aircraft). Control
reconﬁguration as a sole strategy for accommodating actuator faults can also be unsuitable.
If the fault results in actuator failure, the control will not be able to inﬂuence the system.
Hence, redundancy may be necessary to ensure that the system meets reliability guidelines,
or in some cases it can prove more cost eﬀective to duplicate than to take another approach.
Redundancy is where an element in a system is replicated by analytical or physical means.
Physical redundancy is where multiple hardware channels are available in the system, and an-
alytical redundancy is where devices are duplicated by means of suitable mathematical models
(15). Analytical redundancy is only suitable for sensors, however, and is not applicable to
actuators. This is attributable to the fundamental diﬀerences between actuators and sensors.
Sensors deal with information, and the signals they produce may be processed or replicated
analytically to provide fault tolerance. Actuators deal with energy conversion, and as a result
actuator redundancy is essential if fault tolerance is to be achieved in the presence of actuator
failure. Actuation force will always be required to keep the system in control and bring it to
the desired state (1). No approach can avoid this fundamental requirement.
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Figure 2.3: Block diagram schematic of a redundant hydraulic actuator.
2.3.2 Traditional Actuation Redundancy
The usual way of providing fault tolerant actuation is through parallel replication (Figure 1.1).
Actuators that are capable of providing the required control action individually are arranged
in triplex or quadruplex with some form of consolidation to sum their output. Hence, if faults
occur within one or more of these actuators, a single remaining healthy actuator would be
able to meet the control requirement, avoiding an actuation system failure.
An example of this parallel redundancy is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which shows a multiple
redundancy hydraulic actuation system used within the Panavia Tornado's fast jet taileron
and rudder control, details of which can be found in (16) alongside other aircraft redundant
actuation examples. Only one lane of redundancy is shown within this diagram, and in
eﬀect there are four identical parallel channels. Each channel has four servo valves which
are charged by two independent hydraulic feeds. These servo valves control the position of
the ﬁrst-stage valves which are mechanically summed before feeding into four control valves
that modulate the position of the actuator ram. Failures are detected by comparing the
outputs of the actuators in a voting scheme, which determines if one of the channels is faulty
and subsequently removes this lane of actuation. At least three actuators are required to
make the voting detection scheme eﬀective, and as such this quadruplex actuation system can
remain full operational even with two individual actuator failures.
Whilst this redundancy provides fault tolerance, this over-engineering incurs penalties
as cost and weight are increased and subsequently eﬃciency is reduced. Also the use of
actuation technology can be restricted using this direct parallel redundancy approach. A move
towards more electric aircraft has been witnessed within recent years to improve weight, fuel
consumption, installation and maintenance costs (17; 18; 19). As a result, electro-mechanical
actuation has been used for control of secondary ﬂight surfaces in civil aircraft and helicopter
ﬂight control systems. However, a major concern regarding the use of electro-mechanical
actuation exists regarding actuator jamming. In hydraulic systems, each channel could be
disengaged on detection of a fault, removing its inﬂuence from the output. However, if
electro-mechanical actuators jam, they will eﬀectively ﬁx the whole parallel redundancy in
place. This issue has prevented their use in the control of primary surfaces (16). Research is
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Figure 2.4: Diagrammatic representation of capabilities and graceful degradation in HRA.
currently underway to reduce the risks of jamming faults within electro-mechanical actuators
(19).
These issues are well-documented in the aircraft industry, but they are by no means
speciﬁc to this application. If new forms of actuation are to be used in parallel redundant
conﬁgurations to provide fault tolerance for any high integrity system, the risks associated
with actuator jamming and associated costs of over-dimensioning will still exist.
2.3.3 High Redundancy Actuation
The High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) concept is a novel topological solution for fault
tolerant actuation. It is inspired by musculature, where the tissue is composed of many
individual cells, each of which provides a minute contribution to the overall contraction of the
muscle. These characteristics allow the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient to individual
cell damage.
This principle of co-operation in large numbers of low capability elements can be used in
fault tolerant actuation to provide intrinsic fault tolerance. HRA uses a high number of small
actuator elements, assembled in parallel and series, to form one high redundancy actuator
(see Figure 1.2).
When lock-up (jam) faults and loose (loss of force) faults occur in the actuation elements of
this structure, a reduction in overall system capability, in terms of travel and force respectively,
will result. However, the HRA has a capability that is in excess of the requirements of
the wider system, and as such, a designed fault level can be intrinsically tolerated. As the
quantity of faults in elements exceeds the pre-designed redundancy, the capability of the HRA
will fall below that required. The capability will not immediately reduce to zero, however,
the performance of the HRA will gracefully degrade. This idea of capability and graceful
degradation are summarised in Figure 2.4.
The HRA has similarities to partitioning of processing within disk drives i.e. Redundant
Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) schemes (20). System reliability and performance can
be improved by using multiple disk drives, where each drive is not capable of providing the
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required processing power, however, the entire array is in excess of the required capability,
providing a margin of redundancy that can be used for system back-up. However, the consol-
idation of processing power is a more diﬃcult task to achieve than consolidation of actuation
outputs, which can be summed mechanically.
Potential advantages of the HRA concept include:
• Increased reliability
• Reduced over-dimensioning and weight.
• Intrinsic accommodation of both lock-up and loose fault modes.
• Graceful degradation.
The HRA solution deals with the issues of actuator lock-up (that was a concern for imple-
mentation within primary critical systems) and has the potential to decrease cost and weight,
which may increase its suitability for further less safety-critical applications. However, these
beneﬁts are gained at a diﬀerent cost: the HRA is a complex system. Arranging actuators in
series introduces many more moving masses increasing the order of the system signiﬁcantly.
In addition, faults in actuators will change the behaviour of the HRA. For these reasons,
control of HRA has been perceived as an issue in the past. Other new research challenges
include:
• Quantiﬁcation of reliability in multi-actuator structures.
• Health monitoring.
• Technology choice and manufacture.
Many of these challenges have been addressed to some extent (3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 21; 22; 23), but
the research has particularly concentrated on the development of passive fault tolerant control
approaches.
2.4 Fault Tolerant Control
The term Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) is used to describe a control strategy that is designed
to retain stability and provide the required performance in the presence of system faults. A
number of survey papers exist (24; 25; 26; 27; 11; 28; 29; 30), which provided an overview of
FTC techniques at the time of their publication and several books provide an introduction to
the area (31; 32; 33). Figure 2.5 illustrates how FTC strategies may be sub-divided.
All methods of fault-tolerant control can be described as either passive or active. Passive
methods employ a single control law for all fault conditions, whereas active control methods
change the control law in response to faults. This may be through online selection, where the
controller is selected from a set of pre-designed control laws in response to faults, or through
online synthesis, where the controller is synthesised in real-time.
Further discussions of these approaches to fault tolerant control, and their respective
advantages and disadvantages, are made in the following subsections.
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Figure 2.5: Fault tolerant control strategies.
2.4.1 Passive Fault Tolerant Control
Passive FTC is where a single robust control law is designed to provide adequate stability
and performance under both nominal and fault conditions. This approach is attractive in
its simplicity. There is no requirement for fault detection or control reconﬁguration, making
its stability more easily veriﬁable for high-integrity applications. Examples of passive fault
tolerant control design can be found in (34; 35).
A well-designed, robust feedback controller will reduce the plant's output sensitivity to
measurement errors and disturbance inputs (28), and in this sense the system is error-tolerant.
If the system's behaviour under known fault conditions is also considered during the design
of the robust controller, then some fault-tolerance may also be achieved. Generally, the
design will only be able to accommodate a small number of faults, possibly only one (27).
Nonetheless, this may be suitable for restricted cases, perhaps where a fault has a small eﬀect
on the system or if the eﬀects of faults are similar to the eﬀects of disturbances on the system
(27).
This is applicable to the HRA concept. Within a truly high redundancy actuator, the
number of elements is very large (in the order of 100-1000), and as such each element's
inﬂuence on behaviour is small. Hence, the eﬀects of faults on the overall system will also be
small, and should be accommodated by robust control design.
When robust control is combined with redundant actuators, then this approach is referred
to as reliable control (36). Hence, the HRA, when combined with passive FTC, may be termed
reliable control. Examples of reliable control methods can be found in (37; 38; 39; 40; 41; 42).
Within these examples, redundant actuators are arranged in parallel (Figure 1.1) and as such,
the eﬀects of faults are mediated by force averaging. A variety of robust control techniques
are combined with redundancy e.g. Eigenvalue assignment (41), Linear quadratic regulator
(42; 39) and H∞ control (40). There are a variety of books detailing robust control methods
used in these examples (43).
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Figure 2.6: Typical active fault tolerant control scheme.
2.4.2 Active Fault Tolerant Control
In contrast to passive approaches, active fault tolerant strategies take action to accommodate
faults. Figure 2.6 gives a general schematic for active FTC (32). Active FTC compensates
for the eﬀects of faults either by selecting a pre-computed control law or by synthesising a
new control law in real-time, and as such, active FTC methods can be classiﬁed as online
selection (sometimes termed `projection-based control') or online synthesis (Figure 2.5). Both
approaches usually require some method of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) to identify
faults within the system and inform the reconﬁguration of control.
2.4.2.1 Fault Detection and Isolation Methods
Signiﬁcant research has been conducted into FDI methods, surveys of which may be found in
(44; 15; 45; 46; 47; 48; 10; 49; 50; 51; 52).
In general, most FDI procedures consist of the following three steps (36):
1. Residual generation - Residuals are produced by comparing the system signals to a
redundant signal.
2. Residual evaluation - The residuals are then compared to some predeﬁned thresholds to
produce symptoms.
3. Decision-making - Based on the symptoms, a decision is made as to which elements are
faulty (i.e., isolation).
As mentioned in the ﬁrst step, in order to identify a fault, the system signals must be compared
to another other signal. This comparison will be achieved through redundancy, which may
be physical or analytical.
Residual Generation through Physical Redundancy Physical redundancy involves
the replication of hardware, such as sensors or actuators. This was the ﬁrst method of FDI,
and is still widely in use, which is probably owing to its ease of implementation and high
certainty of fault detection in comparison to analytical methods. To detect faults in sensors
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and actuators, multiple independent hardware channels are used and their outputs compared
to produce residuals, although the technique is mainly aimed at sensor faults (1). These
residuals may be evaluated via comparison to a set of a priori residual values, which indicate
the fault type. The fault must then be isolated and the control strategy may be reconﬁgured.
Physical redundancy is a simple method of residual generation and beneﬁts from a high
certainty of fault detection. However, its disadvantages include (28):
• the added cost and weight of the redundancy,
• increased maintenance requirements,
• its inability to detect plant faults.
Residual Generation through Analytical Redundancy Analytical redundancy is a
quantitative approach that negates the need for redundant components by constructing re-
dundant signals from algebraic or temporal relationships between the states, and the inputs
and outputs of the system. There are three main methods by which analytical redundancy
can be achieved: parity relations; observers; or parameter estimation.
Parity Relations The parity space approach, pioneered by Chow and Willsky in the
early 1980s (53), uses direct redundancy to produce residuals. A sensor directly measures
a quantity and this quantity is also derived indirectly through the outputs of other avail-
able instruments, or both signals may be derived indirectly. The relationship between these
two quantities is established under non-faulty conditions to form a nominal model. Actual
measurements are then continuously checked against these relationships to produce residual
functions. This allows faults in both the system and its actuators and sensors to be detected.
Parity relations will only be eﬀective as a means of FDI when:
• accurate mathematical models of actuators and the system under control are available.
• a slightly redundant instrument set is available, allowing suﬃcient overlapping to pro-
duce parity relations.
• all the quantities in the relationships are knowable and/or measurable with a low level
of uncertainty.
• computation can be demanding in real-time application.
Observer-based methods The second approach to analytical FDI uses Luenberger
observers (in deterministic settings), or Kalman ﬁlters (in stochastic settings), to estimate
system outputs from measurement subsets in order to compare them to actual outputs and
produce residuals. The simplest observer-based scheme uses the most reliable sensor output
to reconstruct a whole measurement set for comparison to the actual measurements (45).
More complicated schemes may involve a number of observers producing estimates based
on each sensor output, examples of which can be found in (54). This allows multiple faults
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to be detected simultaneously. This method would require a considerable amount of compu-
tational eﬀort, especially if the number of sensors was large.
Other methods use parallel banks of ﬁlters based on diﬀerent system fault states to produce
multiple residuals (55), which can be analysed to determine which fault state is in eﬀect within
the system. This method again requires considerable processing power if the number of fault
states is large.
In addition to computational demands, a deep analytical understanding of the system
under control is required to implement observer methods. However, advantages exist as the
procedure of observer design is systematic; non-linear systems can be treated and a very
sensitive reaction to faults can be achieved.
Parameter Estimation Parameter estimation methods are based upon the concept
that faults in systems can manifest as changes to the parameter values of the system. Accurate
parametric models of the system are required in order to identify parameter changes. Surveys
of various methods using estimation principles such as ordinary and orthogonal least squares
methods can be found in (48; 56). Sliding-mode (57) and extended Kalman ﬁlter methods
(58) have also been suggested where the parameters are estimated in addition to the states.
As with observer-based methods, parameter estimation can be computationally demanding if
the system is complex.
Other, non-quantitative methods of residual generation are available such as Bayesian
networks or Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (ANN) (59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64), where models of the
system are not required, and historical data are used to train the system. However, care must
be taken to ensure the network receives suﬃcient training, and that the data sets used are
representative of system behaviour if the result is to be accurate and useful. The required
training periods and data requirements can be limiting factors.
Overall, analytical redundancy oﬀers the advantages of reduced cost and weight when
compared to physical methods. However, analytical methods often require accurate modelling
of the system and its uncertainties, a deep understanding or statistical knowledge of the
system, and extended design and tuning periods.
Residual Evaluation and Fault Isolation Once residuals have been produced, whether
via physical or analytical means, the residuals must be evaluated to determine whether a fault
has occurred and if so, the fault location must be determined.
Suitable residual thresholds may be determined through experimental or simulation tests.
The number of thresholds exceeded and the values of the residuals characterise the fault
symptoms and indicate the fault location. These thresholds will mainly depend upon the
level of uncertainty in the measurement and the modelling errors, i.e. if uncertainty levels
and modelling errors are high, higher thresholds will have to be implemented to ensure that the
FDI does not falsely report a fault. However, if the thresholds are raised then the possibility
of missing a fault is increased. The balance between the risk of false-alarm and missed-alarm
is diﬃcult to achieve (27). A number of techniques have been proposed to tackle this problem.
(65; 66; 67; 68) suggest methods that decouple the uncertainties from the fault signals, thus
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allowing thresholds to be lowered, making the system more sensitive to faults. Additionally,
(69; 70; 71) propose more robust FDI methods that improve fault detection in the presence of
modelling uncertainties. However, these methods do not work in the presence of both model
uncertainties and disturbances (72). Methods proposed in (72; 73) claim to produce robust
FDI schemes in the presence of both.
Other solutions to this problem may be found in adaptive thresholds, where each threshold
becomes a function of the measurable quantities (74; 68). If a residual exceeds its threshold,
then a symptom can be derived.
Learning-based methods such as neural networks may also be employed in diagnosing
faults from quantitatively produced residuals, resulting in a hybrid fault detection scheme
(75; 76), care must be taken to train the network appropriately.
Statistical testing of residuals is another option for fault diagnosis and isolation, where
the likelihood of the fault state may be produced (55; 44; 77). This approach is applied and
further discussed in Chapter 6.
2.4.2.2 Online Selection & Online Synthesis Control Algorithms
Having detected a fault and isolated its location and nature, an active FTC system then alters
the control so that the stability and performance of the system can be maintained at an ideal
or acceptable degraded level.
Control law re-scheduling, multiple-model and interacting multiple-model approaches are
all examples of pre-computed active FTC methods. In each case, a number of control laws are
designed oine to meet requirements under certain fault situations and these laws are enforced
according to the fault state of the system as detected by the FDI algorithm. Examples of
these approaches can be found in (78; 79; 80; 81; 82).
There are numerous online-estimation based methods for control reconﬁguration, including
pseudo-inverse methods (83; 84), eigenstructure assignment (85; 86; 87), model-following (88)
and sliding mode control (89; 90).
There are advantages and disadvantages to both online selection and synthesis approaches.
Pre-computed control laws are only useful for anticipated faults, whereas an online scheme
could adapt to an unexpected fault. However, there is a risk of instability associated with
active fault tolerant control methods. The FDI unit may diagnose a fault incorrectly, leading
to a mis-reconﬁguration of the control system where the stability of the closed loop system is
not guaranteed. Pre-computed strategies may mitigate this risk by only including controllers
that will maintain the closed-loop stability in any fault case (91). However, controller design
in this case may prove to be conservative.
The two approaches have diﬀering computational requirements. The memory requirement
for storing a priori designs must be considered in the pre-computed case, whereas computa-
tional power is more of a critical factor for online-synthesis. Generally, memory requirement
is less of an issue than processing capability.
The transition period is another consideration. The time taken between fault detection
and control reconﬁguration is vital, as in this time actuators could saturate or further damage
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could be done to the system. Therefore, the quicker the new control law can be achieved the
better, and online synthesis will be slower than pre-loaded methods.
This transition time is one of the main problems with active FTC. Another problem is
the unwanted transients induced during the reconﬁguration process. These transients may be
harmful to the system itself, its environment or its human operators. This issue has not been
addressed to a great extent, but one paper that treats this issue is (92).
2.5 Multi-Agent Systems
The active fault tolerant control approach described within Chapter 7 is based upon multi-
agent concepts, and as such it is useful to provide an overview of multi-agent systems in order
to establish a foundation for the work that follows.
The concept of an agent was ﬁrst given by Minksy (93). In his book, 'The Society of
Mind', he introduced the term agents to describe the workings of the mind. Each agent is
only capable of a simple process, but these agents are numerous and diversely capable, and it is
through the interaction of these agents that true intelligence can be achieved. The principles of
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) were further developed in the disciplines of distributed artiﬁcial
intelligence and object-oriented programming 30 years ago, since then it has emerged as a
discipline in its own right. Today, MAS concepts have become not only an important subject
of research, but of industrial and commercial application in a diverse range of ﬁelds (94).
This section aims to introduce issues that are central to MASs for use within the active
fault tolerant control approach of Chapter 7.
2.5.1 The Agent Concept
There is still some controversy within the agent community as to the exact deﬁnition of an
agent and what qualities an agent must possess. There is a general consensus that auton-
omy is essential within an agent, however, the attribution of other qualities is still under
debate. However, Jennings, Sycara and Wooldridge (95) provide a deﬁnition of an agent,
which emphasises the fundamental characteristics of the agent philosophy:
`An agent is a physical or virtual entity situated in an environment that is capable
of ﬂexible autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives' (95)
This deﬁnition encompasses three key features:
• Situation - the term, used in this context, means that the agent exists within an envi-
ronment which it receives sensory information from and has the capability to act upon.
• Flexibility - the agent is described as ﬂexible as it not only responds to its environment,
but also exhibits opportunistic, goal-directed behaviour. Hence the agent is not only
reactive, but pro-active. The term ﬂexible also encompasses the agents social ability.
An agent should be capable of interaction with other agents in order to achieve their
objectives, and aid the activities of others.
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Figure 2.7: Multi-Agent system.
• Autonomy - the agent should act without the direct intervention of humans or other
agents and have control over its own behaviours.
Certain aspects of this deﬁnition may be more important than others according to the ap-
plication, but it is the presence of all these features that separates the agent concept from
related ﬁelds such as object-orientated, distributed control and expert systems. The agent's
situation, ﬂexibility and autonomy resembles the concept of closed-loop control, as a closed-
loop controller also senses and acts, and is designed to satisfy some objective. However, there
are important diﬀerences within the agent concept. The most obvious diﬀerence is the social
interaction and negotiation between agents. Also, the agent philosophy is strongly associated
with localisation, as an agent often has a partial representation of the overall problem. This
point is emphasised within (96).
Other features that are routinely attributed to agents include learning and mobility. How-
ever, it is thought that these aspects should not be included in a strict deﬁnition of an agent as
their applicability is often questionable. In some applications learning may be of paramount
importance, for others, it is very undesirable. For example, the self modiﬁcation of an agent's
behaviour would be unthinkable in terms of safety for systems such as Georgeﬀ's Procedural
Reasoning System (PRS) (97) which provides air traﬃc control. Also, the ability for an agent
to move from one computer to another and be capable of execution on various platforms
may be desirable in applications such as e-commerce, but unnecessary and unfeasible in most
applications.
2.5.2 Multi-Agent Systems
A multi-agent system, as its name suggests, is a collection of agents that collaborate to achieve
an objective. As each agent has only a partial knowledge and inﬂuence on the system, the
agents must work together to solve problems that are beyond their individual capabilities.
This point is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.8: Multi-Agent applications.
Jennings, Sycara and Wooldrige go further in their deﬁnition of a MAS by specifying
that, in addition to their localised nature, MASs have no global system control; their data is
decentralised and they operate asynchronously (95).
2.5.3 Typical Applications
Multi-agent concepts are being researched or applied in a diverse range of applications, span-
ning industrial, commercial and public sectors. Generally however, the application of MASs
falls into one or more of the categories shown in Figure 2.8. These categories are discussed
below.
Formation Control MASs are suited to applications where a good degree of modularity
exists. This is certainly true of formation control applications, where the spatial arrangement
of multiple-robots (98; 99), aircraft, satellites or other autonomous vehicles needs to be man-
aged, as each entity can be considered a module with its own state variables, and indeed it is
employed within these ﬁelds.
Knowledge Management & Decision Support Today's world has become knowl-
edge rich. There is an abundance of information available in databases and via the Internet.
The sheer volume of data can be prohibitive, as it becomes increasingly diﬃcult and time con-
suming to ﬁnd the required information. Knowledge management is required to bypass the
tedious and often ineﬃcient task of search directing and ﬁnd information in a more extensive
and systematic manner. Agents can perform this management by ﬁltering and gathering in-
formation on the behalf of a user whilst also adapting to the user's behaviours and preferences,
learning what is useful and what is not.
Decision support takes knowledge management one step further. There are many large
distributed systems such as energy distribution networks, environmental emergency services
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and air-traﬃc control that require real-time decisions to be made based on an overabundance
of information. Agents can be deployed in these cases to manage and ﬁlter this data and
present summarised relevant information in a timely manner whilst also making lower-level
autonomous decisions or giving warning of the development of undesired events. Examples
of agent based knowledge management and decision support applications can be found in
(100; 101; 102; 103).
Interaction Simulation Some large-scale modelling scenarios contain elements that
interact in a co-operative, negotiative, or competitive manner such as business, social and
ecological environment models. These elements can be eﬀectively simulated through the
use of agents, which allows social interaction between entities that have individual beliefs,
pragmatical abilities and agendas.
Negotiation Agents The social and negotiative abilities of agent technology exploited
in interaction modelling, can also be used to orchestrate and negotiate agreements with other
agents, systems or humans on the behalf of a user. Agents, given their own agenda, can
negotiate terms much more quickly and eﬃciently than human counterparts. Applications of
this nature would include e-commerce transactions (104), meeting scheduling and health care
applications.
Co-operative Control Perhaps the most relevant application with respect to the HRA,
co-operative control encompasses those applications that have distributed modules that need
to work together to achieve a common goal. Examples of this include process control (105),
manufacturing (106), multiple degrees-of-freedom robots (107), and cellular robots (108).
2.5.4 Central Concepts in Multi-Agent Systems
2.5.4.1 Agent Architectures
Having deﬁned what an agent is and its general characteristics in Section 2.5, the inner
workings of an agent may now be considered. This can be termed as the architecture of
an agent. Agent architectures describe the data structures within an agent, the possible
operations performed on these data structures and the control of ﬂow of data between them.
A formalisation of agent architecture can be made by taking a state-based perspective.
The formalisations made here are based on those made by (94). The environment in which
the agent is situated can be characterised by a set of environment states:
S = {s1, s2,, ...} (2.1)
At any given time it is assumed that the environment is in one of these states. The agent
senses the environment in some manner, through a sensory set and forms some perception
based on this sensory information. These perceptions are represented as a set:
P = {p1, p2,, ...} (2.2)
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Figure 2.9: Abstract agent architecture: Purely reactive agent.
Figure 2.10: Abstract agent architecture: Agent that maintains state.
It is worth noting that P does not necessarily equal S. Due to the localisation of sensory
ability intrinsic in the multi-agent deﬁnition, there will be states of the environment which a
particular agent will not be able to diﬀerentiate between.
Finally, the actions which the agent is capable of applying to the environment is similarly
represented by:
A = {a1, a2,, ...} (2.3)
Based on these formalisations, there are two basic agent architectures: purely reactive
agents and agents that maintain state.
Figure 2.9 gives an abstracted representation of a purely reactive agent architecture.
Purely reactive agents perform actions based entirely on the perceived current state i.e. no
consideration of previous environmental states is taken. This behaviour is represented by the
functions:
sense : S → P
act : P → A (2.4)
Agents with state however, have an architecture akin to that depicted in Figure 2.10.
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The agent now has an internal data structure, which is used to record history of the agent's
perceptions. This gives the agent an internal state:
I = {i1, i2,, ...} (2.5)
The agent's actions are now not only based on the current perception, but are also aﬀected
by the internal state of the agent. The sensed environment is still mapped to P as before.
However, the action is now based on I, which is the mapping of the current perceived state
and internal state.
sense : S → P
next : I × P → I
act : I → A (2.6)
These formalisations describe agent architectures in the abstract. However, they do not
describe how actions are decided upon or how perceptions and internal states are formed.
These aspects will be discussed by considering the main agent architecture classiﬁcations in
the following sections.
Logic-Based Agents Logic-based agents were developed from the artiﬁcial intelligence
planning ﬁeld, that concerns itself with creating intelligence that decides what actions to
take. Most logic-based agents are based on the symbolic representations made by Newell &
Simon (109). Generally, an agent of this type will create a symbolic model of its environment,
represented by some ﬁrst-order predicate logic, based on its perceptions. The agent will also
have a list of possible actions, symbolically formed, that specify the circumstances under
which the action can be taken and the eﬀects that action would have on the environment. A
planning algorithm takes the model, the action set and a state representation of its goal and
plans the required actions which would result in the attainment of that goal state.
Hence, the agent formulates a plan of action from ﬁrst principles and will produce an
optimum solution to the problem. However, the time taken to formulate symbolic models
of the environment and logically deduce what actions are required restricts this schemes use
within a real-time environment, as the environment state may change during the lengthy
planning period.
Behaviour-Based Agents Behaviour-based architectures do not reason about their en-
vironment, avoiding the environment modelling and action planning present in logic-based
agents. Instead, these architectures combine simple behaviours to produce complex intelli-
gent overall behaviour. This is commonly termed as emergence.
The most widely known behaviour based architecture is subsumption (110), a represen-
tation of which is shown in Figure 2.11. The architecture consists of a number of ﬁnite-state
machines, which contain task accomplishing behaviours. These behaviours are arranged in
layers, in order of their abstraction with the most reactive, basal behaviour on the bottom
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Figure 2.11: Subsumption
layer. Each layer receives the sensory input, which is still formally represented as a perception.
However, this perception is not a symbolic representation of the environment but more akin
to raw sensory data. The perceptions map to an action within each layer in the same manner
as described in 2.4. The higher layers inhibit those below it, and as such a behaviour's action
is executed if it is not inhibited.
The computational simplicity of this scheme results in reaction times more than suﬃcient
for real-time implementation. The resultant behaviour is robust and timely, but not optimal
as it was in logic-based agents (111). In addition, goal-directed behaviour is diﬃcult to achieve
through subsumptive architectures, as the state is not retained.
Practical Reasoning Agents Deliberative agents, in contrast to reactive agents, reason
about what goals they want to achieve and how they will achieve them. Logic-based agents are
the extreme embodiment of deliberative architectures. However, the most prominent delib-
erative architecture is the Belief-Desire-Intention model (BDI) which is a practical reasoning
agent (112). Practical reasoning architectures are based upon theories regarding the reason-
ing capabilities of humans. These theories often attribute attitudes to the human thought
processes such as beliefs, desire and intentions and regard the interaction of these attitudes
as the root of rationality and planning.
Figure 2.12 gives a representation of the BDI architecture. The beliefs of the agent are
formed from its current and previous perceptions. Desires represent the options, based on
its current beliefs, that are available to the agent. The desires are then ﬁltered to form the
agent's intention i.e. its chosen course of action. This intention will be executed until the
environment changes and its beliefs are altered.
This architecture allows the agent to achieve goal-directed behaviour, whilst also reacting
to its environment to a greater degree than that aﬀorded by logic-based agents, as no complete
symbolic environment model is formed. However, the delay between perception changes and
intention formation can still be inhibiting for real-time use in highly dynamic environments.
Hybrid agents Hybrid agents attempt to combine both deliberative and reactive archi-
tectures in order to produce a reactive agent capable of achieving long-term goals. This is
frequently realised through layering of the architecture. This may be vertically or horizon-
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Figure 2.12: Beliefs-Desires-Intentions architecture
Figure 2.13: Hybrid architectures
tally as shown in Figure 2.13. The reactive layer is the lowest layer, which in itself, may be a
number of reactive layers arranged as in subsumption. Higher layers deal with the formation
of more complex beliefs from the sensory data, plan formation and communication with other
agents. This architecture provides the ﬁrst obvious structure for implementing co-operative
multi-agent systems.
An example of a hybrid architecture is proposed by Franklin (112). Hybrid architectures
potentially provides all the attributes necessary to classify as a MAS: autonomy, reactivity,
pro-activity and social ﬂexibility. However, the co-ordination of the layer's actions is an issue
that can be diﬃcult to solve. The co-ordination of the agents must also be considered, but
these issues are more associated with the structure of the agency, which is discussed within
the next section.
2.5.4.2 Agency Structures
Agency structures deﬁne the conﬁguration of multi-agent systems and the interactions between
the individual agents. Hence, this section will introduce the central ideas regarding the
architecture of agencies, communication between agents and the co-ordination of their actions.
Communication Communication between agents is key, as it allows agents to share infor-
mation and co-ordinate their actions to achieve individual or global goals that are beyond
their individual capabilities.
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Forms of Communication Communication in MASs can exist at a number of levels,
ranging in sophistication. A MAS at its most primitive can contain no direct communication
at all (113; 114). Agents, instead infer and speculate on other agent's plans and states
based on observation of the agent's behaviour and its sensory knowledge of the environment.
Communication of this sort is present in the ﬁeld of game theory. However, communication of
this sort can be very prohibitive to agent reasoning. One only has to examine a game of poker
or bridge to realise that speculating on an opponent's or partner's hand and intentions based
on their behaviour and the cards played, that reasoning and planning can become complex
even in a situation where the rules and objectives are clearly deﬁned. The situation also
becomes highly inﬂated when large numbers of agents are involved.
Another indirect form of communication is through a shared data structure, where agents
write their knowledge and plans and can access that of others. This method is called black-
boarding and will be considered further later in this section.
Direct communication at its most basic level involves the swapping of primitive signals,
with ﬁnite values and ﬁxed interpretations in order to communicate basic intentions. A scheme
with this level of communication was implemented by (112).
Message based communication is the next level of communication possible. Agents util-
ising this approach pass messages regarding their state, observations or plans depending on
the purpose of their communication. The complexity of the messages depends on the charac-
teristics of the agents involved. An early example of message based communication between
agents is the Actors system (115).
Finally, the most sophisticated form of communication available to MASs is through high-
level languages that are based on natural language formations, speech act-theory and conver-
sational theory.
The communication made can be synchronous or asynchronous and be addressed to a
single recipient or have multiple destinations. These features are determined by the agent
and agency architecture, which ultimately determines the structure of interaction between
the agents. In general, modes of communication may be:
• Point-to-point - In point-to-point communications the message is addressed to a speciﬁc
agent. This type of communication is common in autonomous agency architectures
(Section 2.5.4.2) that frequently contain deliberative agents.
• Broadcast - Messages can be broadcast to all rather than addressed to any particular
recipient. This is useful in an environment where the presence of agents is uncertain
and is utilised in schemes such as contract-net.
• Multi-recipient - As its name suggests, multi-cast communications are those made to a
particular subset of agents. This may be a group of agents whose address is known to
the sender and are known to be an interested party in the message content, or may be
a group of agents determined by a description of the the service required as in broker
architectures.
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Communication Protocols and Languages Communication protocols are necessary
to support the interaction of agents. There are two levels of protocol needed: one to support
the communication linkages of the agent and another that supports the communication of
information.
Probably the most well-known of the former is contract net (116). This protocol provides
a method of dynamically assigning manager and contractor roles to agents, which speciﬁes the
subsequent form of their communications, in order to achieve tasks in a co-ordinated manner.
Agent communication languages (ACL) are the protocols that support the exchange of
information. Well-known ACLs include:
• Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) - KQML was developed in the
early 1990s through the U.S. government's DARPA knowledge sharing program whose
goal was to develop a high level language based on speech act theory to aid agent co-
operation. It has been frequently commented however, that KQML lacked the precision,
consistency and deﬁnity required for wide-spread, inter-operable used. Thus, in recent
years, the use of KQML has been superseded by FIPA-ACL.
• FIPA-ACL - FIPA-ACL (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) is also based on
speech act theory and has similarities with KQML. However it was directly created
using a rigorous semantic formula, which removed the ambiguity present in KQML.
FIPA is a standardisation body which began its operations in 1995. It speciﬁes 22
performatives that deﬁne the message content's type, and the expected subsequent ﬂow
of communication. Readers who wish to know more are directed to the FIPA website
(117).
Content Languages and Ontologies The actual content of the message could be in
any language, although FIPA has proposed standards for four diﬀerent content languages:
FIPA-Semantic Language (FIPA-SL); Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF); Resource Deﬁ-
nition Framework (RDF) and Constraint Choice Language (CCL). The choice of language is
important, as it deﬁnes how the ontology is shaped. The ontology is the speciﬁcation of terms
for objects, concepts and relationships necessary if the agents are to understand each other.
Co-ordination It is not enough to communicate within a MAS. Co-ordination of the indi-
vidual agent's actions is necessary if tasks are to be achieved eﬃciently whilst meeting global
constraints.
Various methods of attaining co-ordination exist, and often they are closely related to the
architecture of the agency. The main approaches to co-ordination in general are (94):
• Direct supervision - Co-ordination can be enforced on a MAS by creating an agent that
has more perspective on the workings of the system. This agent can then direct the
sharing of information and assert some level of control over the actions of the agents.
This creates a hierarchy, which is undesirable particularly in large systems where the
bottle necking of information will occur.
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• Mediation - Intermediary agents may be utilised to co-ordinate agents actions by con-
trolling the ﬂow of information between agents and matching an agent's needs and
resources to other agents.
• Reactive co-ordination - Co-ordinated group behaviour can emerge by agents reacting
independently with basic behaviours to its stimuli. This is evident in ﬂocking, where
ﬂocks of birds turn with perceived synchronism due to the individuals sensing its neigh-
bours movement and reacting to it.
• Standardised co-ordination - The standardisation of procedures in response to deﬁned
situations brings co-ordination into a multi-agent system in the same way as cultural
norms and social laws bring order into human societies, without the added complexities
of true free-will. This standardisation can be built into the system, or enforced by some
form of supervision.
• Mutual adjustment - Finally, co-ordination can be achieved through information and
plan sharing between agents. In this scenario, no agent has control over others or
the ﬂow of information. The mutual adjustment might be realised through negotiative
communications between the agents or through agent modelling, where each agent plans
around the plans of others. This is known as distributed multi-agent planning (118).
Agency Architecture The manner in which an agency is organised ultimately determines
how eﬀectively the individual agents communicate and co-operate. There are many ways in
which agents may be organised. In general, however, architectures tend to ﬁt into one of three
categories as deﬁned by (111): hierarchical, federated and autonomous architectures. These
categories will be discussed in the following subsections.
Hierarchical Architectures An hierarchical agency architecture is where at least one
agent, or group of agents have authority over another (Figure 2.14). Traditional control
structures and supervisor systems use hierarchical control, where certain elements of the
system will be superior to others. As discussed earlier, this centralisation of decision-making
has issues associated with reliability and ﬂexibility that MAS concepts attempt to avoid.
Indeed, the idea of hierarchy within an agency architecture is not strictly in-keeping with the
central ideas of multi-agent systems. However, it can be diﬃcult to leave the hierarchical
mindset, particularly when the application is arranged in an hierarchical fashion as it often
is in manufacturing. Several hierarchical multi-agent designs have been proposed in this
application area (119; 120; 121).
Autonomous Agency Architectures Autonomous agency architectures are the an-
tithesis of hierarchy based architectures. No agent within the architecture is controlled or
managed by another. Hence, these architectures are the apotheosis of multi-agent concepts.
Figure 2.15 illustrates a typical autonomous agency architecture.
All agents make independent decisions regarding their actions and with whom they com-
municate. They communicate directly with any other agent in the agency at will. Each agent
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Figure 2.14: Hierarchical agency architecture
Figure 2.15: Autonomous agency architecture
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Figure 2.16: Blackboard-based agency architecture
will build up knowledge of the other agents i.e. there is no shared data structure that contains
information about the agents or knowledge they acquire.
Communication and co-ordination of the agents actions in autonomous schemes is much
more diﬃcult than in hierarchical agencies. However, the interactions between the agents are
much more ﬂexible.
Federated Architectures The communication and co-ordination diﬃculties present
in autonomous architectures can be aided by compromising a little on the ﬂexibility of the
system. Federated architectures allow agents to make independent decisions. However, it
involves some mechanism for the sharing of data. This is often realised through an agent that
controls the interaction between the resource agents. Several schemes have been proposed
that implement this federated approach, these include:
• Blackboards
• Facilitators
• Brokers
• Contract-net
Each of these schemes will be discussed brieﬂy here.
Blackboards The blackboard was an early solution proposed by (122) to agent co-
ordination problems. Agents within a blackboard system are considered to be specialists
in their knowledge or capabilities. The agents use a shared data structure on which the
information they possess is written. It is analogous to a problem being solved by a group of
experts around a blackboard. The problem and initial information is presented on the board
and the expert that is capable of beginning to solve it does so on the board. Other experts
step in when their particular expertise is applicable until the problem is solved. However, no
communication takes place between the experts.
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Figure 2.17: Facilitator agency architecture
Figure 2.18: Broker agency architecture
Facilitators Figure 2.17 shows a typical agency architecture that uses facilitator agents.
The facilitators route messages amongst agents and agencies and co-ordinate their action.
This provides a reliable message routing system and allows agents to send and receive mes-
sages in their preferred format. The inter-agent communication that was present within the
autonomous agency architecture is lost within this scheme, removing some of their indepen-
dence regarding whom they communicate with.
Brokers A broker scheme works much like brokers in the real world operate. Figure 2.18
gives a general representation of a broker scheme. Within a MAS that utilises broker agents,
there will be a group of agents that are able to provide a range of services and a group of
client agents that require some service. The broker will receive requests from client agents
and ﬁnd suitable service agents to execute the request. Brokers may then continue to mediate
the interaction between the service and client agents, or allow communication to be directly
linked between the two.
The FIPA abstract architecture (123) is essentially a broker type architecture designed
to facilitate inter-operability between agent based systems developed by diﬀerent companies
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Figure 2.19: FIPA abstract architecture
(see Figure 2.19). The agents exist on a platform that provides some message transport
system that allows them to communicate with each other. On each platform there exists two
utility agents: a agent management service agent (AMS), and a directory facilitator (DF).
The former is compulsory, but the DF is optional. The AMS works as a white pages, keeping
a record of all the agents registered on the platform. The DF is a yellow pages, maintaining
a record of the services that each agent can provide. The agents communicate with the DF
to ﬁnd agents that can provide the services they require, after which the communication is
directed agent-agent.
Contract-net Contract-net protocol was ﬁrst presented by (116), and provides a more
ﬂexible federated architecture. Agents using contract-net protocol dynamically assume one of
two roles: manager and contractor. A manager agent is given a task to perform and decides if
the task can be decomposed into sub-tasks. The manager then calls for bids from the contrac-
tor agents to perform the task/sub-tasks. The contractor agents then reply, communicating
how eﬀectively they could perform the task and the manager awards the contracts optimally.
The contractor then performs the task and reports to the manager on the tasks results.This,
however, is a communication intensive method of agent co-ordination.
Comparison of Agency Architectures Inevitably, the speciﬁc application will play
a large role in deciding which agency architecture is most eﬀective, but there are some general
conclusions one can make regarding these architectures.
Autonomous agency architectures are the ideal embodiment of MAS concepts, providing
agents with high independence and ﬂexibility. However, their direct communication links
can be inhibiting in agencies that contain agents with heterogeneous communication forms.
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In addition, in agencies containing very high numbers of agents, it is foreseeable that direct
communication may become cumbersome.
Some degree of the independence aﬀorded by autonomous approaches is lost within fed-
erated architectures, as agents must communicate through some interaction controlling agent
or a shared data structure and thus agent interaction is now restricted. Delegation of com-
munication routing and some level of task co-ordination present in federated approaches is
intended to free the agents, allowing them to concentrate on their other activities. This
does not compromise the non-hierarchical nature of MAS concepts, as the intermediary agent
does not have control over individual agent decisions. This is particularly true of schemes
that implement protocol like contract-net, where the interaction structure of the system is
dynamic.
Hierarchical architectures, however, do not strictly adhere to the concepts of multi-agent
systems. Nonetheless, their use within existing hierarchical systems is understandable. If the
full advantages of MAS concepts are to be realised however, it is necessary that a move to
federated or autonomous architectures is made.
2.5.5 Multi-Agent Systems & Fault Tolerant Control
The use of multi-agent concepts in fault tolerant systems is a relatively small, but growing
subset of agent applications.
There are innumerable instances where agent techniques have been used in FDI schemes
(124; 125; 126; 127; 128; 129; 130). This may be due to the similarities that fault detection
has to decision support applications. In many of these FDI schemes, the agents diagnose
faults through data analysis and present fault information either to operators or separate
reconﬁguration mechanisms. Rarely do the agents both diagnose and take measures to com-
pensate the fault within the system, a point acknowledged by (131). This seems perverse, as
the multi-agent ethos is that agents should both sense and act in their environment.
There are some examples of agents diagnosing faults, and taking remedial action within
power network applications (132). Power networks contain many local controllers in the form
of automatic voltage regulators and power system stabilisers which regulate the voltage with-
out consideration of network-wide conditions. Eﬀorts have been made to use agent concepts
to distribute and automate the emergency control decisions to these local units, which may
shed loads to retain the stability of the network.
Agent techniques have attracted much attention in power network applications (133; 134;
135; 136; 137; 138; 139), and likewise in networked control systems. This is due to the
structure and uncertain architecture of these problems suits the localised perspective that
agent concepts oﬀer. The use of multi-agent concepts in process control is also quite common
(140; 141; 142; 143; 144) as these applications value the modularity, ﬂexibility and openness
that agents can provide (144). The issues tackled within these applications are special and
somewhat distinct to the challenges in normal fault tolerant applications. Agents are mainly
used to provide encapsulation to tackle compatibility issues in these applications, which often
require new system elements to be added to old infrastructure, and to manage communication
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links in uncertain environments.
However, the basic agent concept has something to oﬀer those control applications which
are not necessarily concerned with open architecture issues. Multi-agent concepts can be used
to provide structuring, which is often neglected within the ﬁeld of control engineering, as the
problem is usually stated in the form of a single plant model (145). Its localised autonomous
qualities can also be used to integrate fault detection and control reconﬁguration into the
structure that it provides.
Despite this, multi-agent techniques have been under-utilised in control and automation
(143), although a few examples do exist (146).
It is possible that agents are not used in fault tolerant control in particular due to the
safety criticality these situations. Multi-agent techniques may be percieved as too ﬂexible
and unpredictable for use within such applications. However, in the author's opinion, this
is not the main cause. As mentionined within Section 2.5.1, ﬂexibility is not an essential
characteristic of multi-agent systems, the degree to which the agency is allowed to adapt
may be determined by the design. In addition, the safety critical risks of autonomy are just
as present in online synthesis methods, which are more wide-spread. A more likely cause
of this lack of application may be the fact that fault tolerance measures are often applied
separately from the structuring of the control, and thus it is not obvious that both detection
and reconﬁguration should be distributed in these cases.
(144) suggests that factors such as the diﬃculty to meet strict real-time requirements in
existing agent systems, the complexity of the control problem decomposition, and the rarity
of redundant resources, may be at the root of this insuﬃcient development. This lack of
redundancy is not an issue within the HRA, and decomposition into sub-systems is also clear.
Hence, the HRA seems suitable for use with multi-agent concepts.
Further rationale for the use of multi-agent concepts in the control of HRA is given in
Chapter 7.
2.6 Conclusions
Fault tolerance is of growing importance to automated systems in order to provide safe,
reliable and ultimately more cost eﬀective operation. The most eﬀective means of achieving
fault tolerance is through systematic analysis of the system and its reliability and fault modes,
leading to integration of fault tolerance in the design process.
There are several ways fault tolerance can be achieved, either through the strengthening
of components, the inclusion of redundant channels, through fault tolerant control, or through
a combination of these methods. Fault tolerant actuation for high integrity systems is usually
achieved through redundancy, but the control of these redundant elements is also important.
A great deal of research has been undertaken in the ﬁelds of fault tolerant control and fault
detection and diagnosis. However, the consolidation of both fault detection and fault tolerant
control is not usually considered (30). Fault tolerant control methods often assume perfect
information regarding the fault state is available without any delays, and similarly, fault
detection schemes often assume that the information they produce can be utilised eﬀectively
39
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW
by any control reconﬁguration scheme. Integration of these two elements is important if a
fault tolerant control scheme is to operate correctly.
The HRA concept presents an opportunity for integrating redundancy into system design
in order to produce a more reliable and eﬃcient solution. By combining the HRA with
a multi-agent inspired active fault tolerant control framework, an integrated fault tolerant
control design can also be achieved which is tailored to the structure of the system.
An overview of multi-agent systems has been provided, which has demonstrated that
agent concepts can be applied to innumerable applications and take a myriad of forms. The
suitability of the agent/agency structures and concepts for use with the HRA will be discussed
further in Chapter 7.
40
Chapter 3
Modelling of High Redundancy
Actuation
In order to understand and control complex systems, a good mathematical representation
of the system is essential. A model should allow the user to form conclusions and control
strategies that would be valid for the real system and as such it should describe and predict the
behaviour of the system when it is subjected to external disturbances. Yet it is inevitable that
the model will not be a perfect representation of the physical system, due to lack of knowledge
of certain behavioural aspects or deliberate simpliﬁcation. Fortunately, the model must only
be suﬃciently accurate to achieve its purpose, whilst avoiding unnecessary complexity.
The work presented in this Thesis requires two types of model: one for simulation, and
another for control synthesis. These two purposes have diﬀering speciﬁcations. A relatively
simple model is required for control design, to reduce the complexity of the design process
and resultant controller. The simulation model, however, should represent the system over a
broader range of operation in order to be test-bed for the control designed using the simpliﬁed
model.
In addition to these requirements, the models must be suﬃciently manipulable in order to
represent diﬀerent HRA conﬁgurations and sizes, and various fault modes. To satisfy these
requirements the following methodology is taken:
1. Single Element Model: Firstly, a linear time-invariant (LTI) model of a single actuation
element is derived from ﬁrst principles. This model is then experimentally veriﬁed and
its parameters identiﬁed.
2. Model Reduction: This LTI model is then reduced through physical assumptions to
produce an element model suitable for control design.
3. Non-linearities: The inclusion of some non-linearities to the element model is made,
producing the full-order non-linear single element model to be used for simulation.
4. HRA Modelling: A procedure for creating HRA conﬁguration models which can be
applied to any of the single element models is developed.
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5. Fault Modelling: The modelling of a number of fault modes is then made, and the
impact of the various fault modes on certain HRA conﬁgurations discussed.
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 cover the ﬁrst two stages in the modelling procedure. The ﬁrst section
addresses the modelling of a closed-bobbin moving coil actuator, and the second a cut-bobbin
actuator. This is as both have been used at diﬀerent times throughout the project.
In the early stages of the project the moving coil actuator used was the LAL 30 (147).
This actuator is unusual as the coil is wound on a closed-bobbin, which forms a closed-
loop around the core. This complicates the electrical and magnetic characteristics of the
system, and renders the standard series resistance and inductor representation of the electrical
characteristics of a standard cut-coil actuator invalid.
The closed-bobbin moving coil actuator has been modelled previously in (8). However, the
model presented there approximates the electrical characteristics with a third order transfer
function ﬁtted to experimental data. The model derived here developed so from ﬁrst princi-
ples, maintaining the physical relevance of the parameters. This approach has not been found
within the literature. Hence, this model and its subsequent reductions and extensions form
an original contribution to knowledge.
In the later stages of the project a more standard cut-bobbin actuator was used for the
experimental rig. The modelling of this actuator is also presented in this chapter and will be
the model used throughout the subsequent control design chapters.
Section 3.3 covers stage 3 of the modelling procedure by introducing non-linearities that
can be applied to either actuator model, and their respective approximations. Subsequently,
Section 3.4 addresses stage four, producing a modelling procedure for forming HRAs.
Finally, the fault modelling is presented in Section 3.5. This fault modelling also forms
some contribution to knowledge. The use of actuators in series is unusual and thus faults in
serial actuators are not commonly covered in the literature, whereas this conﬁguration is a
particular feature of the HRA concept. The fault types included here in serial actuation have
been previously covered in the work of (7). However, these faults were introduced into an
electromechanical system, and thus consideration of these fault types within electromagnetic
actuation forms a new contribution to the project.
3.1 Modelling of a Closed-Bobbin Moving Coil Actuator
3.1.1 Operating Principles of a Moving Coil Actuator
The application of moving coil actuators was originally limited to voice coils within loud-
speakers and similar devices, but became popular in hard disk drives, servo controlled valves,
and mirror position for lasers. The short stroke of moving coil actuators limited their use
to applications of this kind, where the travel requirement was low. However, technological
advances in magnetic materials have made the production of actuators with longer strokes
feasible. This has opened up possibilities for use within many ﬁelds. In applications requiring
precise position control over a moderate stroke, moving coil actuators have advantages in
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Figure 3.1: Moving coil actuator.
comparison to d.c. and stepper motors, as they do not exhibit the backlash, irregular motion
or power loss that result from converting rotary motion to linear motion (148).
A diagram of the moving coil actuator used within these studies can be found in the
SMAC data sheet included in Appendix B. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic components of the
actuator. The actuator comprises a moving coil wound round the centre pole of a magnetic
assembly that produces a uniform magnetic ﬁeld perpendicular to the current conducted in
the coil. On providing a voltage, a current ﬂows in the coil generating a force which is parallel
to the direction of travel. This force causes the coil, and the rod which is mounted on it, to
move.
This force is proportional to the current in the coil, the number of turns, and the ﬂux
strength.
The copper coil is wound round an aluminium bobbin, which forms part of the piston
carriage. This aluminium bobbin surrounds the centre pole of the magnet, forming a circuit,
and as such, as it moves within the magnetic ﬁeld, eddy currents are induced within it. These
eddy currents produce magnetic ﬁelds that oppose the external magnetic ﬁeld and thus oppose
the movement of the coil causing a damping eﬀect. Eddy currents are also induced within the
bobbin by the changing current in the coil, which adds to the damping within the system.
3.1.2 Modelling Methodology
The moving coil actuator is modelled in two stages: ﬁrstly the electrical subsystem which
characterises the force produced by the electrical input, and then the mechanical subsystem
upon which this force acts. The electrical subsystem equations are derived from magnetic
principles. These equations are then used to produce an electrical equivalent circuit, using
the analogies provided in Table 3.1. This equivalent circuit represents the electrical sub-
system, or complete static system. The mechanical subsystem equations are then derived
from fundamental equations of motion and ﬁnally, the two subsystems are combined using
dynamical laws to produce one overall model for the actuation element.
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Table 3.1: Analogous electrical and magnetic quantities.
Electrical Magnetic
Voltage, u Magnetomotive force, F
Current, I Magnetic Flux, Φ
Resistance, R Reluctance, <
Figure 3.2: Magnetic ﬂux within the static system.
3.1.3 Electrical Subsystem Modelling
Figure 3.2 provides a representation of the ﬂux within the system. The ﬁgure shows the iron
core with the coil surrounding it. The coil has a voltage input, u and winding resistance R1.
As the bobbin is eﬀectively a closed turn around the core, it is represented by a second coil
within this diagram. The resistance of the bobbin is included as R2. The third coil is included
to represent the inductive and resistive core losses. The majority of the ﬂux ﬂows in the iron
core, and is shown in Figure 3.2 as ΦM . Φ1 is the ﬂux linking the coil and Φ2 is the ﬂux
ﬂowing in the bobbin. Φb is the ﬂux that links the coil and the bobbin. Finally, the core
losses are denoted as Φ3.
The magnetomotive force (m.m.f.) that creates this ﬂux is expressed as below, where <
is the reluctance:
F = <Φ (3.1)
The reluctance is analogous to the electrical resistance and is dependant on the dimensions
of the core as well as its materials.
Hence, the ﬂuxes denoted in Figure 3.2 can be deﬁned:
F1 = <1Φ1 (3.2)
F2 = <2Φ2 (3.3)
F3 = <3Φ3 (3.4)
FB = F1 + F2 = <1Φ1 + <2Φ2 (3.5)
F1 + F2 + F3 = <mΦM (3.6)
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Faraday's law of electromagnetic induction states that current ﬂowing through the coil
not only establishes a magnetic ﬁeld in the iron, but also creates a voltage across the coil
that is proportional to the rate of change of the magnetic ﬂux. This voltage is known as the
electromotive force (e.m.f.):
E = −N dΦ
dt
(3.7)
where N is the number of turns. Lenz's law further states that the induced e.m.f. will
oppose the current that created it. Therefore, in the current case, the e.m.f. created by the
changing ﬂux is:
E1 = N1
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ1 + ΦB) (3.8)
E2 = N2
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ2 + ΦB) (3.9)
E3 = N3
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ3) (3.10)
and thus:
u = N1
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ1 + ΦB) +R1I1 (3.11)
0 = N2
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ2 + ΦB) +R2I2 (3.12)
0 = N3
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ3) +R3I3 (3.13)
and using the m.m.f. law, analogous to Ampere's law:
<Φ = NI (3.14)
leads to:
Φ1 =
N1I1
<1 (3.15)
Φ2 =
N2I2
<2 (3.16)
Φ3 =
N3I3
<3 (3.17)
ΦM =
NMIM
<M =
NM (I1 + I2 + I3)
<M (3.18)
ΦB =
NBIB
<B =
NB(I1 + I2)
<B (3.19)
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Thus substituting Equations 3.15-3.19 into Equations 3.11-3.13:
u = N1
(
NM
<M
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+
N1
<1
dI1
dt
+
NB
<B
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R1I1 (3.20)
0 = N2
(
NM
<M
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+
N2
<2
dI2
dt
+
NB
<B
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R2I2 (3.21)
0 = N3
(
NM
<M
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+
N3
<3
dI3
dt
)
+R3I3 (3.22)
and ﬁnally the electrical subsystem can be expressed in electrical terms:
u = N1
(
Lm
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+L1
dI1
dt
+LB
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R1I1 (3.23)
0 = N2
(
Lm
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+L2
dI2
dt
+LB
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R2I2 (3.24)
0 = N3
(
Lm
d
dt
(I1+I2+I3)+L3
dI3
dt
)
+R3I3 (3.25)
where:
Lm =
Nm
<m , L1 =
N1
<1 , L2 =
N2
<2 , L3 =
N3
<3 andLB =
NB
<B
These equations describe the actuation element without mechanical movement i.e. when
the bobbin is clamped. Hence, the mode represents only the electrical subsystem. From these
equations the equivalent circuit shown in Figure 3.3 may be derived.
Some simpliﬁcations may be made as L2 and L3 are much smaller than Lm and LB, and
thus they may be removed with little aﬀect on the system (149). Using Kirchhoff's current
and voltage laws on this simpliﬁed circuit (Figure 3.4), the following transfer function and
state space model can be derived to describe the electrical subsystem:
IR1
uin
=
LBLms
2 + (LB(R1 +R2) + Lm(R2 +R3))s+R2R3
LBLmL1s3 + c1s2 + c2s+R1R2R3
(3.26)
where
c1 = (Lm(LB(R1 +R2) + L1(R2 +R3)) + LBL1R3)
c2 = (R2(LmR1 + L1R3) +R3(R1 +R2)(LB + Lm))
 I˙R1I˙LB
I˙Lm
 =

−(R1+R2)
L1
R2
L1
0
R2
LB
− (R2+R3)LB
R3
LB
0 R3LM −
R3
LM
 •
 IR1ILB
ILm
+

1
L1
0
0
 • u (3.27)
where: ILm is the current ﬂowing through inductor Lm and is equal to the sum of I1, I2
and I3; ILB is the current ﬂowing through inductor LB and is equal to the sum of I1 and I2;
and IR1 is the current ﬂowing in the winding resistance R1 and is equal to I1.
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Figure 3.3: Electrical subsystem equivalent circuit.
Figure 3.4: Simpliﬁed electrical subsystem equivalent circuit.
3.1.4 Mechanical Subsystem Modelling
The mechanical subsystem is a typical second order system consisting of the moving mass of
the element and any stiﬀness and damping within the system with an input force originating
from the electrical subsystem. A diagram of the mechanical subsystem alongside its free-
body diagram is given in Figure 3.5. Using Newton's Law the mechanical subsystem can be
described by the equation of motion given in equation (3.29).
FT = mx¨ (3.28)
therefore:
x¨ =
1
m
Fe − d
m
x˙− r
m
x (3.29)
Figure 3.5: Mechanical subsystem and its free-body diagram.
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3.1.5 Full Model
Having established the electrical and mechanical subsystems, the full model can now be cre-
ated by considering the dynamics of the system. There are two equations that describe the
ﬂow of force between the two subsystems: the Lorentz force law and Faraday's law of
induction.
The current ﬂowing perpendicular to the ﬂux density results in a force known as the
Lorentz force:
Fe = BNlI (3.30)
This force moves both the coil and the bobbin, therefore a force is generated by both I1
and I2 as they are the currents associated with the coil and bobbin:
Fe = BNlI1 +BNlI2 (3.31)
= k (I1 + I2) (3.32)
= kILB (3.33)
The magnetic ﬂux density, B, is assumed to be constant over the travel of the coil/bobbin.
The number of turns, N and the conductor turn length, l are also constant and so BNl may
be combined to produce one force constant k. This force is the input to the mechanical
subsystem.
As the coil and bobbin are allowed to move in the ﬁeld, their movement will generate
electromotive forces within their circuits in accordance with Faraday's law. Lenz's law
states that this electromotive force will oppose the movement, and hence it is known as the
counter-electromotive force and is expressed as below:
E = BNlx˙ (3.34)
= kx˙ (3.35)
The derivative x˙ is the perpendicular component of the velocity of the wire relative to the
ﬂux lines. BNl is again constant and can be replaced by the force constant k. As I1 and
I2 are the currents associated with the moving coil and bobbin, E acts as a voltage in the
loop containing LB, and as such features in the expression for I˙LB. Hence, the state-space
expression for the full system is stated below:
I˙R1
I˙LB
I˙Lm
x¨
x˙
=

− (R1+R2)L1 R2L1 0 0 0
R2
LB
− (R2+R3)LB
R3
LB
− kLB 0
0 R3Lm − R3Lm 0 0
0 km 0 − dm − rm
0 0 0 1 0
•

IR1
ILB
ILm
x˙
x
+

1
L1
0
0
0
0
 • uin (3.36)
A block diagram for the moving-coil actuator model is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Simulink block diagram representation of the moving-coil actuator model.
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3.1.6 Parameter Identiﬁcation
Experiments were performed on a single actuation element in order to determine the param-
eter values and verify the model. The speciﬁcations provided for the LAL30 SMAC give the
moving mass and force constant (Table 3.2 (147)). However, these parameters were checked
experimentally for completeness. The experiment setup, methodology and parameter identi-
ﬁcation results are discussed within the following subsections.
Table 3.2: SMAC LAL30 moving coil actuator speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcations
Stroke 15 mm
Peak Force 14.5 N
Force Constant 7.4 N/A
Moving Mass 0.15 kg
3.1.6.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment is setup as shown in Figure 3.7. xPC Target alongside Matlab/Simulink is
used to provide a real-time environment. xPC Target is a host-target prototyping environment
that enables the connection of Simulink models to physical systems and real-time execution on
PC compatible hardware (150). Two PCs, a host and target connected via a TCP/IP network
are used within the setup. Matlab/Simulink runs on the host PC, where the application is
designed in Simulink using xPC target I/O blocks. This Simulink ﬁle is then built and
compiled within the host computer and downloaded to the target PC where it is executed
using the xPC Target real-time kernel. The target PC sends and acquires signals according
to the executable from the PCI cards, which are the I/O interface between the target and the
experiment hardware. The two PCI cards used in this experiment are:
• NI6024E which has 16 analogue I/Os.
• NI6602 which has 8 up/down counters.
The command signal is output from the NI6024E, ampliﬁed and then applied to the actuation
element. Four signals are measured from the element: the position and acceleration of its end-
eﬀector, the coil current and the ampliﬁer output. The position is measured via an optical
glass scale encoder, which is integral in the SMAC actuator and is connected to the NI6602.
The acceleration is acquired using an accelerometer (ADXL311) mounted on the end of the
rod (a data sheet for this sensor is included in Appendix B). It has an analogue output and as
such, is routed to the NI6024E. Coil current is obtained from an output pin on the actuator,
which determines the current using a shunt resistor, is connected to the analogue PCI card.
The ampliﬁer output is also monitored in order to decouple any ampliﬁer dynamics from the
other measurements in the post-experiment analysis.
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Figure 3.7: Experiment setup.
3.1.6.2 Frequency Response
Frequency responses for the four measured signals were obtained over the frequency range
1-2000 Hz with the coil free-moving. A frequency sweep for coil current and ampliﬁer output
was also carried out with the coil clamped mid-way along its travel. This aids the identiﬁcation
process as clamping the coil removes the mechanical dynamics from the system.
In Simulink, a sinusoidal input was applied to the element, and its frequency was manually
varied. The frequency response from input to each of the measured quantities was determined
by correlating the output signal with the input sinusoid and a cosine of the frequency. In
mathematical terms, at frequency point i the input signal is:
ui(t) = Uisin(ωit) (3.37)
And from the corresponding steady-state response, yi(t) the following integrals are calcu-
lated:
Si =
∫ Te
0
yis(t)sin(ωit)dt (3.38)
Ci =
∫ Te
0
yis(t)cos(ωit)dt (3.39)
where Te is the duration of the experiment. Having obtained the integrals, the gain
function is now given by:
A(ωi) =
2
UiTe
√
S2i + C
2
i (3.40)
and the phase given by:
φ(ωi) = arctan
Ci
Si
(3.41)
The experiment data (along with oﬀset corrections) is included in Appendix B. The free-
moving coil frequency response results are plotted in Figures 3.8 to 3.10. Figure 3.10 also
gives the clamped voltage-coil-current response.
The position and acceleration responses are sensible, up to approximately 200Hz, after
which unmodelled dynamics appear, most likely caused by mechanical resonances. This is
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Figure 3.8: Frequency response of free-moving coil: voltage-position.
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Figure 3.9: Frequency response of free-moving coil: voltage-acceleration.
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Figure 3.10: Frequency response of clamped and free-moving coil: voltage-current.
not a problem, however, as these dynamics are well above the frequency region used in typical
applications.
3.1.6.3 Parameter Fitting
Within the identiﬁcation process only two parameters could be measured directly: the moving
mass, m and the force constant, k. The moving mass was weighed and found to be 0.130 kg.
To measure the force constant, a known current was applied to the element and its force
measured using scales. The value of k was found to be 7.76 N/A. These values are very close
to the stated values of Table 3.2.
The remaining parameters were found by ﬁtting the model to the frequency response data
using the optimisation toolbox. The frequency data was entered into Matlab and weights were
applied to favour the magnitude response and the 10−100 Hz region. Lower weights were used
to remove the inﬂuence of the high frequency regions in the position/acceleration responses.
Known model values were then set and the remaining parameters deﬁned as parameters to
be determined. The model response is then matched to the measured data by deﬁning the
diﬀerence between them as a scalar function, and using the Matlab function `fsolve' to ﬁnd a
minimum of the function through variation of the parameters, starting from an initial estimate
using a non-linear least squares approach. Details of this approach and the weights used can
be found in Appendix B where an example Matlab code is provided.
The clamped frequency response was used ﬁrst in the ﬁtting process, as this system has
the fewest parameters. The clamped system transfer function was stated in equation (3.26).
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Figure 3.11: Model and experimental frequency response of clamped coil: voltage-current.
The optimisation results suggested that the inductor LB, symbolising the ﬂux linking the
bobbin and the coil, was negligible. Thus, LB was removed from the model, simplifying it
by a degree. The new clamped subsystem model is described by the transfer function in
equation 3.42 and the state space expression in 3.43.
IR1
uin
=
Lms+R2|3
LmL1s2 + (Lm(R2|3 +R1) + L1R2|3)s+R1R2|3
(3.42)
where:
R2|3 =
R2R3
(R2 +R3)[
I˙R1
I˙Lm
]
=
[
− (R1+R2|3)L1
R2|3
L1
R4
Lm
− R4Lm
]
•
[
IR1
ILm
]
+
[
1
L1
0
]
• u (3.43)
The parameters Lm, L1, R1 and R2|3 were determined from this response. The values of R2
and R3 could not be separated at this stage. The determined parameter values are provided
in Table 3.3 and the clamped model frequency response is plotted with the experiment data
in Figure 3.11.
The free-moving current and position responses were then used to determine the remaining
model parameters. The full system state-space model with LB removed is provided below for
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Table 3.3: Parameter values.
Parameter Value
m 0.13 kg
k 7.76 N/A
Lm 14.14 mH
L1 4.63 mH
R1 8.87 Ω
R2|3 16.08 Ω
R2 27.10 Ω
R3 39.50 Ω
r not measurable
d not measurable
reference.
I˙R1
I˙Lm
x¨
x˙
=

−R2(R2|3−R3)−R1R3L1R3
R2(R3−R2|3)
L1R3
−kR2|3L1R3 0
R2(R3−R2|3)
LmR3
R2(R2|3−R3)
LmR3
−kR2|3L1R2 0
kR2|3
mR3
k(R3−R2|3)
mR3
−(k2+d(R2+R3))
m(R2+R3)
− rm
0 0 1 0
•

IR1
ILm
x˙
x
+

1
L1
0
0
0
•u
(3.44)
The remaining model parameters determined from these responses are shown in Table 3.3.
The ratio between R2 and R3 was determined, allowing values for each to be found. The model
shows some sensitivity to the distribution between R2 and R3. However, the chosen values
provide the best ﬁt. The mechanical parameters r and d were found to be negligible within
the optimisation and thus are set at a small value. The frequency responses of the model and
measured data for the free-moving system are shown in Figures 3.12 to 3.14.
It can be seen from Table 3.3 that the ﬁtted parameters are of reasonable magnitude.
The model provides a good ﬁt to the measured data between 5− 100 Hz. These discrepancies
are present both in the accelerometer and encoder readings, and as such may not be directly
attributed to either. The operational temperature and frequencies should be well within
the linear limits suggested by the accelerometer documentation. The discrepancies at higher
frequencies can be attributed to unmodelled mechanical resonances. Changes in resistance
due to thermal eﬀects may have some inﬂuence on the current measurements, particularly at
high frequency. There may also be some skin eﬀects present in the high frequencies, which
could be modelled. However, this would increase the model order signiﬁcantly, and as these
eﬀects are outside the normal operating region, their inclusion in the model is not considered
beneﬁcial. In the acceleration frequency response, a discrepancy at low frequencies (2− 5 Hz)
can be observed. This diﬀerence is attributable to stiction.
55
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING OF HIGH REDUNDANCY ACTUATION
101 102 103
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
Frequency, Hz
M
ag
ni
tu
de
, m
/V
Measured and Model Frequency Response of Free−Moving Coil: Voltage−Position
101 102 103
−300
−250
−200
−150
−100
Frequency, Hz
Ph
as
e,
 d
eg
 
 
Measured response
Model response
Figure 3.12: Model and experimental frequency response of free-moving coil: voltage-position.
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Figure 3.13: Model and experimental frequency response of free-moving coil: voltage-
acceleration.
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Figure 3.14: Model and experimental frequency response of free-moving coil: voltage-current.
3.1.7 Model Reduction
The model derived and veriﬁed in the previous sections is a good linear approximation to the
actual moving-coil actuator. The intended use of this model is as an element within multi-
element conﬁgurations which form the HRA and as this element model is fourth order, the
resultant HRA model will be some multiple of this. Figure 3.15 shows the order of various
example HRA conﬁgurations using the 4th order element. These HRA models are of high
order, making them cumbersome for control design purposes. The ﬁgure also shows the ﬁnal
model size that could be obtained using a reduced order element. The HRA model sizes
using a 2nd order model are much more manageable for control design. Hence, it would be
desirable to use a reduced order element that suitably approximates the behaviour of the
original system in the design of the control. The control laws created may then be tested on
the full order system. This section will detail the reduction of the element model to a 3rd and
2nd order model for this purpose1.
There are two main approaches to model reduction: analytical reduction and physical
reduction. The former is where states are removed or residualised from the original model
according to some deﬁned analytical procedure, such as balanced reductions. Analytical
reduction is useful when the model is large, and there are no obvious physical assumptions
1Another option for obtaining a more manageably sized model would be to reduce the HRA conﬁguration
model, rather than the single element. This approach has a few drawbacks however, as the reduction process
would have to be carried out for each HRA conﬁguration model required and their respective fault modes.
Also, this approach is only suitable for centralised design, whereas the main control approach presented here
is decentralised, and as such requires the single element model.
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Figure 3.15: HRA model sizes for element models of varying order.
that can be made.
In contrast, a physical model reduction is where the model is reduced through practical
knowledge of the actual system. Due to the vastly varied nature of systems, no deﬁned
procedure exists to conduct a physical model reduction and as such any results will be as
good as the assumptions made within the reduction. However, reduction based on physical
knowledge is desirable, as in contrast to analytical procedures, the connection of the model
to the physical system and its parameters is maintained. This is important to understanding
how parameter or structural changes that occur aﬀect the system, which is crucial for fault
tolerant control.
A physical reduction approach is taken here in order to maintain the physical signiﬁcance
of the model. Also, the nature of the model lends itself to this form of reduction. As was
illustrated in Figure 3.15, a reduction speciﬁcally in the electrical subsystem would be advan-
tageous as this contributes the majority of the states, and simpliﬁcations in electrical circuits
are common and straightforward. Indeed, a physical reduction from 5th order to 4th has
already been made by removing LB.
In the following subsections the reduction of the model to 3rd and 2nd order is detailed.
3.1.7.1 Third Order Element Model
A 3rd order element model will contain only one electrical state, hence one state must be
removed from the electrical subsystem of equation 3.43. The most obvious component to
remove from the equivalent circuit is the inductance L1, as this constitutes the fastest pole. By
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removing this inductor the third order system, G3 may be expressed as shown in equation 3.45.
G3 :
I˙Lmx¨
x˙
=
 −
R1R2R3
LmR123
k(R1R2−R123)
LmR123
0
k(R123−R1R2)
mR123
k2(R1R2−R123)−dR3R123
mR3R123
− rm
0 1 0
•
ILmx˙
x
+

R2R3
LmR123
kR2
mR123
0
u (3.45)
where:
R123 = R1R2 +R3(R1 +R2) (3.46)
3.1.7.2 Second Order Element Model
To reduce the model to second order, the ﬁnal remaining inductance, Lm must be removed.
As this component is in parallel with R3, it is necessary to combine their impedances at a
certain frequency to simplify the circuit. Their combined impedance Z is:
Z =
R3
√
(jωLm)2
R3 +
√
(jωLm)2
(3.47)
If ω is set to zero, to provide the lowest steady-state error then:
Z =
R3
R3 + 1
(3.48)
Using this combined impedance in place of R3 and Lm, the second order model, G2 can be
expressed as below:
G2 :
[
x¨
x˙
]
=
[
− (k2(R1+R2)−dR12ZmR12Z − rm
1 0
]
•
[
x˙
x
]
+
[
kR2
mR12Z
0
]
• u (3.49)
where:
R12Z = R1R2 + Z(R1 +R2) (3.50)
3.1.7.3 Model Reduction Quality
The two reduced order models are stable and fully controllable and observable. Figure 3.16
shows the frequency response of the original 4th order system and the 3rd and 2nd order
reduced models, and Figure 3.17 the singular values of the additive error between them.
It can be observed that the approximations are good within the low-mid frequency region.
The high frequency region is less well approximated as the models were reduced through
the removal of the high frequency inductors. This is acceptable however, given the original
model's uncertainty within this region. The time domain response of the two approximations
is also adequate, as shown in Figure 3.18.
Overall, the results indicate that the second order approximation provides an adequately
accurate model for the purpose of control design.
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Figure 3.16: Bode diagrams of the 4th, 3rd and 2nd order models.
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Figure 3.18: Step response of the 4th, 3rd and 2nd order models.
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3.2 Modelling of a Cut-Bobbin Moving Coil Actuator
Cutting the bobbin of a moving coil actuator simpliﬁes the electrical dynamics signiﬁcantly,
as no eddy currents are induced in the bobbin.
A model for this system can be derived from the closed-bobbin model that was presented in
Section 3.1, by simplifying the electrical circuit. The mechanical subsystem remains unaltered,
however, the components associated with the bobbin (R2 and LB) in the electrical subsystem
equivalent circuit (Figure 3.4) must be removed. Therefore, the circuit shown in Figure 3.19
represents the cut-bobbin electrical subsystem.
Figure 3.19: Cut-bobbin electrical subsystem equivalent circuit.
This circuit, in combination with the mechanical subsystem, results in the following system
model: 
I˙R1
I˙Lm
x¨
x˙
=

−R1+R3L1 R3L1 − kL1 0
R3
Lm
− R3Lm 0 0
k
m 0
−d
m − rm
0 0 1 0
•

IR1
ILm
x˙
x
+

1
L1
0
0
0
•u (3.51)
3.2.1 Model Reduction
By taking the same approach as described in Section 3.1.7, the model can be reduced to
provide a model more suitable for control design of HRA. It may be reduced to third order
by removing the inductance L1, and to second order by subsequently removing Lm and R32.
This produces the reduced order models expressed in equations 3.52 and 3.53.
Gcut3 :
I˙Lmx¨
x˙
=

−R1|3Lm
kR1|3
LmR1
0
kR1|3
mR1
k2−d(R1+R3)
m(R1+R3)
− rm
0 1 0
•
ILmx˙
x
+

R1|3
LmR1
0
0
u (3.52)
Gcut2 :
[
x¨
x˙
]
=
[
−k2+dR1mR1 − rm
1 0
]
•
[
x˙
x
]
+
[
k
mR1
0
]
• u (3.53)
The frequency responses of these approximations, alongside the full-order model, are shown
in Figure 3.20 and the additive error between them is shown in Figure 3.21. It can be seen
that the approximations are suﬃciently accurate within the low and mid frequency regions.
2R3 is also removed as the combined impedance of these elements needs to be very small in order to achieve
a good approximation, as was the case in Section 3.1.7.
62
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING OF HIGH REDUNDANCY ACTUATION
The step responses for a unit voltage input are shown in Figure 3.22 also suggest that the
reduced order models are adequate for control design use.
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Figure 3.20: Bode diagrams of the 4th, 3rd and 2nd order cut bobbin models.
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3.3 Non-Linearities
Moving coil actuators are relatively linear in comparison to other electromagnetic actuators
such as solenoids. The magnetic ﬂux density along the travel of the moving coil is designed to
be constant, providing a linear relationship between voltage input and force output over the
length of its travel. It also does not suﬀer from backlash as electromechanical actuators do.
However, it is inevitable that non-linearities exist within the system as all physical systems
have limits on their magnitude. For example, the moving coil actuator has travel limits, as
its motion is transversal, and the input voltage to the system is also limited by the supply
voltage. In normal operation, the actuator will be controlled to operate within these limits,
making the linear model valid for control design. However, when faults occur the system may
reach these limits, and thus it necessary to include them in the model for simulation purposes.
3.3.1 Travel Limits
When the moving-coil reaches the end of its travel it will hit the end stop, abruptly reducing
the velocity of the coil and limiting the position. This can be modelled as a stiﬀ spring and
damper that occurs at the travel limits, through modiﬁcation of the mechanical subsystem:
mx¨ =
Fe − dx˙− rx , ∀xlim > |x|Fe − (d+ dlim)x˙− (r + r)x , ∀xlim ≤ |x| (3.54)
Where xlim is the position limit, and dlim and rlim are the damping and stiﬀness caused
by the end-stop. The values of dlim and rlim are several orders of magnitude larger than
the normal damping and stiﬀness values. This non-linearity can be included in Simulink
using logic operators that detect when the coil has reached the travel limit, and switches the
end-stop damping and stiﬀness on accordingly.
Figure 3.23 shows the step response of the element when the travel limits are included
using this approach. It can be seen that the end-stop damping and stiﬀness limits the position
and nulls the velocity suﬃciently.
3.3.2 Input Saturation
The input voltage to the system is limited to ±24 V. This can be included in the Simulink
model through the introduction of a saturation block at the input, which limits the input to
the required region.
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Figure 3.23: Step response of travel limited element.
3.4 Modelling of HRA Conﬁgurations
Having developed a model for a single actuation element for simulation and control synthesis
purposes, multi-element assemblies can now be constructed. The focus of the current project
phase is on planar assemblies and thus the elements are arranged either serially, or in paral-
lel, or in serial/parallel combinations. The optimum conﬁguration of actuation elements, in
accordance with the high redundancy actuation concept, is addressed by the work of other
HRA researchers, and as such will not be addressed here. This section will address the issue
of creating models of possible actuation assemblies using SMAC moving coil actuators as ac-
tuation elements. Models of speciﬁc conﬁgurations that are to be used in the control design
chapters are detailed in the next chapter.
Assemblies of actuation elements can be constructed with ease if the model is split into
two sections: the electrical/mechanical force model and a separate mass model. This aids the
construction of element assemblies, as each actuator element will apply its force to a mass
that is dependant on the conﬁguration.
For example, in a two-by-two series in parallel assembly, as shown in Figure 3.24, elements
one and two work upon masses m1 and m2 respectively. m1 and m2 are the combined mass
of the moving mass of elements 1 and 2 the casing mass of 3 and 4, respectively. The casing
masses of actuator elements 1 and 2 are not included in the diagram as they are ﬁxed to
a surface. Actuator elements 3 and 4 both apply their force to m3, which is the combined
mass of the moving masses of elements 3 and 4 and the load mass. The division between the
electrical/mechanical force model and the mass model is distinct within this ﬁgure, as each
actuation element works upon a mass that is dependant on the assembly's arrangement.
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Figure 3.24: Two-by-two series-in-parallel assembly.
Figure 3.25: Free-body diagram of two-by-two series-in-parallel assembly.
A free-body diagram of the assembly shown in Figure 3.24 is provided in Figure 3.25.
Each force within this diagram can be described generically by the following equations (using
the 4th order closed-bobbin element model from equation 3.44):
Fn = A31nIR1n +A32nILmn + A33n(x˙(i−1 )−x˙i)+r(x(i−1 )−xi) (3.55)
I˙R1n =
1
L1n
un −A11nIR1n+A12nILmn+A13n(x˙(i−1 )−x˙i) (3.56)
I˙Lmn = A21nIR1n +A22nILmn +A23n(x˙(i−1 )−x˙i) (3.57)
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where:
A11n =
R2n(R2|3n−R3n)−R1nR3n
L1nR3n
, A12n =
R2n (R3n−R2|3n )
L1nR3n
, A13n =
knR2|3n
L1nR3n
,
A21n =
R2n(R3n −R2|3n)
L1nR3n
, A22n =
R2n (R2|3n−R3n )
LmnR3n
, A23n =
knR2|3n
L1nR2n
,
A31n =
knR2|3n
R3n
, A32n =
kn(R3n−R2|3n )
R3n
, A33n =
k2n + dn(R2n +R3n)
R2n +R3n
.
Where n and i are the actuator element and mass identiﬁer, respectively and (i − 1) is
the mass that physically (rather than numerically) precedes mass i. A generic state-space
expression may be derived from these equations to represent the element subsystem and the
mass subsystem:
Ge :
[
I˙R1n
I˙Lmn
]
=
[
−A11n A12n
A21n A22n
]
•
[
IR1n
ILmn
]
+
[
1
L1n
A13n
0 A23n
]
•
[
un
(x˙(i−1 )−x˙i)
]
(3.58)
Fn =
[
A31n A32n
]
•
[
IR1n
ILmn
]
+
[
0 A33n
]
•
[
un
(x˙(i−1 )−x˙i)
]
(3.59)
Gm :
[
x¨i
x˙i
]
=
[
0 0
1 0
]
•
[
x˙i
xi
]
+
[
1
mi
0
]
FTi (3.60)
Using the generic force equations, the state-space equations for the example assembly are:
I˙R11 =
1
L11
u1 −A111IR11+A121ILm1−A131 x˙1 (3.61)
I˙R12 =
1
L12
u2 −A112IR12+A122ILm2−A132 x˙2 (3.62)
I˙R13 =
1
L13
u3 −A113IR13+A123ILm3+A133(x˙1−x˙3) (3.63)
I˙R14 =
1
L14
u4 −A114IR14+A124ILm4+A134(x˙2−x˙3) (3.64)
I˙Lm1 = A211IR11 +A221ILm1 −A231 x˙1 (3.65)
I˙Lm2 = A212IR12 +A222ILm2 −A232 x˙2 (3.66)
I˙Lm3 = A213IR13 +A223ILm3 +A233(x˙1−x˙3) (3.67)
I˙Lm4 = A214IR14 +A224ILm4 +A234(x˙2−x˙3) (3.68)
F1 = A311IR11 +A321ILm1 −A331 x˙1 + rx1 (3.69)
F2 = A312IR12 +A322ILm2 −A332 x˙2 + rx2 (3.70)
F3 = A313IR13 +A323ILm3 + A333(x˙1−x˙3) + r(x1−x3) (3.71)
F4 = A314IR14 +A324ILm4 + A334(x˙2−x˙3) + r(x2−x3) (3.72)
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FT1 = m1x¨1 = F1 − F3 (3.73)
FT2 = m2x¨2 = F2 − F4 (3.74)
FT3 = m3x¨3 = F3 − F4 (3.75)
This subsystem approach can be used in Simulink to build HRA conﬁgurations. The
block diagram is split into a element subsystem and a mass subsystem as shown in Fig-
ures 3.26 to 3.28. These subsystems can be easily combined to create all possible serial/parallel
assemblies. For example, the arrangement of subsystems necessary to create the two-by-two
series-in-parallel assembly is shown in Figure 3.29.
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Force
Position
Velocity
Acceleration
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Relative Velocity
Voltage Input
Force
Voltage
Input
1
Figure 3.26: Simulink subsystem model.
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Figure 3.27: Element subsystem from Figure 3.26.
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Figure 3.28: Mass subsystem from Figure 3.26.
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Figure 3.29: Subsystem arrangement for two-by-two series-in-parallel element assembly.
The 2nd order electrical subsystem used here can be easily replaced with the 1st order
or zero order reduced models described in Section 3.1.7, or the cut-bobbin model and its
associated approximations (Section 3.2).
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3.5 Fault Modelling
Having created a nominal model of a single element and a method for creating assembly
models, it is necessary to model potential faults that can be injected into the actuation
system. Sensor faults are not considered within this thesis as they are not within the scope of
this work. There are many methods and application of sensor fault detection, and actuation
faults are of much greater import to the HRA concept. Three main fault cases for a moving
coil actuator have been identiﬁed and modelled, namely:
• Parameter deviations
• Mechanical loose
• Mechanical lock-ups
The simulation of these faults is outlined in the following subsections and some discussion is
given on the eﬀect of these faults when elements are arranged to form a HRA.
3.5.1 Parameter Deviations
Heating of the element will change the resistance within the electrical circuit. Likewise induc-
tances will change a little due to geometry changes arising from thermal expansion. These
electrical changes may be considered as parameter deviation faults. Parameter deviations
can be made by varying the blocks within the simulations or parameter values in the equa-
tions. The eﬀect of parameter deviations on some speciﬁc HRA examples will be discussed in
Chapter 5. A deviation of 10% is considered
3.5.2 Mechanical Loose Faults
An actuator element is described as mechanically loose if it loses the ability to exert force
between its two end points. Simulation of the mechanical loose fault can be achieved through
severing the force output of the element in Figure 3.27.
Loose faults in parallel systems remove the force generated by an element from the mass(es)
upon which it acts. For example, in the parallel arrangement of elements shown in Figure 3.30,
if element 2 becomes mechanically loose, then it no longer applies the force F2 to the mass.
However, as elements 1, 3 and 4 are not faulty, then F1, F3 and F4 are still applied to the
mass, retaining its controllability.
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Load 
Element 4
Load 
Element 4
Element 1
Element 3
Element 2
Element 1
Element 3
Figure 3.30: Loose fault in parallel actuation elements
Loose faults in serial elements, however, are more problematic. If element 2 becomes loose
in the serial elements shown in Figure 3.31, then the connection to ground is lost. Elements 3
and 4 will continue to apply a force to their respective masses, but this force will act equally
and oppositely on the loose element's mass and meet no resistance, other than inertial forces,
until the coil reached the end of its travel and hits the end-stop. Hence, loose faults render
the load of a purely serial arrangement of elements uncontrollable.
Element 1 Element 3
m 1 m 2 m 3
Element 4
Load
Element 2
Element 1 Element 3
m 1 m 2 m 3
Element 4
Load
Figure 3.31: Loose fault in serial actuation elements
3.5.3 Mechanical Lock-up Faults
If an element loses the ability to change the length between its two end points then it is
said to be mechanically locked-up. This may occur if the coil of the ﬁrst actuator element is
deformed and touches the magnet. This ﬁxes the mass with respect to the reference point,
and consequently the relative position is constant and the relative speed is zero.
The mechanical lock-up fault is more challenging in terms of its dynamic eﬀect on the
system and its ease of simulation in comparison to the other faults. If an element becomes
locked, then the two masses it links will move at the same speed. Therefore, they can be
considered as one larger mass. For example, in the serial elements shown in Figure 3.32, if
element 2 becomes locked, then m1 and m2 can be combined into one mass. This reduces the
order of the system by 4 to 2 states (depending on the order of the electrical subsystem used).
Force can still be exerted on the load, and thus serial elements increase a HRAs tolerance to
lock-up faults.
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Element 1 Element 3
m 1 m 2 m 3
Element 4
Load
Element 2
m 1 m 2 +
Element 1 Element 3
m 3
Element 4
Loadm 1 m 2 +
Figure 3.32: Lock-up fault in serial actuation elements
Parallel elements do not improve the system's tolerance to lock-up faults, however. If
a lock-up faults occurs in parallel elements, as depicted in Figure 3.33, then this eﬀectively
locks all of the parallel actuators, assuming that the elements are not capable of breaking the
locked element (which is the case for the HRA concept).
Load 
Element 4
Load 
Element 1
Element 3
Element 2
Figure 3.33: Lock-up fault in parallel actuation elements
A lock-up fault may be simulated by changing the friction of an element to a very large
value, so that the actuation element is unable to move. This approach incurs solver problems
in simulation, as the solutions become very small, simulation run times increase. This issue is
particularly problematic in this case as the HRA contains many elements, a number of which
could be locked simultaneously.
Hence, lock-up faults have been simulated using an alternative approach here. Lock-up
fault simulation can be achieved by using the impulse of the mass. Impulse is the change in
momentum and can be expressed as:
Fdt = mdx˙ (3.76)
By passing the neighbouring elements the impulse and mass through element blocks in
Simulink when they become locked, then eﬀectively the locked element can be removed from
the simulation: the masses add to form the locked actuator mass and the momentum in the
system is preserved.
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This idea is further illustrated in Figures 3.34 and 3.35 where representations of the
simulation process for a simple system are given. The impulse and mass is passed upwards
and downwards throughout the system between the mass simulation blocks. If the elements
are healthy, then these signals are switched oﬀ and the sum of the mass and impulse in each
mass simulation block is only that of the mn and Fdtn. However, lock-up faults activate the
mass and impulse links as shown in Figure 3.35, and the summed mass and impulses in the
masses attached to a locked element are aligned to form one mass. This may be expressed
more formally as:
x˙n =
(
Fdtn+flock(n)Fdtbelow(n) + flock(n+1)Fdtabove(n+1)
)(
mn + flock(n)mbelow(n) + flock(n+1)mabove(n+1)
) (3.77)
where
mbelow(n) = m(n−1) + flock(n−1)mbelow(n−1) (3.78)
mabove(n) = m(n+1) + flock(n+1)mabove(n−+1) (3.79)
Fdtbelow(n) = Fdt(n−1) + flock(n−1)Fdtbelow(n−1) (3.80)
Fdtabove(n) = Fdt(n+1) + flock(n+1)Fdtabove(n+1) (3.81)
and
flock(n) = 0when en is healthy
flock(n) = 1when en is locked
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Figure 3.34: Simulation of lock-up faults through passing the mass and impulse - Nominal
system
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Figure 3.35: Simulation of lock-up faults through passing the mass and impulse - Lock-up in
element 2
3.6 Conclusions
The modelling of HRA using moving coil actuation technology has been addressed throughout
this chapter. It was established that two types of model were required: a relatively simple LTI
model for control design purposes and a more complete model for simulation. To achieve this
a LTI model for a single moving coil actuator was derived from ﬁrst principles and veriﬁed.
This model was combined with some non-linearities to form the element model for simulation
purposes. The element model for control design was then produced by reducing the full-order
LTI to second order by physical reduction means.
Having derived an element model, a methodology was presented for creating and simulat-
ing assemblies of elements which form HRAs, which could be applied to either element model.
Also, the modelling of a number of fault cases was described, and their eﬀect on parallel and
serial elements discussed.
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Application Example
4.1 Introduction
The control of HRA has been the primary focus of this phase of the HRA project, and indeed
is the focus of the work contributed by this thesis. However, before the control of HRA can
be addressed it is important to deﬁne the system that is to be controlled. The modelling of
a single actuation element has been presented and methods of creating HRA models given.
However, the dimensioning of a speciﬁc HRA to meet requirements has not been addressed.
Deﬁning the HRA's requirements is problematic at this stage of the project. The HRA
is to be used as part of a larger system and thus, its requirements are dependent on the
speciﬁcations of that system. At present however, the concept is not concentrated on a
speciﬁc application (as it is applicable to many areas). Also, the current technology used
within the project serves to only prove the viability of the HRA concept and is not the ﬁnal
technological solution. The technology used within a HRA synthesised for a real application
is likely to be of a much smaller scale if high numbers of elements are to be used1.
Nonetheless, for the control results that follow to have meaning, it is important to dimen-
sion the HRA system studied sensibly and design its performance to meet realistic criteria.
Hence, this chapter deﬁnes a number of example HRAs for use within the control studies,
whose dimensions and control requirements are loosely based upon some typical speciﬁcations
for possible applications for a HRA. To this end, Section 4.2 provides a general discussion of
typical HRA application requirements. Based on these and the current technology speciﬁca-
tion, requirements for three example HRAs are synthesised in Section 4.3. Finally, having
deﬁned some example HRAs and requirements, the capabilities of these systems and their
fault tolerance is discussed in Section 4.4.
4.2 Typical Application Requirements
A number of potential applications for the HRA have been studied as part of the HRA
project's work. These applications include a ﬂight control surface, railway active suspension,
a jet engine inlet guide vane, and a pick-and-place application. The requirement types of these
1These technological and synthesis issues will be the focus of the next phase of the HRA project as a whole
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applications are varied, making comparison diﬃcult. Table 4.1 assembles all the relevant
capabilities that are used in more than one application. It can be concluded that these
requirements are typical for actuators across diﬀerent ﬁelds, and they are not speciﬁc to a
certain application.
Table 4.1: Typical application requirements
Flight control Railway active Pick & place Jet engine
surface suspension inlet guide vane
(151) (152) (17)
Static performance
Force capability 13kN 3.3kN - 55kN
Acceleration - 2.25m/s2 150m/s2 -
Speed 0.1m/s 0.12m/s 1m/s 0.1m/s
Travel - 18mm 30mm 50mm
Tracking Performance
Overshoot - - 0.01mm 10%
Frequency 0-3Hz 0.1-20Hz 0-15Hz 0-2Hz
4.3 Example HRAs Requirements
Based upon the requirements in Table 4.1 and the speciﬁcations of the actuation element
currently in use (Table 4.2), requirements for three generic example applications have been
created (Table 4.3).
Firstly a 4 × 4 parallel-in-series (PS) system is chosen, as this is the dimensioning and
conﬁguration of the experimental rig. Example system 2 is a series-in-parallel (SP) system of
the same dimensioning, and is included as this is the other main conﬁguration for a planar
HRA. The requirements for both of these systems are the same.
Example HRAs 1 and 2 contain sixteen elements, which is a relatively low number of
elements for a HRA, making the system relatively simple to manage. However, this low
number of elements reduces the eﬃcacy of the HRA concept. Fewer elements results in higher
levels of over-dimensioning, and faults in individual elements have more aﬀect on the overall
system behaviour. Hence, a more realistically dimensioned HRA is provided in the ﬁnal
example system, which is a 10× 10 PS HRA.
Table 4.2: Actuation element speciﬁcations
Moving-coil actuator speciﬁcation
Force 100N
Max.
acceleration 80m/s2
Travel ±0.015m
Moving mass 0.13kg
Load 1kg
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Table 4.3: Application example requirements
Application using Application using
Capability 4× 4 HRA (PS &
SP)
10× 10 PS HRA
Force 200N 600N
Acceleration 80m/s2 80m/s2
Speed 0.05m/s 0.05m/s
Travel ±30mm ±90mm
Load 2kg 6kg
Overshoot 2% 2%
Frequency 1Hz 1Hz
The application requirements have been scaled between the two example sizes in this case.
This is due to the limitations of the current technology. In a real situation, the 10×10 HRA's
elements would be of a smaller scale to meet the same requirements as the 4 × 4 case (or
vice-versa). This is not possible in the current technology, so the application requirements
have been scaled instead, providing the same eﬀect. The resulting requirements are generally
a factor of 10 from the the typical requirements of the real applications of Table 4.1, which is
due to the speciﬁcation of the current element technology.
Models for these examples can be found in Appendix C.
Finally, control requirements can be formulated from this speciﬁcation, and are included
in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Control requirements for example systems
Control
Requirements
Examples 1 & 2
4× 4 PS & SP
Example 3
10× 10 PS
Transient response requirements
Settling time
(ST)
1s 1.2s
Rise time (RT) 0.7s 0.75s
Overshoot (OS) 2% 2%
Frequency domain requirements
Gain margin
(GM)
>10dB >10dB
Phase margin
(PM)
>60deg >60deg
Frequency 1Hz 1Hz
4.4 Capability & Fault Tolerance
Based on the dimensions of the examples HRAs and the requirements, it is now possible to
deduce the nominal capabilities of the HRAs and their levels of fault tolerance to lock-up and
loose faults. Capability and fault tolerance are important concepts for the HRA.
The system's capability, as discussed here, is deﬁned as the amount of force or travel the
system can potentially produce in comparison to the required force/travel needed to meet the
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speciﬁcation. For example, in a traditional triplex parallel redundancy system, the nominal
system has a force capability of 300% (3 times the force required) and a travel capability of
100% (it can travel the required distance but no further). If a fault occurs, this capability will
reduce. If it falls below 100%, then the system can no longer achieve the full requirement.
Using this terminology, redundant systems in their nominal state always have capabilities
greater than 100%, and as such the nominal HRA must have a capability in excess of 100%.
However, this value is also an indicator of the level of over-dimensioning in the system i.e.
300% capability indicates that the system is over-dimensioned 3 times. An aim of the HRA
concept is to reduce this over-dimensioning, hence a smaller nominal capability is desirable.
The fault tolerance of the system is deﬁned as the number of faults it can tolerate before
the capability falls below 100%. Hence, a triplex parallel redundancy system can tolerate 2
loose faults, and no lock-up faults.
Hence, it is desirable to have a high level of fault tolerance, for a low level of nominal
capability. A single indicator of the eﬃciency with which the fault tolerance is provided may
then be derived by dividing the fault tolerance by the nominal capability.
The nominal capabilities and fault tolerances for the example HRAs and the traditional
triplex case are provided in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: HRA capabilities and fault tolerance levels
Capabilities and
fault
Parallel 4× 4 HRA 10× 10
HRA
tolerance levels
triplex
system
PS SP PS
Nominal force
capability
300% 200% 200% 166.66%
Nominal travel
capability
100% 200% 200% 166.66%
No. of lock-up
faults tolerated
0 2 2-8 4
No. of loose faults
tolerated
2 2-8 2 4-40
Lock fault
tolerance/nominal
capability
0 0.01 0.01-0.04 0.024
Loose fault
tolerance/nominal
capability
0.0067 0.01-0.04 0.01
0.024-
0.24
In the 4 × 4 examples the HRA has a nominal force capability that is twice of that of
the requirements. This allows the PS system to tolerate two lock-up faults, as each fault will
reduce the system's travel capability by 25%. In the SP case, the capability is reliant on where
the fault occurs. If no more than two elements are locked in each serial branch, the system
will meet the travel requirement. However, if three faults occur in the same serial branch,
then the system can no longer meet this requirement. Hence, the 4x4 SP conﬁguration can
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tolerate 2-8 faults.
As the lock-up and loose faults are duals, the opposite is true for loose faults. Only two
loose faults are tolerable in the 4x4 SP conﬁguration as each fault will render a serial branch
inoperable, and its force will be lost. The PS conﬁguration may tolerate more loose faults, as
long as they occur in separate parallel branches.
The nominal capabilities of the 10×10 examples are lower than that of the 4×4 examples.
However, the tolerance to faults has increased, as each fault has a smaller inﬂuence on the
whole system. This is a key feature of the HRA concept: by reducing the element size,
and increasing their numbers greater fault tolerance can be achieved with less functional
redundancy. This has implications for improving the eﬃciency, and weight of the system, if
a suitable technology can be used.
This is numerically illustrated by the fault tolerance/nominal capability values given in
the last two rows of Table 4.5. The values displayed here are derived from dividing the fault
tolerance by the nominal capability, and as such, they are a measure of how much tolerance
is achieved with the level of functional redundancy. Hence, it is a measure of the eﬃciency of
the system, and a higher value is better as it means more fault tolerance with less functional
redundancy. The table shows that the eﬃciency with which the tolerance of the triplex system
is achieved is lower than that of the HRA systems. The 4× 4 systems also have a lower level
of eﬃciency/tolerance in comparison to the 10× 10 system.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter produced a number of example HRA conﬁgurations that meet requirements that
are sensibly dimensioned, in order to provide HRA systems for use in the control studies
that follow. To achieve this, ﬁrstly, the requirements for some typical HRA applications were
found. Based upon these requirements and the speciﬁcations of the current HRA technology,
some example HRA requirements were established. Two sets of HRA requirements for two
sizes of HRA (4×4 and 10×10) were created and based on these requirements, three example
HRA conﬁgurations were synthesised. The fault tolerance and capabilities of the example
conﬁgurations was then discussed. It was shown that PS conﬁgurations oﬀer greater tolerance
to lock-up faults and SP to loose faults. Also, the 10× 10 conﬁguration was shown to provide
greater fault tolerance using less functional redundancy, which is an important feature of the
HRA concept.
Models for the HRA conﬁgurations included in this chapter can be found in Appendix C.
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Chapter 5
Passive Fault Tolerant Control of High
Redundancy Actuation
5.1 Introduction
Control is often integral to providing fault tolerance. The HRA project thus far has focused on
using passive Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) to provide fault tolerance. Passive FTC is where a
single robust control law is designed, which should provide adequate stability and performance
under both nominal and fault conditions1. Passive FTC been shown to be theoretically viable
for fault tolerant control with low levels of redundancy (5; 3; 7; 4), and successful practical
testing of these results on a two-by-two electromechanical HRA was achieved (7; 6). More
recently Steﬀen has investigated robust control of HRAs with higher numbers of elements
(21; 22). Results indicate that robust control should be a satisfactory method of achieving
fault tolerant control of these structures for most applications.
The passive FTC concept with respect to HRA is illustrated by Figure 5.1. The behaviour
of the nominal HRA is represented by a point bn in the diagram. Inevitably, a bound of
uncertainty for the system surrounds this point. bn and its uncertainty bound lies within a
region of acceptable behaviours BPFT , within which the system is considered fault tolerant.
Passive FTC aims to design a single robust controller that keeps the behaviours of the fault
perturbed HRAs (points bf ) within BPFT .
Although the HRA has a capability level in excess of that required by the application, lock-
up and loose faults reduce the overall travel or force capability respectively, and as such, there
are fault limits dictated by the capability requirement. Thus, HRA under fault conditions in
excess of this limit (represented by points bgd) will lie outside BPFT in BGD, a region that
represents the HRA graceful degradation operation.
The passive FTC approach is attractive, as its simplicity and constancy make it more
easily veriﬁable for a high integrity application. However, if the region BPFT is restricted,
then it can be diﬃcult or impossible to retain {bf} within this region.
Hence, active FTC approaches have also been investigated, which detect element faults
and change the control in order to move the points bf closer to bn, into a behaviour region
1A detailed discussion of passive FTC is provided in the literature review in Chapter 2.
82
CHAPTER 5. PASSIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF HIGH REDUNDANCY
ACTUATION
Figure 5.1: Diagrammatic representation of passive and active fault tolerant control of HRA.
BAFT that provides improved performance under fault conditions within the limits of the of
the system capability.
This chapter details the design and analysis of basic passive fault tolerant control for the
HRA in order to provide a benchmark for comparison with the multi-agent control strategies
which will be presented in Chapter 7. In addition, the work presented in this chapter will
give an indication of the attainable performance of the HRA using passive methods alone,
and allow the demonstration of a number of the key features of HRA in a simple context.
The sections that follow contain the design and analysis of classical passive control for
each of the three example HRAs that were detailed in Chapter 4. In each case, the following
approach is taken:
1. System analysis - the example system is examined under nominal and fault conditions
(according to the fault injection methodology described in Section 5.1.1) to determine
the requirement for control. The reduced order HRA models are used in the analysis
stage to aid clarity.
2. Control design - based on the results of the system analysis, a global load position con-
troller is designed. The control structure used is illustrated in Figure 5.2. A reference is
provided to the system which represents a global travel command for the whole HRA,
and feedback of the load position measurement is used. The passive controller provides
an identical drive voltage to all actuators in the system. This is a very simple arrange-
ment which requires only one sensor and input for the whole HRA. This simplicity is
intentional, as the whole passive approach is an exercise in simplicity, and serves to
illustrate what can be achieved using very basic methods with HRA.
3. Fault simulation - having established a control design using the linear, reduced order
HRA models, the controller's performance under fault conditions is analysed using the
full order, non-linear systems in order to provide a more accurate representation. The
eﬃcacy of the control design is subsequently evaluated as described in Section 5.1.2.
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Figure 5.2: Passive fault tolerant control structure.
5.1.1 Fault Injection Methodology
Due to the example HRA's relatively large number of elements, there are many possible
locations for fault injection, particularly when one considers multiple faults within the system.
However, examining each possible case is impractical, and thankfully unnecessary, as many
of these faults have similar eﬀects. Hence, a fault injection methodology is described in this
section to provide a suﬃciently thorough, yet concise procedure to analyse the system under
fault.
Firstly, the inﬂuence of parameter uncertainty is considered, then the eﬀects of lock-up
faults and loose faults are addressed.
5.1.1.1 Parameter Uncertainties
As stated earlier, the nominal behaviour of the system is subject to a degree of uncertainty
(Figure 5.1). The parameters of the reduced order system include the force constant k, the
input resistance R, and the mechanical damping and stiﬀness coeﬃcients d and r respectively,
the actual value of which is subject to uncertainty. Hence, considering the aﬀect of their
variation on the system is prudent.
A 10% deviation in each parameter is introduced into the system individually, in order
to get an appreciation of each parameter's inﬂuence. A change of 10% is used in line with
previous HRA studies made in (7). As there are many elements in each system, there are
many parameters that can be varied. However, varying one element's resistance in a parallel
branch of elements is equivalent to varying any of the other elements parallel to it. Hence,
where elements are arranged in parallel, only one variation per branch will be considered.
Therefore, with reference to Figure 5.3, in both the SP and PS case elements E11, E21, E31
and E41 are injected with parameter deviation faults consecutively, and the same follows for
the 10× 10 system.
5.1.1.2 Loose Faults
Loose faults are injected into the system up to the limit of the HRA's force requirement i.e.
1-8 in 4x4 PS HRA, 1-2 in 4x4 SP HRA and 1-40 in 10x10 PS HRA. As with parameter
deviations, a single loose fault in any parallel branch of elements is very similar to a single
loose fault in any other parallel branch. Further analysis shows that the quantity of loose
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Figure 5.3: Series-in-Parallel and Parallel-in-Series HRA.
Table 5.1: Loose fault injection for 10× 10PS HRA
Fault case 4× 4 PS 4× 4 SP 10× 10 PS
1 loose E(1,1) E(1,1) E(1,1)
2 loose E(1,1:2) E(1,1:2) -
3 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1) - -
4 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1:2) - E(1,1:4)
5 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1:2),E(3,1) - -
6 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1:2),E(3,1:2) - -
7 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1:2),E(3,1:2),E(4,1) - -
8 loose E(1,1:2),E(2,1:2),E(3,1:2),E(4,1:2) - E(1:2,1:4)
12 loose - - E(1:3,1:4)
16 loose - - E(1:4,1:4)
20 loose - - E(1:5,1:4)
24 loose - - E(1:6,1:4)
28 loose - - E(1:57,1:4)
32 loose - - E(1:8,1:4)
36 loose - - E(1:9,1:4)
40 loose - - E(1:10,1:4)
faults is decisive in the change of system behaviour, and maximum tolerable faults in the
fewest number of parallel branches is the worst case. Hence, the loose faults are injected as
described by Table 5.1. Only a selection of the possible 40 loose cases are chosen for the
10× 10 example for brevity.
5.1.1.3 Lock-up Faults
As in the loose fault case, lock-up faults are injected into the example systems up to the
capability limits of the system (1-2 in 4 × 4 PS HRA, 1-8 in the 4 × 4 SP HRA and 1-4 in
the 10 × 10 PS HRA). In the PS arrangement, a lock-up ﬁxes the parallel elements end to
end, eﬀectively locking the whole branch. Hence, the lock-up faults in the PS examples are
injected into separate branches. The location, serially, has very little aﬀect. However, faults
nearer the load are slightly more severe, hence lock-up faults are injected from the load in, as
a worst case.
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Table 5.2: Lock-up fault injection for example systems
Fault case 4× 4 PS 4× 4 SP 10× 10 PS
1 lock E(4,1) E(4,1) E(10,1)
2 lock E(3:4,1) E(3:4,1) E(9:10,1)
3 lock - E(3:4,1),E(4,2) E(8:10,1)
4 lock - E(3:4,1:2) E(7:10,1)
5 lock - E(3:4,1:2),E(4,3) -
6 lock - E(3:4,1:3) -
7 lock - E(3:4,1:3),E(4,4) -
8 lock - E(3:4,1:4) -
In the SP example, a maximum of two lock-ups in each serial branch is permissible for the
capability requirements, the location of which within the serial branch is negligible. Hence,
the faults are injected as described by Table 5.2.
5.1.2 Evaluation Methodology
In order to quantify the aﬀect of faults on the example systems, and establish the degree
of accommodation aﬀorded by the designed control scheme, it is pertinent to deﬁne some
evaluation criteria. Hence, the following characteristics are examined and compared:
• Stability margins - The preservation of stability margins is important for the system
under fault and as such, they are examined.
• Additive error  The additive error is the nominal system G minus the faulty system
Gf . This indicates the diﬀerence between the nominal and perturbed states over the
frequency range.
• Inﬁnity norm of additive error  The inﬁnity norm denotes the maximum. Thus, the
inﬁnity norm of the additive error is the maximum error, giving an indication of the
severity of the fault.
• Transient characteristics - Requirements for each example include overshoot limits and
speed requirements, and in addition, as the control objective is set-point tracking,
steady-state errors should also be minimised. Hence, the transient characteristics of
the nominal and faulty systems are compared.
5.2 Open-Loop System Analysis
This section will examine the three example systems under nominal and fault conditions
in order to establish the requirement for control in each case. In addition, this analysis
gives an indication of the comparative tolerance to the considered fault types for PS and SP
conﬁgurations of elements, and for two levels of HRA size (4x4 and 10x10). The models used
are the reduced-order representations, full descriptions of which are included in Appendix C.
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Figure 5.4: Frequency response of 4x4 PS HRA
Table 5.3: Stability margins of nominal example systems
PM GM BW
Example HRA (deg) (dB) (rads−1)
4x4 PS HRA 79.1 ∞ 0.51
4x4 SP HRA 79.1 ∞ 0.51
10x10 PS HRA 40.0 ∞ 0.79
5.2.1 Nominal system
Figures 5.4 to 5.6 show the frequency response of the three example systems from voltage
input to load position output and Table 5.3 contains a summary of their frequency domain
characteristics. The 4×4 PS and SP conﬁgurations have the same nominal frequency response
from the designated input-to-output. The gain and phase margins are adequate in both of
these cases, but an increase in bandwidth is required. The 10 × 10 HRA also requires an
increase in bandwidth, but in addition, the phase margin should also be widened.
5.2.2 Parameter Deviations
A 10% parameter deviation is introduced into the example HRAs according to the methodol-
ogy given in Section 5.1.1. Figures 5.7 to 5.9 gives the resultant singular values of the nominal
and parameter deviated systems and Figures 5.10 to 5.12 the additive error between them.
Table 5.4 summarises these ﬁgures.
The ﬁgures show that generally, the perturbation is minimal. The 4 × 4 examples have
similar perturbations. Changes in k and R produce the greatest aﬀect around the bandwidth
of the system. Deviations in the damping have little aﬀect over the whole frequency range.
However, changes in the stiﬀness r have the greatest eﬀect at low frequency, resulting in
changed steady-state behaviour, which is intuitively correct.
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Figure 5.5: Frequency response of 4x4 SP HRA
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Figure 5.6: Frequency response of 10x10 PS HRA
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Figure 5.7: Singular values for 4x4 PS HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty.
The parameter changes have a noticeably smaller eﬀect on the 10 × 10 HRA. Changes
in the stability margins and bandwidth are smaller, and the maximum error is considerably
lower than the 4×4 systems, a result which reﬂects an important feature of the HRA concept,
where more elements result in decreased eﬀects of faults in individual elements.
5.2.3 Loose Faults
Figures 5.13 to 5.15 give the singular values of the nominal systems and systems with loose
faults, injected according to the fault methodology. The additive errors between the nominal
and fault cases are also provided in Figures 5.16 to 5.18. Table 5.5 contains the stability
margins and additive errors of the loose fault systems.
It is apparent that loose faults have a greater aﬀect on the system in comparison to
parameter faults and that more loose faults increase the perturbation. The largest errors
occur at low frequency, suggesting that signiﬁcant steady-state errors are present.
Comparing a single loose fault in each system, it is apparent that, as with the parameter
deviations, this fault type has less aﬀect in the system with the most elements. It can also be
seen that the loose fault has less inﬂuence on the PS conﬁguration than the SP HRA. This is
as parallel elements provide greater tolerance to this fault type.
Maximum fault levels in each conﬁguration produce similar changes in bandwidth and
phase margin. However, the number of faults required to induce the maximum is diﬀerent
in each case. Up to a 10◦ decrease in phase margin is induced by the loose faults, hence
the control should include at least 10◦ of phase margin above the minimum requirement to
accommodate these changes under fault.
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Figure 5.8: Singular values for 4x4 SP HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty.
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Figure 5.9: Singular values for 10x10 PS HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty.
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Figure 5.10: Singular values of additive error between nominal and parameter deviated 4x4
PS HRA.
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Figure 5.11: Singular values of additive error between nominal and parameter deviated 4x4
SP HRA.
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Figure 5.12: Singular values of additive error between nominal and parameter deviated 10x10
PS HRA.
Table 5.4: Stability margins and additive error of 4x4 PS HRA under nominal and fault
conditions
PM GM BW ||G−Gf ||∞
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 79.2 ∞ 0.50 -
k 75.8-81.9 ∞ 0.45-0.56 0.22-2.2
d 79.1 ∞ 0.50 0.0002-0.0013
r 79.1 ∞ 0.50 0.011-1.9
R 77.5-80.2 ∞ 0.48-0.533 0.20-1.05
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 79.1 ∞ 0.51 -
k 80.9-83.6 ∞ 0.45-0.56 0.22-2.7
d 79.1 ∞ 0.51 0.030
r 79.1 ∞ 0.51 0.20
R 79.1-80.6 ∞ 0.51-0.54 0.20-1.2
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 39.98 ∞ 0.79 -
k 40.02-40.04 ∞ 0.79 0.088
d 39.98-40.02 ∞ 0.79 0.001
r 39.98 ∞ 0.79 0.087
R 39.96-39.98 ∞ 0.79 0.080
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Figure 5.13: Singular values for 4x4 PS HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.14: Singular values for 4x4 SP HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.15: Singular values for 10x10 PS HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.16: Singular values of additive error between nominal and 4x4 PS HRA with loose
faults
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Figure 5.17: Singular values of additive error between nominal and 4x4 SP HRA with loose
faults
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Figure 5.18: Singular values of additive error between nominal and 10x10 PS HRA with loose
faults
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Table 5.5: Stability margins and additive error of example HRAs under nominal and loose
fault conditions
PM GM BW ||G−Gf ||∞
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 79.2 ∞ 0.50 -
1 loose 78.4 75.9 0.50 2.19
2 loose 77.1 49.9 0.50 4.37
3 loose 76.6 49.2 0.50 6.56
4 loose 74.7 49.1 0.50 8.75
5 loose 73.9 52.5 0.50 10.94
6 loose 72.4 ∞ 0.49 13.12
7 loose 71.6 ∞ 0.49 15.31
8 loose 70.2 ∞ 0.48 17.50
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 79.1 ∞ 0.51 -
E11 loose 77.4 ∞ 0.50 2.19
E11, E12 loose 71.3 ∞ 0.50 4.37
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 40.0 ∞ 0.79 -
1 loose 39.7 ∞ 0.79 0.87
4 loose 38.4 ∞ 0.78 3.50
8 loose 36.9 ∞ 0.77 7.00
12 loose 35.7 ∞ 0.75 10.50
16 loose 34.7 ∞ 0.74 14.00
20 loose 33.9 ∞ 0.72 17.50
24 loose 33.4 ∞ 0.71 21.00
28 loose 33.1 ∞ 0.69 24.50
32 loose 32.9 ∞ 0.67 28.00
36 loose 32.9 ∞ 0.66 31.50
40 loose 33.0 ∞ 0.64 35.00
96
CHAPTER 5. PASSIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF HIGH REDUNDANCY
ACTUATION
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101 102 103 104
−200
−150
−100
−50
0
50
Singular values of 4x4 PS HRA with lock faults
Frequency, Hz
Si
ng
ul
ar
 V
al
ue
s, 
dB
 
 
nominal
1 locked
2 locked
Figure 5.19: Singular values for 4x4 PS HRA with lock-up faults
5.2.4 Lock-up Faults
The singular values of the example systems under lock-up faults are shown in Figures 5.19 to 5.21
and their additive errors in Figures 5.22 to 5.24. Table 5.6 contains the phase margins and
inﬁnity norm additive errors for these systems.
In general, the inﬁnity norm of the additive errors are much larger than those incurred
by the loose faults, indicating that the lock-up fault is the most severe of the fault types
examined within both the PS and SP conﬁgurations. The error levels in the low frequency
region are comparable to those incurred by loose faults, again suggesting steady-state changes.
However, larger errors around the system bandwidth are created by lock-up faults. Signiﬁcant
decreases in the bandwidth indicate a slower system response. This is logical, as lock faults
eﬀectively increase the amount of mass in the system. The lock-up faults increase the phase
margin of the system, hence do not present a problem for stability.
When comparing the aﬀect of lock-up faults between the example systems, a similar trend
to the loose faults can be observed. The maximum PM changes are similar in each case,
however, more lock-ups are present in the SP system than in the PS to reach this maximum.
This is because serial elements provide more tolerance to lock-up faults. Comparing the PS
conﬁgurations, it can be seen that a single lock-up fault has approximately half the eﬀect on
the 10× 10 system than the 4× 4 system in terms of maximum additive error. This is due to
increased element numbers reducing fault severity.
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Figure 5.20: Singular values for 4x4 SP HRA with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.21: Singular values for 10x10 PS HRA with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.22: Singular values of additive error between nominal 4x4 PS HRA and 4x4 PS HRA
with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.23: Singular values of additive error between nominal 4x4 SP HRA and 4x4 SP HRA
with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.24: Singular values of additive error between nominal 10x10 PS HRA and 10x10 PS
HRA with lock-up faults
Table 5.6: Stability margins and inﬁnity norm of additive error for example HRAs under
nominal and lock-up fault conditions
PM GM BW ||G−Gf ||∞
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 79.2 ∞ 0.50 -
1 lock 85.4 ∞ 0.39 18.8
2 lock 90.4 ∞ 0.26 24.90
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 79.1 ∞ 0.51 -
1 lock 82.5 ∞ 0.47 3.65
2 lock 84.0 ∞ 0.44 8.84
3 lock 85.3 ∞ 0.41 13.17
4 lock 86.3 ∞ 0.39 18.71
5 lock 87.9 ∞ 0.34 21.75
6 lock 89.1 ∞ 0.31 26.14
7 lock 90.0 ∞ 0.28 38.10
8 lock 91.0 ∞ 0.26 35.08
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 40.0 ∞ 0.79 -
1 lock 41.7 ∞ 0.75 8.71
2 lock 44.3 ∞ 0.71 17.38
3 lock 48.0 ∞ 0.68 25.70
4 lock 53.9 ∞ 0.61 35.01
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5.2.5 System Analysis Summary
The system analysis has produced a number of points that should be considered in the control
design. The nominal 4 × 4 systems have suﬃcient stability margins, but an increase in
bandwidth is required. The nominal 10 × 10 system requires both an increase in the phase
margin and bandwidth however.
The faults analysed have a varied aﬀect on the example systems. Parameter deviations in
each case have a relatively small inﬂuence and should not cause issues. Loose faults, however,
have a greater inﬂuence. They introduce steady-state errors and decrease the phase margin.
An extra 10◦ of phase margin should be provided to accommodate this. Lock-up faults are
the most severe fault type. They decrease the bandwidth of the system and increase the phase
margin, and as such are not a threat to stability, but will aﬀect the speed of the system.
Thus, loose and lock-up faults have conﬂicting eﬀects, and as such, a trade-oﬀ exists
between designing for loose fault and lock-up fault performance. The control may be made
more conservative to accommodate loose faults more easily, however, this will heighten the
negative inﬂuences of lock-up faults. Likewise, more phase could be introduced into the control
law to make the lock-up faults more tolerable, at the expense of decreasing the tolerance to
loose faults. Hence, it is a question of which fault has the highest probability of occurrence
in an application as to the adjustments that could be made. However, assuming that they of
equal likelihood, designing control based on the nominal system is a simple compromise, and
is the approach taken in the following section. Alternatively, an optimisation approach akin
to that presented in (23) could be followed to achieve a more suitable controller. However, as
passive control is not the main contribution of this work, the simple approach is taken.
The system analysis has also demonstrated some key features of the HRA concept. It
has been shown that faults have a smaller aﬀect on the 10× 10 system in comparison to the
4 × 4 conﬁgurations, as greater numbers of elements reduce the inﬂuence of element faults.
Secondly, it has been demonstrated that serial elements increase the accommodation of loose
faults, and parallel elements the tolerance to lock-up faults.
5.3 Control Design
Given the conclusions of the system analysis in Section 5.2, the design of control laws (ac-
cording to the structure of Figure 5.2) for each of the three example systems is detailed in
this section.
5.3.1 4x4 PS HRA
A simple phase advance controller is designed to introduce gain and phase into the system.
The control law is given in equation 5.1. A zero is placed at -2.25 to cancel a pole in that
region, and the pole is placed approximately 12 times faster to increase the phase margin by
approximately 10◦. This extra phase margin is then used to increase the gain of the system.
GPA = 11
0.45s + 1
0.038s + 1
(5.1)
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Figure 5.25: Frequency response of 4x4 PS HRA with passive control
The resultant open loop frequency response of the reduced order system, on which the
control is based, and the full order system is shown in Figure 5.25 and Table 5.7 gives the
associated characteristics. It can be seen that the diﬀerence between the reduced order and
full order system is very small in the low and mid frequency regions, having little aﬀect on
the phase margin, bandwidth or transient characteristics of the system. The phase in the full
order system, however, does fall below −180◦ degree, and as such the full order system has a
gain margin of 41dB. This margin is adequate however, and is not considered a problem.
A step response using the full order system is given in Figure 5.26. A step input of the
full travel position reference (0.03m) is applied at t = 0. The voltage input to the elements
is well within the physical limits of the system. The load position and the relative positions
of the elements is given in the second subplot. The travel is equally distributed between
the elements, however the elements nearer the load move more quickly. This is due to the
force produced by those elements eﬀectively working on less mass than those elements nearer
the ﬁxed surface. This is a phenomenon that should be less prevalent in HRAs that contain
increased inter-mass to load mass ratios. A summary of the load position response transient
characteristics is given in Table 5.7.
5.3.2 4x4 SP HRA
As the nominal characteristics of the 4 × 4 SP HRA are the same as the 4 × 4 PS system,
and the control is designed to suit the nominal case (as it is assumed that loose and lock-up
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Figure 5.26: Step response of 4x4 PS HRA with passive control
Table 5.7: Stability Margins and transient characteristics of globally controlled example HRAs
PM GM BW SSerr RT ST OS
(deg) (dB) (rads−1) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA 80.0 41.5 5.76 0 0.31 0.58 0
4x4 SP HRA 80.0 41.5 5.71 0 0.31 0.58 0
10x10 PS HRA 73.7 47.5 3.19 0 0.47 0.79 0.05
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Figure 5.27: Frequency response of 4x4 SP HRA with passive control
faults are equally likely), then the control designed in the PS example (see equation 5.1) may
also be applied here.
The resultant open loop frequency response for the reduced order SP system and its full-
order representation are shown in Figure 5.27 and the simulated step response of the full order
system is given in Figure 5.28. The results are the same as that for the PS system, as further
shown by Table 5.7.
5.3.3 10x10 PS HRA
A similar approach to that of the 4× 4 systems is taken to controlling the 10× 10 PS HRA.
The phase advance controller designed is given in equation 5.2. The zero is placed to cancel a
pole at -0.5952, and the pole of the phase advance is placed 12 times faster. The gain is then
increased to improve the steady-state errors, within the overshoot limit.
GPA = 2.5
1.68s + 1
0.14s + 1
(5.2)
The open loop frequency response of the controlled reduced order and full order system
is given in Figure 5.29. Again, the low to mid frequency region are very similar, resulting
in little change to the phase margin, bandwidth and transient characteristics of the system.
The full order system does not have inﬁnite gain margin however, as shown in Table 5.7.
Nevertheless, the gain margin is ample.
The simulated step response of the controlled full order system is given in Figure 5.30.
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Figure 5.28: Step response of 4x4 SP HRA with passive control
Figure 5.29: Frequency response of 10x10 PS HRA with passive control
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Figure 5.30: Step response of 10x10 PS HRA with passive control
A step input of the full travel position reference (0.06m) is applied at t = 0. The resultant
voltage input to the system is well within the physical limits of the system. The load position
and the relative position of the inter-element masses are given in the second subplot. Equal
distribution of the travel is again evident.
5.3.4 Control Design Summary
The design of simple phase advance controllers for the three example HRA systems has been
detailed. The controlled systems meet the requirements (Chapter 4) for the nominal system.
The next section will examine their performance under fault conditions.
5.4 Fault Simulation
5.4.1 Parameter Deviations
Figures 5.31 to 5.36 show the singular values and simulated step response of the controlled
parameter deviated systems in comparison to the nominal case and Table 5.8 summarises these
results. The inﬁnity norm of the closed-loop additive error (||∆GfCL||∞ =||GCL −GCLf ||∞) is
greatly reduced in comparison to the uncontrolled system, as one would expect. The eﬀects on
system behaviour are minimal in each case, and the system remains within the performance
requirements.
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Figure 5.31: Singular values for controlled 4x4 PS HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty
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Figure 5.32: Singular values for controlled 4x4 SP HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty
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Figure 5.33: Singular values for controlled 10x10 PS HRA with 10% parameter uncertainty
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Figure 5.34: Step response of 4x4 PS HRA with passive control and parameter deviations
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Figure 5.35: Step response of 4x4 SP HRA with passive control and parameter deviations
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Figure 5.36: Step response of 10x10 PS HRA with passive control and parameter deviations
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Table 5.8: Stability margins and transient characteristics of example HRAs under nominal and fault conditions
4x4 PS HRA PM GM BW ||GfCL||∞ SSerr RT ST OS
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 80.0 41.5 5.76 - 0 0.31 0.58 0
k 79.8-80.4 40.5-42.0 5.74-5.79 0.012-0.016 0 0.30-0.31 0.63-0.65 0
d 80 41.5 5.76 0 0 0.31 0.58 0
r 80 41.5 5.76 0 0 0.31 0.58 0
R 78.7-80.8 41.4-41.6 5.72-5.74 0.0034-0.0037 0 0.31 0.58 0
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 80.0 41.5 5.71 - 0 0.31 0.58 0
k 81.4-85.2 41.2-41.4 6.29-6.45 0.086-0.090 0 0.30-0.37 0.80-1.16 0
d 81.4 41.5 6.34 0.082 0 0.30 0.77 0
r 81.3 41.5 6.34 0.082 0 0.30 0.77 0
R 81.3-79.7 41.4-41.7 6.31 0.079 0 0.28-0.31 0.58-0.76 0
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 73.7 47.5 3.19 - 0 0.47 0.79 0.05
k 73.93-74.05 46.6-49.6 3.16 0.0011 0 0.48 0.80 0.12
d 73.98 47.5 3.16 0 0 0.48 0.80 0.13
r 73.98 47.5 3.16 0.0006 0 0.48 0.80 0.13
R 73.93-74.03 46.6-51.5 3.16 0.0013 0 0.48-0.49 0.80 0.13
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5.4.2 Loose Faults
Figures 5.37 to 5.42 give the singular values and simulated step response of the controlled 4x4
PS, SP and 10× 10 PS HRAs with loose faults, which are summarised in Table 5.9.
A signiﬁcant bandwidth decrease is still present and as such the transient characteristics
are aﬀected. In particular, the overshoot increase in the system is substantial, exceeding the
requirement limit in most cases. One remedy to this issue may be to increase the phase
advance in the control. However, this will make the nominal performance more conservative
and the phase advance ratio is already relatively high.
The SP HRA transient response exhibits the eﬀects of the non-linearities in the system.
As the branches become increasingly loose, then the loose element coils hit the end-stops
causing the large transients seen in Figure 5.42. This phenomena can be more clearly seen in
Figure 5.43, which gives the SP 4 × 4 system response to a pulse train, whilst there are two
loose faults in elements e43and e44 i.e.two branches are loose. The relative positions of all the
elements are also given in this ﬁgure.
On applying the initial voltage it can be seen that the force exerted by the remaining active
elements in the loose branches (cyan), causes the loose elements (red) to hit their nearside
end-stop. Likewise, as the elements decelerate, the loose elements continue to travel and hit
the far-side end-stop. The uncontrollability of the loose element is exacerbated by the control
driving the remaining active elements in the loose branch. This phenomena will be further
discussed in Chapter 7.
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Figure 5.37: Singular values for controlled 4x4 PS HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.38: Singular values for controlled 4x4 SP HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.39: Singular values for controlled 10x10 PS HRA with loose faults
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Figure 5.40: Step response of 4x4 PS HRA with passive control and loose faults
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Figure 5.41: Step response of 4x4 SP HRA with passive control and loose faults
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Simulated step response of  controlled 10x10 PS HRA with loose faults
Time (sec)
In
pu
t (
V)
 
 
nominal
1 loose
4 loose
8 loose
12 loose
16 loose
20 loose
24 loose
28 loose
32 loose
36 loose
40 loose
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Time (sec)
Po
sit
io
n 
(m
)
Figure 5.42: Step response of 10x10 PS HRA with passive control and loose faults
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Table 5.9: Stability margins and transient characteristics of example HRAs under nominal
and loose fault conditions
4x4 PS HRA PM GM BW ||GfCL||∞ SSerr RT ST OS
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 80.0 41.5 5.76 - 0 0.31 0.58 0
1 loose 77.4 39.7 5.49 0.06 0 0.30 0.53 0.13
2 loose 74.0 37.8 4.99 0.15 0 0.31 0.56 1.62
3 loose 73.1 40.6 4.73 0.19 0 0.32 1.02 2.57
4 loose 71.6 45.7 4.30 0.26 0 0.34 1.34 4.36
5 loose 71.2 46.1 4.09 0.29 0 0.36 1.46 5.22
6 loose 70.4 46.3 3.75 0.34 0 0.39 1.66 6.75
7 loose 70.2 46.2 3.60 0.36 0 0.40 1.75 7.44
8 loose 70.0 46.1 3.34 0.39 0 0.43 1.91 8.62
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 79.3 41.5 5.73 - 0 0.31 0.57 0
1 loose 75.99 44.55 4.44 0.16 0 0.40 1.43 2.99
2 loose 69.48 46.68 3.21 0.38 0 0.53 2.26 8.51
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 73.7 47.5 3.19 - 0 0.47 0.79 0.13
1 loose 73.1 45.8 3.14 0.02 0 0.48 0.77 0.16
4 loose 70.1 39.0 3.02 0.10 0 0.47 0.72 1.45
8 loose 68.2 45.2 2.86 0.18 0 0.48 1.33 3.15
12 loose 67.2 50.5 2.71 0.24 0 0.51 1.59 4.30
16 loose 67.2 50.6 2.58 0.27 0 0.57 1.85 4.87
20 loose 67.9 50.3 2.46 0.30 0 0.57 2.18 5.06
24 loose 68.9 50.2 2.35 0.30 0 0.60 2.59 4.98
28 loose 70.4 50.2 2.26 0.31 0 0.63 3.01 4.83
32 loose 72.1 50.2 2.18 0.31 0 0.66 3.40 4.74
36 loose 73.9 50.2 2.11 0.30 0 0.69 3.75 4.80
40 loose 75.7 50.2 2.06 030 0 0.72 4.08 4.91
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Figure 5.43: Response of SP 4× 4 HRA with two loose faults in two branches to pulse train
input.
5.4.3 Lock-up Faults
The frequency response and additive error of the locked systems are given in Figures 5.44 and
the transient response in Figure 5.47. These plots and Table 5.10 show that the additive error
of lock-up faults is reduced in the controlled system. As in the case of loose faults however,
the rise time and settling time rise considerably.
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Figure 5.44: Singular values for controlled 4x4 PS HRA with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.45: Singular values for controlled 4x4 SP HRA with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.46: Singular values for controlled 10x10 PS HRA with lock-up faults
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Figure 5.47: Step response of 4x4 PS HRA with passive control and lock-up faults
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Figure 5.48: Step response of 4x4 SP HRA with passive control and lock-up faults
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Figure 5.49: Step response of 10x10 PS HRA with passive control and lock-up faults
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Table 5.10: Stability margins and transient characteristics of example HRAs under nominal
and lock-up fault conditions
PM GM BW ||GfCL||∞ SSerr RT ST OS
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (dB) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 80 41.5 5.76 - 0 0.31 0.58 0
1 lock 86.5 42.5 5.02 0.09 0 0.45 1.32 0.17
2 lock 95.5 43.5 3.99 1.00 0 0.94 2.09 0
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 80.0 41.5 5.71 - 0 0.31 0.58 0
1 lock 83.1 41.5 6.42 0.090 0 0.33 0.76 0
2 lock 84.9 41.5 6.42 0.098 0 0.35 0.99 0.03
3 lock 86.6 41.5 6.42 0.11 0 0.39 1.16 0.09
4 lock 88.4 41.5 6.41 0.12 0 0.44 1.28 0.17
5 lock 92.2 41.5 6.25 0.14 0 0.58 1.56 0
6 lock 96.1 41.4 6.06 0.16 0 0.72 1.75 0
7 lock 100.1 41.4 5.82 0.19 0 0.83 1.92 0
8 lock 104.1 41.4 5.53 1.00 0 0.94 2.08 0
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 73.7 47.5 3.19 - 0 0.47 0.79 0.13
1 lock 73.4 48.2 2.90 0.082 0 0.66 1.09 0
2 lock 73.7 48.8 2.69 0.15 0 0.77 1.12 0
3 lock 74.7 49.3 2.52 0.20 0 0.85 2.16 0
4 lock 76.7 49.9 2.36 0.24 0 0.93 3.49 0
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5.4.4 Fault Simulation Summary
The fault simulations have demonstrated the aﬀect of faults on the closed-loop systems. Pa-
rameter deviations have a negligible inﬂuence in the closed-loop. Loose faults however, result
in increased settling times and overshoots. Likewise, lock-up faults produce increased rise and
settling times. Stability margins are maintained in each system under the faults considered.
The transient characteristics of the results are summarised in Figures 5.50 to 5.52.
In these ﬁgures the settling time, rise time and overshoot of the nominal and faulty systems
are represented alongside the performance requirements (denoted by the blue area).
It can be seen that the parameter deviated systems for each example all lie within the
performance boundary. Although up to 8 loose faults are theoretically tolerable for the 4× 4
PS HRA, only the systems with 1-2 loose faults lie within the desired performance region, due
to the large increases in overshoot and settling time. Likewise, up to 2 lock-up faults are tol-
erable from a capability perspective, however, neither of these systems meet the performance
requirements.
The results are similar for the SP system. Only 4 of the theoretically possible 8 lock-up
faults are tolerated within the SP system, due to increases in rise time and settling time, and
no loose faults lie within the required performance boundary due to the the overshoot and
settling time introduced.
The 10 × 10 PS HRA is capable of tolerating 1-4 loose faults and 1 lock-up before the
performance criteria is exceeded.
Overall, a large number of the tolerable fault situations (from a capability perspective)
do not satisfy the performance criteria. There are a number of ways in which this could be
improved:
• Relax the performance criteria - It may be acceptable in certain applications to deﬁne
a nominal performance criteria and accept a performance degraded beyond this point
under higher levels of fault, and in this way increase the number of permissible faults
within the system. However, this is not an ideal concession.
• Improve the passive control - The control approach taken within this section is very
basic. A more sophisticated approach or a more complex control law could provide
greater performance in fault conditions.
• Active fault tolerant control - Changing the control law in response to fault conditions
will improve performance, at the expense of a reliance on fault detection and reconﬁg-
uration.
The next chapter investigates an active fault tolerant approach to controlling HRA and will
aim to quantify the advantages in terms of performance and fault tolerance. Issues associated
with the introduction of active FTC such as the reliance on fault detection will also be
addressed within this chapter.
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Figure 5.50: Transient characteristics of passively controlled 4×4 PS HRA under fault
Figure 5.51: Transient characteristics of passively controlled 4×4 SP HRA under fault
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Figure 5.52: Transient characteristics of passively controlled 10×10 PS HRA under fault
5.5 Conclusions
The design and simulation of passive fault tolerant control for three HRA examples have been
presented in this chapter.
Analyses of the systems under nominal and fault conditions were initially conducted, in
order to establish the control requirements and quantify the eﬀects of faults on the systems.
Generally, it was shown that faults have less aﬀect in larger systems, and that serial actuation
provides greater tolerance to loose faults and parallel actuation to lock-ups. Parameter devi-
ations were found to have a relatively small inﬂuence in both the SP and PS conﬁgurations.
Loose faults and lock-up faults however, have greater aﬀect, with the lock-up fault being the
more severe.
Loose and lock-up faults were found to have conﬂicting eﬀects from a control design
perspective, and as such, a trade-oﬀ exists between designing for loose fault and lock-up fault
performance. It was assumed that the occurrence of loose and lock-up faults were of equal
likelihood, and thus designing control based on the nominal system was considered the most
suitable compromise.
Hence, passive classical control laws were designed for each system based on the nominal
mode. This control was tested under simulation using the full order, non-linear system.
Faults were injected into each system up to the theoretical capability limits of the system.
Results of these simulations indicate that, using the single basic control law designed in 5.3,
performance is signiﬁcantly degraded, leading to a large number of the theoretically tolerable
faults exceeding the performance requirements.
The active fault tolerant control of the example HRAs will be addressed within Chapter 7
in order to assess the beneﬁts accrued in terms of fault tolerance and performance with the
introduction of control reconﬁguration.
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Chapter 6
Fault Detection & Health Monitoring
6.1 Introduction
One of the major advantages of passive fault tolerant control (Chapter 5) is that fault state
knowledge i.e. Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) is not required from a control perspective.
However, from an operational perspective, some form of health monitoring is a necessity. It
is envisaged that the HRA will continue to operate within an acceptable performance region
under element fault conditions, until the capability (be it travel or force) falls below that
required by the application. At this point, or just before it, maintenance will be required to
replace the HRA unit. Hence, health monitoring is needed to provide an indication of the
capability of the HRA in order to schedule this maintenance or health information could be
used for operational purposes.
The Active Fault Tolerant Control (AFTC) method presented in the next chapter also
requires the fault state of the system to be detected. However, in AFTC, the control is
dependent on the fault state and thus more detailed information is required.
This chapter approaches the issues of fault detection for general health monitoring pur-
poses and for AFTC. To this end, two methods of fault detection are presented and applied
to the 4 × 4 PS example HRA system1: an Interacting Multiple-Model (IMM) method for
general health monitoring and a rule-based approach to be used in the AFTC method.
Two diﬀerent approaches are described as FDI for general health monitoring and FDI for
the AFTC methods presented in this work have diﬀering requirements and resources at their
disposal. These characteristics are summarised in Table 6.1.
As mentioned previously, the explicitness of the fault information required is diﬀerent,
however, there also other distinctions. The speed of detection is more critical within the AFTC
set-up, as the eﬀectiveness of the control relies upon the diagnosis. Simplicity is also a major
requirement for the particular AFTC method presented in this work. The AFTC method in
question is inspired by multi-agent concepts, and as such it operates on a localised basis2.
Hence, faults need to be detected in small sub-sets of the HRA's elements. This information
1For the sake of brevity, the fault detection methods are only applied to the 4× 4 PS system, and not all
three example HRAs. The methods apply equally to the other example systems and indeed the rule-based
method is applied to the other HRAs in the Chapter 7.
2The multi-agent active fault tolerant control approach is described in detail in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.1: Fault detection and health monitoring requirements and resources
Fault Detection for AFTC General health monitoring
Requirements Fault type and location Indication of HRA's capability
Fast detection Timely detection
Localised operation Centralised operation
Resources Many local sensors Minimal sensors
Local input information Single input information
can then be aggregated throughout the agency, providing a very detailed representation of
the fault state of the HRA. Consequently, there are numerous fault detection units, and as
such a simple approach is desirable in order to reduce complexity in the system. Indeed, a
simple approach is all that should be required as detecting faults on this local scale is more
straightforward than taking a centralised perspective.
Another consequence of the localised AFTC is that there is local sensory information
available to each FDI unit. In contrast, the FDI for health monitoring should use the limited
sensory information available in the passively controlled systems, as added sensors will increase
cost. As the scheme is centralised, however, then a more complex approach may be permissible
as it is a one-oﬀ in the system.
6.2 Rule-Based Fault Detection for AFTC
A rule-based approach to fault detection was chosen for use with the multi-agent inspired
control scheme of Chapter 7 as it satisﬁes the requirements outlined in Table 6.1. The rule-
based detection is very simple, and provides a ﬁnite-state representation of the fault condition.
The composition of the rule-based FDI for the PS 4 × 4 HRA example is represented in
Figure 6.1. The ﬁgure shows the internal control structure of the agent that controls the bank
of parallel elements nearest the load. There is an identical agent for each parallel bank of
elements. Details of the control architecture are given in Chapter 7, and as such they are
omitted here. All that is necessary to note is that in each agent there is a fault detection
unit which has access to all the quantities within the agent, such as the local measurements
of element position and coil current, the actuator voltage input and local reference, and with
these quantities it is necessary for the FDI unit to determine whether the elements are healthy,
locked, or if a proportion of them are loose using some logical relations. The lock-up and loose
fault detection processes have been separated within this layer, and operate concurrently to
optimise detection times. Also, a loose detection algorithm is used per element within the
agent's subsystem, thus separating the detection algorithms allows easier extension to diﬀerent
element levels. The detection algorithms are discussed in the subsections that follow.
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Figure 6.1: Rule-based fault detection in multi-agent control of HRA
6.2.1 Lock-up Fault Detection
Symptoms: If an element is locked, then its relative velocity is zero. Other occasions
where an element may be stationary include when the element is at its reference point, or
when it has reached the limit of travel.
Diagnosis: Hence, the algorithm should ﬁrstly check if the element is moving. If it is not,
then it should check if there is a position error in order to determine if it is at the reference
point. If there is an error, then the position of the element should be checked to determine if
the element is at the limit of travel, and the input is larger than the element travel limit.
Rules: Hence, to diagnose a lock-up fault, the following rules can be used:
Flock → Llock1 ∧ Llock2
Llock1 : x˙ < x˙threshold
Llock2 : e > ethreshold ∧ (x < xlimit ∨ (x = xlimit ∧ u < xlimit))
where Llock represents the rules to be checked, e is the local input error and ethreshold,
x˙threshold and xlim represent the position error threshold, the velocity threshold and the travel
limit respectively.
The inputs and outputs of the detection algorithm are shown in Figure 6.2 and the process
is described in the ﬂow chart of Figure 6.3. The position and error are locally available, and
the velocity is approximated using a diﬀerence equation.
A conviction factor is used within the algorithm to decide whether the actuation element
is locked. If the rules are valid for enough iterations, then the fault detection will enter the
lock-up state. If however the actuation element moves, the conviction factor is reset. This
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Figure 6.2: Lock-up fault detection
conviction factor and the thresholds are manually tuned based on the clock rate and the
system.
6.2.2 Loose Fault Detection
Symptoms: If an element is loose, then the current ﬂowing within the coil is zero. The
current may also be zero whilst the actuator is healthy if the element is stationary.
Diagnosis: Thus, to diagnose a loose fault the algorithm should ﬁrstly check if a current
ﬂows in the coil. If there is no current, then the velocity should be checked, a non-zero value
indicated that the element is moving whilst not being driven, i.e. it is loose.
Rules: Thus, diagnosis of this fault type may be achieved with the following rules:
Floose → Lloose1 ∧ Lloose2
Lloose1 : Ic < Icthreshold
Lloose2 : x˙ > x˙threshold
where Lloose represent the rules to be checked, and Ic is the measured coil current. Fig-
ure 6.4 shows the inputs and outputs of the loose fault detection algorithm and Figure 6.5
provides a ﬂow chart. Again, a conviction factor is used within the algorithm to decide
whether the actuation element is loose.
6.2.3 Fault Simulations
The rule-based FDI approach described in the previous sub-section is simulated here. The
cascaded nominal control architecture that will be described in Chapter 7 is used. A sine wave
input reference provides a constant source of excitation and Gaussian white noise is added to
the HRA plant input and measured values. A sampling frequency and clock rate of 20 Hz is
used within the fault detection element of the simulation.
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Figure 6.3: Flow chart for lock-up fault detection
Figure 6.4: Loose fault detection
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Figure 6.5: Flow chart for loose fault detection
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Table 6.2: Loose fault simulation proﬁle (refer to Figure C.1 for element numbers)
Fault State Loose Elements Time
Nominal - 0-2s
1 Loose E11 2-4s
2 Loose E11 E21 4-6s
3 Loose E11 E21 E31 6-8s
4 Loose E11 E21 E31 E41 8-10s
5 Loose E11-2 E21 E31 E41 10-12s
6 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31 E41 12-14s
7 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31-2 E41 14-16s
8 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31-2 E41-2 16-18s
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Figure 6.6: Rule-based loose fault detection simulation
6.2.3.1 Loose Faults
Figure 6.6 gives the fault detection signals produced by the rule-based FDI where the fault
status changes from nominal to 8 loose faults (the total number tolerable in this conﬁguration)
as described in Table 6.2. The input and output to the HRA during this period is shown in
Figure 6.7. The rate at which faults occur in this proﬁle is unrealistically high. However, it
is simulated in this fashion as long-term, realistic timescales are not practical.
Each fault is detected accurately within 0.1s. However, it should be noted that if the input
type is changed to a less constant excitation, detection times can rise.
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Figure 6.7: HRA input and output during loose fault proﬁle.
Table 6.3: Lock-up fault simulation proﬁle
Fault State Locked branch Time
Nominal - 0-5s
1 Locked E2 5-10s
2 Locked E2, E4 10-15s
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Figure 6.8: Rule-based lock-up fault detection simulation
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Figure 6.9: HRA input and output during lock-up fault proﬁle.
6.2.3.2 Lock-up Faults
Simulation of the lock-up fault proﬁle represented in Table 6.3 results in the fault detection
waveforms shown in Figure 6.8 with input and output signals of that shown in Figure 6.9.
These results are typical of other fault location proﬁles.
Again, the detection of faults is accurate and quick, with a maximum detection time of 0.15
seconds. As in the loose fault detection, the speed of detection is decreased if the excitation
to the system is reduced, as faults cannot be detected when the element is stationary.
6.2.3.3 Summary
The fault simulations show that lock-up and loose faults are detected quickly and accurately
within this rule-based FDI approach. Detailed information regarding quantity and location of
fault is provided. However, a large number of sensors are required, and this approach is only
really practical when combined with a highly decentralised control strategy. Hence a more
centralised approach is discussed in the next section.
6.3 Interacting Multiple-Model Fault Detection for Health Mon-
itoring
As stressed in Section 6.1, a health monitoring scheme for use with passive robust control
should use the measurands that are already available to produce an indication of the overall
capability of the HRA. This can be a diﬃcult task as the measured information is from the
load alone i.e. nothing is explicitly known about the element-level dynamics. However, this
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Figure 6.10: IMM estimation
limited measured information can be combined with what is known about the behavioural
dynamics of the system under nominal and fault conditions i.e. the system models, to produce
an estimate of the system health state. The IMM FDI approach provides one possible means
of achieving this.
Conventional multiple-model estimation methods use a bank of ﬁlters, each of which is
based on a model of the system when it is in a particular mode. The outputs of these ﬁlters
are combined with a probabilistically weighted sum to achieve an overall state estimate.
However, there is no interaction between the ﬁlters, and as such the approach is not suited
to situations where the parameters or structure of the system changes (82). Nonetheless, non-
interacting methods of multiple-model estimation have been applied to FDI applications,
where sudden parameter and structural changes to the system occur using ad hoc solutions
(153; 154).
The interacting multiple-model method, developed in the ﬁeld of tracking (155; 156) deals
with these issues. In the IMM approach, the initial estimate at the beginning of each iteration
is a mixture of recent estimates from the ﬁlters. As a result the accuracy of estimation is
increased and dependency on the previous mode history is introduced. This increases its
suitability to detecting faults and thus it has been applied within this ﬁeld (157; 82; 158; 159;
160).
6.3.1 IMM Estimation Algorithm
A depiction of the IMM estimation algorithm is shown in Figure 6.10. A number of ﬁlters (in
this case Kalman ﬁlters) are designed based on m models of the system modes.
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Also, a mode transition probability matrix pij is deﬁned where the element ij represents
the probability of transition from mode i to mode j in the next time frame. This may be
based on knowledge of fault type frequency and likelihood when the system is in a certain
state.
The IMM algorithm has four main stages:
• Mixing
• Mode matched ﬁltering
• Mode probability calculation
• Combination of estimates
Mixing
The ﬁrst stage of the IMM algorithm involves the mixing of all the ﬁlters estimated values
and covariances from the previous iteration (xˆi(t−1) and P
i
(t−1) for i = 1 : m) and the mixed
probability, ρi|j(t−1) to produce the input to the ﬁlters:
xˆ0j(t−1) =
m∑
i=1
xˆj(t−1)ρi|j(t−1), j = 1, ...m (6.1)
P 0j(t−1) =
m∑
i=1
ρi|j(t−1)
{[
xˆj(t−1) − xˆ0j(t−1)
]
(6.2)
·
[
xˆj(t−1) − xˆ0j(t−1)
]T}
(6.3)
where ρi|j(t) in the previous time step was calculated by:
ρi|j(t−1) =
1
c¯j
pijρi(t−1), i, j = 1, ...,m (6.4)
c¯j =
m∑
i=1
pijρi(t−1), j = 1, ...,m (6.5)
Mode matched ﬁltering
The Kalman ﬁlter algorithms are then obtained based on the discrete system. For a discrete
system:
x(t+1) = Fx(t) +Gu(t) + w(t) (6.6)
y(t) = Hx(t) + Lu(t) + v(t) (6.7)
where w(t) and v(t) are the plant and measurement noise respectively with covariances
of Q and R. Both are assumed to be white Gaussian with zero mean. The Kalman ﬁlter
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algorithms can then be expressed as:
xˆj(t/t−1) = F
j(xˆ0j(t−1/t−1) +D
ju(t−1) (6.8)
xˆj(t/t) = xˆ
j
(t/t−1) +K
j
(t)
[
y(t) − (Hj(xˆj(t/t−1)) + Lju(t)
]
(6.9)
Kj(t) = P
j
(t/t−1)H
j T
(t/t−1)S
j−1
(t) (6.10)
Sj−1(t) = H
j
(t/t−1)P
j
(t/t−1)H
j T
(t/t−1) +R
j
(t−1) (6.11)
P j(t/t−1) = F
j
(t−1)P
0j
(t/t−1)F
j T
(t−1) +G
j
(t−1)Q
j
(t−1)G
j T
(t−1) (6.12)
P j(t/t) = P
j
(t/t−1) −Kj(t)Sj(t)Kj T(t) (6.13)
Mode Probability Calculation
The mode probability, ρj(t) (for mode j at time t) is then updated based on the likelihood
function Λ for each mode ﬁlter:
ρjt =
Λj(t)c¯j∑m
i=1 Λi(t)c¯i
(6.14)
Λj(t) =
∣∣∣2piSj(t)∣∣∣− 12exp [−12(y(t) − (Hj xˆj(t/t−1) + Lju(t)))T (6.15)
·
(
Sj(t)
)−1 (
y(t) −
(
Hj xˆj(t/t−1) + L
ju(t)
))]
(6.16)
The mode probabilities give a time-varying estimate on the likelihood of the system state
being one of the model-based modes and thus they are used in the indication of fault type for
FDI applications. The probabilities are smoothed using a moving average window.
Combination of Estimates
Finally, the combined state estimate xˆ(t) and covariance P(t) are derived by weighting the
estimated state and the mixed covariance for each mode with the mode probabilities:
xˆ(t) =
m∑
j=1
xˆj(t)ρj(t) (6.17)
P(t) =
m∑
j=1
ρ
j(t)
[
P j
(t)
+
[
xˆj
(t)
−xˆ
]
·
[
xˆj
(t)
−xˆ
(t)
]T ] (6.18)
6.3.2 IMM Mode Allocation
The choice of modes on which to base the ﬁlters is important within this method, as the
output of the IMM algorithm is the likelihood of each mode being the active mode in the
system, with respect to each other (eqn. 6.16).
One allocation option is to use a ﬁlter for every possible fault scenario, as this should
provide the most accurate estimation. This approach was taken in (161) for a 3 × 3 PS
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system where 23 modes were required to cover all possibilities up to 2 loose faults and 2
lock-ups. Whilst the performance of this approach was good, it was noted that this is a
large number of ﬁlters considering the relatively low number of elements within the system,
and for larger HRAs the number of ﬁlters required explodes. This approach also required
use of all the relative element positions and full order representations of the system. As the
example systems are larger than the system addressed within this paper, and the available
measurements are limited in this case, then this approach is not taken here. However, the
interested reader is directed towards Appendix F where a copy of the paper can be found.
Since the work of (161), another approach to mode allocation has been taken, which can
reduce the number of modes and measurements required. Figure 6.11 represents the IMM
FDI approach taken for the 4× 4 PS HRA example within this study. The modes used are:
• IMM Loose FDI:
 Mode 1: Nominal system
 Mode 2: 1 element loose in each branch
 Mode 3: 2 elements loose in each branch
• IMM Lock-up FDI
 Mode 1: Nominal system
 Mode 2: Lock-up in parallel element branch 1
 Mode 3: Lock-up in parallel element branch 2
 Mode 4: Lock-up in parallel element branch 3
 Mode 5: Lock-up in parallel element branch 4
 Mode 6: 2 lock-up faults in parallel element branches 1 and 2
 Mode 7: 2 lock-up faults in parallel element branches 3 and 4
Two separate IMM algorithms are used, one for detecting loose faults and one for lock-ups
and their outputs are combined post-IMM to provide a full health state. This reduces the
number of ﬁlters required as modes representing combinations of these faults are no longer
needed. Both of these IMM algorithms use 8th order ﬁlters based on the reduced order
systems, and use only one system output to base the estimation upon: the load position.
Consequently, it is now diﬃcult to know where the fault is actually located. Fault location
has important implications for determining the likelihood of the next fault decreasing the
capability signiﬁcantly, or causing a failure. Hence for detailed health prognostics, the infor-
mation provided by this scheme may not be suﬃcient. However, an estimate of the capability
can be detected, and this this can be used as an important indicator the current health of the
element. In addition, information regarding the timing of faults, and the progression from
one fault state to the next can also be implied and used within the health monitoring.
The IMM loose FDI uses 3 modes. Mode 2 represents the system with one loose fault in
each parallel branch (4 loose faults in the system) and mode 3 represents the system with 2
136
CHAPTER 6. FAULT DETECTION & HEALTH MONITORING
Figure 6.11: IMM FDI for 4× 4 PS HRA
loose faults in each branch (8 loose faults in all). As a consequence, when there are fewer
actual loose faults in the HRA, the likelihood produced for these modes does not approach
unity. In fact, the likelihood is directly proportional to the number of faults present. For
example, if there is one loose fault in the HRA, then the likelihood of mode 3 is found to be
close to 0.25 i.e. a quarter of the 4 loose faults that mode 3 represents is present. This can be
exploited in the post-IMM processing of the probabilities and an estimate of both the number
of loose faults F̂loose and the force capability of the system can be produced from these three
modes. F̂loose is derived as follows:
F̂loose = 4Λ2(t) + 8Λ3(t) (6.19)
The IMM lock-up FDI uses more modes, 7 in all. This is because the location of the lock-
up fault has a stronger inﬂuence on the overall system behaviour. Modes 2 to 5 represent a
lock-up fault in each branch respectively. The algorithm does not reliably indicate the correct
single fault mode due to the limited measured outputs. However, as the fault location is not
of interest, it is possible to simply sum the probability of modes 2 to 5 to produce a more
robust probability of there being a single lock-up (or a single reduction in travel capability)
in the system. Likewise, the sum of likelihoods of modes 6 to 7 provides a probability of
there being two branches locked in the system, where these modes represent the two extreme
location possibilities (two locked branches near the base, and two locked branches near the
load). Hence, the probability of travel capabilities 4 to 2 (4 representing 4 times the single
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element capability etc.) may be expressed as:
Λtravelcap4(t) = Λ1(t) (6.20)
Λtravelcap3(t) =
5∑
i=2
Λi(t) (6.21)
Λtravelcap2(t) =
7∑
i=6
Λi(t) (6.22)
6.3.3 Fault Simulation
The simulation set-up is shown in Figure 6.11. The system is given a sine wave input reference
to provide a constant source of excitation. The transition matrix pij is set as shown in
equation 6.23 such that the probability of no transition from the current state (i.e. where
i = j) is 0.999 and transitions to the other modes (i.e. where i 6= j) are set at equi-likelihood.
pij =

α β · · · β
β α
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . β
β · · · β α
 ∈ Rn×n (6.23)
where:
α = 0.999
β =
1− α
(n− 1)
A very small value of covariance is used for the noise on the measured position (5×10−12m2),
as the glass encoder that is used to measure position has an rms noise value of 1µm. The
plant noise covariance Q is set at 1× 10−5V2, as this gives a noise level in the order of mV.
6.3.3.1 Loose Faults
Figure 6.12 gives the mode probabilities produced by the IMM loose FDI where the fault
status changes as described in Table 6.2.
Figure 6.12 shows that the nominal state in the ﬁrst fault period is detected clearly. In
subsequent fault periods, where loose faults are in eﬀect, the mode probabilities behave as
discussed in Section 6.3.2. Mode 2 only approaches unity when four loose faults in sepa-
rate branches are present, but for fault states before this point, the probability is roughly
proportional to the actual number of loose faults. The same applies to mode 3.
Using equation 6.19, the number of loose faults is estimated as shown in Figure 6.13. It
can be observed that the limited number of ﬁlters and measurements used can provide a rough
estimate of the number of loose faults in the system. The capability is more important for
the health monitoring of the HRA, however, and Figure 6.14 gives the estimated capability in
this case. After 4 seconds the ﬁrst loose fault causes a decrease in force capability from 3 to 4.
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Figure 6.12: Mode probabilities produced by IMM loose FDI from measured load position
output and known voltage input.
Table 6.4: Loose fault simulation proﬁle
Fault State Loose Elements Time
Nominal - 0-4s
1 Loose E11 4-8s
2 Loose E11 E21 8-12s
3 Loose E11 E21 E31 12-16s
4 Loose E11 E21 E31 E41 16-20s
5 Loose E11-2 E21 E31 E41 20-24s
6 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31 E41 24-28s
7 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31-2 E41 28-32s
8 Loose E11-2 E21-2 E31-2 E41-2 32-36s
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Figure 6.13: Estimated number of loose faults.
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Figure 6.14: Estimated force capability.
This is detected in 0.528 seconds. At 20 seconds the ﬁfth loose fault causes the capability to
decrease from 3 to 2, which is detected in 0.23 seconds. There is a small spike in the capability
at around 8 seconds, however, this could be smoothed out.
6.3.3.2 Lock-up Faults
The fault proﬁle described in Table 6.5 was simulated and the resultant fault modes and
capability estimation is shown in Figure 6.15. the inputs and outputs of the system are also
given in Figure 6.16. These results are typical for all lock-up fault locations.
The summed mode probabilities indicate the correct system fault state throughout the
fault proﬁle. In this instance, the correct single locked element branch mode is chosen as the
most probable during the single lock-up period (2-4 seconds). This location accuracy is not
always the case with single lock-up faults, however, a single fault is always indicated.
When the second fault occurs in element branch 4, there is a temporary rise in mode 5
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Table 6.5: Lock-up fault simulation proﬁle
Fault State Locked branch Time
Nominal - 0-2s
1 Locked E2 2-4s
2 Locked E2, E4 4-6s
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Figure 6.15: Mode probabilities and estimated travel capability.
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Figure 6.16: Measured load position output and known voltage input for HRA during lock-up
faults.
(its corresponding single lock-up mode), however, the double lock-up mode is converged upon
reasonably quickly.
The ﬁrst reduction in capability is detected after 0.142 seconds, and the second reduction
is conﬁrmed by the FDI 0.436 seconds after the second fault occurs.
6.3.3.3 Summary
The simulation results show that the IMM FDI method used produces accurate diagnosis of
capability levels in lock-up and loose fault condition. This result, like the rule-based approach,
is sensitive to the input of the system. However, low excitation in this case can cause false
diagnosis, rather than just delayed diagnosis. One solution to this problem may be to combine
the IMM output with some logic that holds the previous estimated state if the excitation falls
below a threshold.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the requirement for fault detection in the HRA for use in control
reconﬁguration, or for general health monitoring purposes. These two applications of FDI
in the HRA have distinct requirements and resources, and as such two methods of FDI were
discussed: a rule-based approach for use in AFTC and an interacting multiple-model method
for health monitoring.
The rule-based method detected the location and nature of faults quickly and accurately
using localised simple algorithms. However, the distributed nature of this method means
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Figure 6.17: Fault detection properties.
that localised sensors are required, which is appropriate to the multi-agent control method
presented in Chapter 7, but is unlikely to be feasible for general health monitoring in a passive
FTC scheme such as that of Chapter 5.
Hence, the IMM FDI approach described in Section 6.3 aimed at providing a simpliﬁed
diagnosis (indicating the capability of the HRA) utilising less sensory information. Whilst
the detection rates using this approach were reduced slightly in comparison to the rule-based
FDI, the correct travel and force capability was estimated, and detection time is not as critical
in general health monitoring.
Despite the simpliﬁcations provided by the reduced-order ﬁlters and mode allocation
method (in comparison to the full mode representation presented in (161)), the IMM FDI
is still far more complex in terms of the design eﬀort and computational demands in compar-
ison to the rule-based approach.
A trade-oﬀ seems to exist in these two methods between where complexity in the system
lies i.e. if further complexity in the system (such as extra sensors) can not be justiﬁed, than
complexity within the FDI scheme itself is required. This idea is illustrated in Figure 6.17. An
ideal fault method should be simple in terms of its design, instrumentation and computational
demands, whilst providing performance in terms of accuracy, speed and reliability. This is
demanding, however, and in reality one must consider which aspects have the most rewards,
and which the most penalties for the purpose in mind. The rule-based method has many of
these desirable properties, however, justifying the instrumentation cost is diﬃcult if it is for
health monitoring alone, and thus the IMM approach may be considered more suitable.
These two approaches are by no means the only fault detection methods that could be
applied to the HRA, as was illustrated in Chapter 2. The ﬁeld of fault detection is diverse,
and it is likely that other methods which satisfy more of these properties exist. However,
health monitoring is not the main concern of the current project phase, and the rule-based
detection presented here can now be used in conjunction with control reconﬁguration to form
an AFTC scheme in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Active Fault Tolerant Control of High
Redundancy Actuation
7.1 Introduction
One of the key objectives of the work carried out is to investigate active fault tolerant control
approaches based upon multi-agent concepts for the HRA and quantify any beneﬁts that can
be achieved in terms of performance and fault tolerance, whilst also evaluating the associated
increases in complexity, and uncertainty. To this end, Chapter 5 provided a passive fault
tolerant control performance for HRA, which acts as a benchmark. In this chapter, an active
fault tolerant control strategy is outlined, the results of which are compared to the passive
benchmark.
A multi-agent control approach was chosen as the active FTC strategy. A detailed ra-
tionale for this choice is given in Section 7.2. The initial impetus for taking this approach
however, was concerns with complexity. The HRA is complex, as it contains many moving
masses making the system high-order. In addition, this system is changeable due to the oc-
currence of faults. Although Chapter 5 has shown that a very simple passive approach can
provide some degree of fault tolerance, previous to the current stage of the HRA project,
concerns were raised regarding whether passive FTC could provide adequate control for such
a complex and changeable system. It was thought that one way in which to deal with this
complexity may be a divide-and-conquer approach: providing active control and fault detec-
tion on a localised basis. Multi-agent concepts oﬀer ideas for implementing such a scheme,
and thus this approach was investigated.
Chapter 2 provided an introduction to multi-agent systems (Section 2.5), and a discussion
of concepts central to multi-agent systems (Section 2.5.4). These form a background and basis
upon which the multi-agent control strategy for the HRA is designed, details of which are
given in this Chapter (Section 7.3).
7.2 Rationale for Multi-Agent Control of HRA
Taking a multi-agent based perspective on HRA control design can provide two key features:
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• Structuring.
• Flexibility.
Multi Agent Control (MAC) and HRA are structurally similar. Both are inspired by natural
mechanisms which utilise large numbers of relatively simple cells/processes to form complex
structures/behaviours. The HRA, viewed as a whole is a complex, changeable system. An
unstructured approach to applying active FTC to this system is likely to make control re-
conﬁguration complicated and fault diagnosis diﬃcult. However, if the HRA is viewed as
a collection of simpler (if not similar) subsystems, then simple control reconﬁguration and
simple fault detection can be applied on a local level, and MAC can provide a framework for
this.
The structuring of control is often neglected within the ﬁeld of control engineering, as the
problem is stated in the form of a single plant model (145). The process industry acknowledges
that the structuring of control is an important issue in complex systems, thus it is given more
attention in this ﬁeld and numerous MAC systems have been proposed within this application
area, for example (162).
Equally, a structured approach to control may be achieved through use of decentralised
control techniques (163; 164). However, these techniques do not necessarily facilitate the
application of localised control reconﬁguration and fault detection. In addition, the abstract
approach to the control problem oﬀered by MA concepts frees the design from the usual
conventions. For example, the sharing of system parameters, capabilities and intentions are
possibilities that may be derived from the multi-agent concept, but would not be considered
within conventional distribution of control, as signals tend to be directly measured quantities
(96). This interaction between the agents is important as it implicitly acknowledges the
interaction between the HRA elements.
The ﬂexibility and structuring provided by MAC also has advantages over more conven-
tional active FTC techniques. Localisation of decision-making capabilities avoids the issue of
single point-of-failure incurred by active FTC schemes that employ centralised fault detection
or supervisors. The ﬂexibility aﬀorded by the communication involved in the agent approach
also oﬀers complex active control strategies to be employed with greater ease.
Hence, it is the combination of both structuring and ﬂexibility that motivates the use
of MAC above conventional decentralised control and centralised active FTC techniques.
Nonetheless, there are a number of potential issues associated with MASs that require careful
attention such as deliberation, communication and negotiation delays, agent non-consensus
and communication failure.
7.3 Design of Multi-Agent Control of HRA
The discussion of concepts central to multi-agent systems given in Chapter 2 illustrated the
diversity that exists in the ﬁeld and demonstrated that there is no deﬁnitive agent or agency
architecture, communication structure or protocol that must be abided by in order for a system
to be considered a MAS. Rather, a multi-agent application is simply one that encompasses
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Figure 7.1: Agency structure for PS HRA.
some of the deﬁning characteristics of the concept of agents. Thus, it is pertinent to consider
which aspects of these agent architectures and agency structures are most useful for the
problem at hand: Multi-Agent Control of HRA (MACHRA), and on this basis form an
appropriate MACHRA strategy.
7.3.1 MACHRA Agency Structure
The ﬁrst consideration is allocation of agents in the HRA. How should the role and remit of
each agent be deﬁned? As the control of the HRA's actuation resources during health state
changes is the main requirement, then the most obvious allocation of agents is according to
the physical resources i.e. per actuation unit. In PS conﬁgurations, an agent is assigned to
each parallel bank of actuators and to each serial bank in the SP conﬁguration. Thus, in a
m× n HRA an agency A consists of a set of agents:
APSm×n = {a1, a2, · · · am} (7.1)
ASPm×n = {a1, a2, · · · an} (7.2)
This structure is illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
An agent is used per bank due to the nature of the faults considered. A lock-up fault
eﬀectively locks all parallel elements, and likewise a loose fault eﬀects all serial actuators, and
as such the resultant control changes made will be the same in this branch regardless of which
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Figure 7.2: Agency structure for SP HRA.
element fails. In more mixed conﬁgurations, agents may be allocated per parallel and serial
branch or per individual actuation unit. However, these conﬁgurations are not within the
scope of this work.
Having assigned agents to subsystems, it is necessary to deﬁne their responsibilities. Lo-
calisation is a key characteristic of MASs, thus each agent should use local sensory information
and exert local inﬂuence. Each moving coil actuation element has an integral glass-slide en-
coder providing local position information and the coil current of each element is readily
available. Using these local measurements, each agent must provide local control drive to its
actuation element(s) and detect faults in their actuators i.e. sense the state of their subsystem.
In order to compensate for reduced capability in other actuation elements, it is necessary that
the agents have knowledge regarding the overall state of the system. Through communication,
they can build up a representation of the overall health of the system and reconﬁgure their
control as necessary.
Communication of simple information regarding the agent's believed state of the sys-
tem needs to be quick and eﬃcient. Considering the types of communication discussed in
Section 2.5.4.2, then direct or message-based communication seems the most appropriate.
Indirect forms of communication are not suitable as they are too slow and the resultant
consequences too ill-deﬁned for a safety-critical application. High level language is also not
suitable as such complexity and ﬂexibility is not needed. Direct communication is chosen for
use in this case as there are a limited number of situations to communicate throughout the
system, which can be ﬁnitely deﬁned.
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The chosen structure of the communications is point-to-point. Each agent communicates
with its direct neighbours, an−1 and an+1. This approach is preferred to a broadcast method
as it reduces the communication traﬃc in the system. Broadcast structures are useful when
the presence of agents in the system is uncertain, but this is less relevant for the HRA as
the HRA starts in a ﬁxed conﬁguration with a ﬁxed agent structure: no more resources or
agents will be introduced into the system as is the case in applications such as distributed
power control (135; 136). Although, in a real application some provision may need to be
made to salvage communication links in the event of an individual agent malfunction. This
could be achieved by implementing a white pages agent similar to that discussed in the FIPA
abstract architecture (Figure 2.19) where a record is kept of the agents in the system and
their communication links, and, on loss of communication, an agent can consult these white
pages to re-establish a communication link with the next available agent.
The ﬁnal agency-related consideration is co-ordination. In the MACRHA scheme, co-
ordination is achieved through built-in standardisation. This approach is chosen as it will
provide the most reactivity, as no context establishing communication or mediation needs to
be conducted. The built-in nature of the standardisation avoids problems with hierarchical
supervision, which can cause single points-of-failure. It also avoids the uncertainty associated
with over-ﬂexibility, which can be an issue for high integrity application veriﬁcation.
7.3.2 MACHRA Agent Architecture
Due to the fault types and system dynamics, the HRA requires a control strategy that will
respond quickly to faults, making reactivity a key requirement. For this reason, a hybrid agent
architecture is chosen. Logic based approaches, where complex models of the environment are
formed and reasoned upon, are not appropriate due to this requirement for speed. Similarly,
practical reasoning methods such as BDI may also be inappropriate due to the delays caused
by reasoning. Additionally, the HRA generally does not have changing goals: the goal is to
provide a performance that is as close to nominal as possible. Thus, having separate desires
and intentions is superﬂuous. A hybrid approach is preferred over a simply reactive approach,
as this allows the retention of state. Simple internal state and system state models are retained
in each agent and the control action is changed in accordance with these.
The agent architecture is vertically layered, containing fault detection, communication
and control layers as shown in Figure 7.3. These layers are discussed individually below.
7.3.2.1 Fault Detection Layer
The top layer contains the fault detection for the agent, where loose faults and lock-up faults
are detected. The input to this layer consists of internally available quantities such as the
local position error and the local measurements available. In the PS conﬁguration case this
is a single local position measurement, and n coil current signals (for n parallel actuation
elements). In the SP conﬁguration, n local position measurements and n coil current signals
are used (where n is the number of serial actuation elements in this case).
The detection algorithms use the simple rule-based approach described in Chapter 6. The
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Figure 7.3: Agent architecture
outputs of these fault detection algorithms are combined to provide a three term model of the
internal fault state, which is passed to the next layer:
F0 =
[
floose funloose flock
]
(7.3)
where floose is the number of loose faults detected (with a maximum of n in n parallel
elements and 1 in n serial elements) and flock is the number of lock-up faults detected (with
a maximum of n in n serial elements and 1 in n parallel elements). There are maximums of 1
due to the eﬀect of the fault on in the parallel and serial elements. A single lock-up in parallel
elements essentially locks all the elements in that branch, and similarly a single loose fault in
serial elements is eﬀectively a loose serial branch.
The middle term, funloose, is only used in the PS conﬁgurations and represents the number
of loose faults that previously occurred in a branch before that branch became locked. If the
branch locks after a loose fault has occurred in that branch, then it eﬀectively cancels the
eﬀect of that loose fault, and it is necessary to communicate this to other agents.
7.3.2.2 Communication Layer
The output of the fault detection layer is fed into the communication layer along with the
messages Fl and Fr from the agents an−1 and an+1 respectively. The communication layer
takes these messages and combines them with the internal state F0 to form two messages
representing the cumulative faults to the left Fl and the right Fr, which are, in turn, passed
to an+1 and an−1 respectively. The communication is formed from three values:
Fl =
[
flloose fldeloose fllock
]
(7.4)
Fr =
[
frloose frdeloose frlock
]
(7.5)
where each quantity is the number of fault types to the left or right. From Fl, Fr, and the
internal fault status F0, a fault state model for the whole system can be formed. In the PS
case this is stated as:
FT =
[
ftloose ftlock
]
(7.6)
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where the ﬁrst term is the total number of loose elements in the system and the second is
the total number of lock-ups. In the PS case these values are deﬁned as:
ftloose = F0(1) + Fl(1) + Fr(1)− F0(2)− Fl(2)− Fr(2) (7.7)
ftlock = F0(3) + Fl(3) + Fr(3) (7.8)
And in the SP case:
ftloose = F0(1) + Fl(1) + Fr(1) (7.9)
ftlock = F0(3) + Fl(3) + Fr(3) (7.10)
This communication procedure is illustrated by an example in Figure 7.4. A loose fault
occurs in the elements associated with a2 and this is communicated to the other agents.
As there are a ﬁnite number of internal and system fault states, based upon these two
quantities, a ﬁnite set of perceptions P for the system can be formed:
P = {p11, p12, . . . pij} (7.11)
where:
pmn =
[
F0(m) FT (n)
]
(7.12)
As mentioned in Section 2.5.4.2, in general P does not necessarily map to the actual system
state S, which is certainly true in this case. Each perception only represents the eﬀective
number of faults in the system. There is no representation of the location of these faults. This
simpliﬁcation that occurs between S and P is not necessarily an issue, however. Reﬂecting
back to the work on passive control detailed in Chapter 5, it was shown that the number
of eﬀective faults was the major inﬂuence on system behaviour. Thus, this representation is
mostly1 adequate for control purposes and reduces the complexity of the communication and
internal models signiﬁcantly.
Each perception p maps to a pre-designed control action c:
P → C (7.13)
where:
C = {c11, c12, · · · cij} (7.14)
Hence, F0 and FT are passed to the control layer where the control action is implemented.
7.3.2.3 Control Layer
Figure 7.5 is a representation of the control layer for PS conﬁgurations. The input to the
control layer is from a global control loop (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). This outer control loop
provides integral action to ensure any steady-state error is removed. As this control law is
1In the case of lock-up faults in the 10×10 system this representation is not suﬃcient to satisfy all possible
fault modes. This is discussed further in Section 7.4.
150
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF HIGH REDUNDANCY
ACTUATION
Figure 7.4: Fault communication example
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Figure 7.5: Control layer
ﬁxed, it is not considered part of the active control or a supervisor of the agents. This is
important, as this removes any decision-making single-point-of failure from the agency, and
retains an autonomous agency architecture.
The control within the layer consists of a feed-forward gain, which is scheduled in order
to keep the gain in the system equal under fault conditions, and an inner local position
control loop with a classical controller. The control parameters are chosen from a bank of
pre-designed controllers depending on the perception input, p. In the SP case, there are
actually four identical inner-loop controllers, one for each local position measurement.
The overall control eﬀect of this scheme is a decentralised gain scheduling and multiple-
model active FTC strategy. In this case, 'multiple-model' means that a number of control laws
are based on a number of fault models for the system. This form of oine design, multiple-
model control, has been chosen for use within this scheme as a pre-designed control law is
more easily veriﬁable for high integrity applications. The stability of online control synthesis
is more diﬃcult to ensure, and the uncertainty and complexity involved can be a barrier to
industrial implementation. Whilst the MAC approach described here is complex in that there
are eﬀectively many control loops, the stability of the control can be veriﬁed oine, and this
sort of multi-loop complexity is used widely in application areas such as aerospace.
7.3.3 Control Design
As stated in equation 7.13, for each perception a control action exists, which must be pre-
designed. The approach to design is discussed within this section. The actual controller values
are available within Appendix D.
7.3.3.1 Nominal Control
The nominal inner-control law used is the phase advance controller designed in the passive
FTC case. The feed-forward gain is related to the travel capability. In the nominal case,
the 4 × 4 conﬁgurations have a travel capability of 4 actuation elements, and the 10 × 10
conﬁguration has a travel capability of 10. The feed-forward gain spreads the input reference
to the inner-loops between the remaining capability, hence, the nominal feed-forward gain is
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Figure 7.6: Multiple-model and passive control design
1/4 for the 4 × 4 HRAs and 1/10 for the 10 × 10 HRA. The ﬁxed outer-loop PI controller
is then designed to provide a transient response and stability margins that are similar to the
benchmark passive FTC presented in Chapter 5.
7.3.3.2 Fault Control
For each perceived fault case, new inner-loop control parameters are designed based on fault
models of the system. The value of the phase advance time constant, τ , is adjusted to re-
cancel the pole that was cancelled by the nominal controller. This brings the response of
the faulty system nearer to the nominal response (this will be illustrated in Section 7.4). In
addition, the feed-forward gain is also re-scheduled when reductions in travel capability occur.
However, as discussed in Section 7.3.2, a new controller is not designed for each actual
system state, but rather for each perceived state. This may be visualised using the same
approach as discussed in Chapter 5 (Figure 5.1). Figure 7.6 shows the behavioural space that
the plant state behaviours B inhabit. The passive approach designed a controller that would
encompass as many of B as possible, but the results were shown to be somewhat conservative.
Active multiple-model control provides the possibility of designing more controllers to suit each
member of B. Within this multi-agent approach however, a controller is designed only for each
perception p, which encompasses a number of fault modes. Each controller must be optimised
to satisfy the requirements with each member of p. Optimisation has been achieved here in a
very basic way, by manually tuning each controller. Nonetheless, a more complex/automated
approach such as genetic algorithms could also be taken.
The closed-loop behaviour may then be represented as in Figure 7.7. The active con-
trol performance region, that represents the behaviour of the system under fault, is closer to
the nominal performance in comparison that of the the passive controller performance. It is
apparent that a trade-oﬀ exists here between the number of fault model controllers (or per-
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Figure 7.7: Multiple-model and passive control performance
ceptions in the multi-agent control approach) and the performance. As the ratio of controllers
to fault behaviours approaches 1:1, the conservativeness of the controllers are also reduced
and a performance nearer to that of the nominal system can be achieved. However, more
controllers increases complexity in the system and increases communication demands. Hence,
a balance must be struck between achieving an adequate performance and the practicalities
of design and implementation.
7.4 Fault Simulations
Having described the multi-agent approach taken and the control design process, simulations
of the systems under fault are presented here. Firstly, the static fault control performance is
assessed and compared to the passive control performance by simulating the same fault proﬁles
as presented in Chapter 5. The term static is used here to represent the control reconﬁguration
state in the system. These static simulations represent the system performance after the fault
has been detected, communicated, and the control reconﬁgured, and any post-reconﬁguration
transients in the system settled.
The control performance in a more fault dynamic sense is addressed in Section 7.4.2, where
faults are injected and the inﬂuence of detection and reconﬁguration time considered.
7.4.1 Static Fault State Simulations
The static fault condition performance of the MAC controlled HRA is examined and compared
to the passive FTC approach within this section.
154
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF HIGH REDUNDANCY
ACTUATION
Figure 7.8: Singular values of nominal and loose MAC controlled 4× 4 PS HRA.
7.4.1.1 Loose faults
Figures 7.8 to 7.10 show the frequency response of the open loop systems under loose fault
conditions with MAC and Figures 7.11 to 7.13 provide the transient responses. Table 7.1
summarises these ﬁgures.
The PS HRA's performance under loose fault conditions is very close to that of the nominal
system. The overshoot problems that were witnessed with passive control have been eradicated
with the MAC. Consequently, the system meets the performance criteria under all the loose
fault conditions.
The SP HRA transient response exhibits similar non-linear eﬀects to those in the passively
controlled case (Figure 5.41) due to the loose elements in the system hitting the end-stops.
This is more clearly illustrated in Figure 7.14, where the relative positions of the elements
are also provided for the SP 4× 4 system response to a pulse train, whilst there are two loose
faults in elements e43 and e44. As before, the force exerted by the remaining active elements
in the loose branches (cyan), is not translated by the loose elements (red), causing the loose
elements to hit the end-stops. The uncontrollability of the loose element is exacerbated by
the control driving the remaining active elements in the loose branch.
There is potential for suppression of this non-linear behaviour in the multi-agent control
approach, as the control scheme in the loose branch can also be reconﬁgured. If the input to
these elements is set to zero, or in other words if they are 'de-activated', then the aﬀect on the
remaining healthy elements is minimised (Figure 7.15). The loose elements still hit the end-
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Figure 7.9: Singular values of nominal and loose MAC controlled 4× 4 SP HRA.
Figure 7.10: Singular values of nominal and loose MAC controlled 10× 10 PS HRA.
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Figure 7.11: Step response of nominal and loose MAC controlled 4× 4 PS HRA.
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Figure 7.12: Step response of nominal and loose MAC controlled 4× 4 SP HRA.
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Figure 7.13: Step response of nominal and loose MAC controlled 10× 10 PS HRA.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Simulated transient response of MAC controlled 4x4 SP HRA with 2 loose faults
Time (sec)
In
pu
t (
V)
 
 
nominal
faulty: active
faulty: active
in loose branch
faulty: loose
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Time (sec)
Po
sit
io
n 
(m
)
 
 
nominal load position
faulty load position
faulty relative position:
active
faulty relative position:
active in loose branch
faulty relative position:
loose
Figure 7.14: Response of SP 4× 4 HRA with two loose faults in two branches to pulse train
input.
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Table 7.1: Stability margins and transient characteristics of example MAC controlled HRAs
under nominal and loose fault conditions
4x4 PS HRA PM GM BW SSerr RT ST OS
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 78.9 42.1 5.37 0 0.32 0.60 0.06
1 loose 77.7 39.7 5.32 0 0.32 0.57 0
2 loose 76.2 35.8 5.35 0 0.30 0.55 0
3 loose 76.1 38.5 5.34 0 0.30 0.54 0
4 loose 76.2 44.0 5.37 0 0.30 0.55 0
5 loose 76.5 43.8 5.38 0 0.31 0.56 0
6 loose 77.3 42.9 5.36 0 0.31 0.57 0
7 loose 78.0 42.2 5.39 0 0.33 0.58 0
8 loose 79.3 41.0 5.40 0 0.33 0.61 0
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 78.9 42.1 5.39 0 0.32 0.60 0.06
1 loose 76.92 42.0 5.08 0 0.33 0.53 0.72
2 loose 73.03 41.07 5.21 0 0.32 0.62 1.75
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 72.5 47.5 3.11 0 0.50 0.80 0.04
1 loose 71.9 45.2 3.24 0 0.52 0.79 0
4 loose 69.2 37.8 3.17 0 0.50 0.73 0.68
8 loose 68.1 44.1 3.27 0 0.45 0.68 1.06
12 loose 68.3 49.0 3.21 0 0.49 0.71 1.16
16 loose 69.5 48.2 3.21 0 0.46 0.70 0.69
20 loose 71.5 47.3 3.20 0 0.48 0.75 0
24 loose 70.9 47.1 3.16 0 0.49 0.75 0.34
28 loose 71.1 47.7 2.87 0 0.53 0.80 1.39
32 loose 70.0 46.9 3.07 0 0.49 0.74 1.13
36 loose 72.2 46.6 3.06 0 0.51 0.80 0.23
40 loose 74.3 45.8 3.20 0 0.51 0.90 0
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Figure 7.15: Response of SP 4× 4 HRA with two loose faults in two branches to pulse train
input with element de-activation.
stops, but not as frequently and they hit the end-stop in the direction of overall travel. There
is also less energy being used within the loose branch elements, which may be considered
advantageous. This sort of strategy is very simple to achieve in the MAC framework.
If this approach is implemented, then the transient response shown in Figure 7.16 can be
achieved. Non-linear eﬀects are still present, however, the large overshoot and steady-state
transients are reduced.
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Figure 7.16: Step response of nominal and loose MAC controlled 4× 4 SP HRA with element
de-activation.
7.4.1.2 Lock-up faults
Figures 7.17 to 7.19 show the frequency response of the open loop systems under lock-up fault
conditions with MAC and Figures 7.20 to 7.22 provide the transient responses. Table 7.2
summarises these ﬁgures.
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Figure 7.17: Singular values of nominal and locked up MAC controlled 4× 4 PS HRA.
Figure 7.18: Singular values of nominal and locked up MAC controlled 4× 4 SP HRA.
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Figure 7.19: Singular values of nominal and loose MAC controlled 10× 10 PS HRA.
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Figure 7.20: Step response of nominal and locked up MAC controlled 4× 4 PS HRA.
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Figure 7.21: Step response of nominal and locked up MAC controlled 4× 4 SP HRA.
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Figure 7.22: Step response of nominal and locked up MAC controlled 10× 10 PS HRA.
164
CHAPTER 7. ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF HIGH REDUNDANCY
ACTUATION
Table 7.2: Stability margins and transient characteristics of example MAC controlled HRA
under nominal and lock-up fault conditions
PM GM BW SSerr RT ST OS
System state (deg) (dB) (rads−1) (%) (s) (s) (%)
4x4 PS HRA
Nominal 78.9 42.1 5.37 0 0.32 0.60 0.06
1 lock 81.1 42.2 5.27 0 0.36 0.63 0.39
2 lock 83.5 42.3 5.23 0 0.38 0.65 0.54
4x4 SP HRA
Nominal 78.9 42.1 5.39 0 0.32 0.60 0.06
1 lock 76.4 40.7 6.23 0 0.27 0.44 0.63
2 lock 76.1 42.0 5.53 0 0.31 0.47 1.61
3 lock 76.2 42.8 5.12 0 0.34 0.49 1.80
4 lock 76.0 43.6 4.78 0 0.36 0.80 2.01
5 lock 76.2 40.8 6.33 0 0.27 0.49 1.96
6 lock 76.7 41.8 5.76 0 0.31 0.45 1.71
7 lock 78.1 42.6 5.35 0 0.34 0.50 1.17
8 lock 79.2 43.2 4.98 0 0.36 0.56 0.79
10x10 PS HRA
Nominal 72.5 47.5 3.11 0 0.50 0.80 0.04
1 lock 72.5 47.8 2.93 0 0.53 0.82 0.91
2 lock 72.8 48.1 2.77 0 0.56 0.85 1.77
3 lock 72.9 48.4 2.64 0 0.58 1.77 2.61
4 lock 72.4 49.1 2.45 0 0.62 2.24 4.27
The dominantly serial nature of the SP conﬁguration makes it more tolerant to lock-up
faults. Nevertheless, in the passive control case, only up to 4 lock-up faults were accommo-
dated. The MAC results show that with simple control reconﬁguration, a performance within
the requirements can be achieved under the full set of potentially tolerable faults.
The 4 × 4 PS HRA's performance under lock-up fault conditions is very close to that
of the nominal system. The settling time issues that occurred in the passive control case
have been signiﬁcantly reduced, and both 1 and 2 lock-up faults are now tolerable within the
performance speciﬁcations.
In the 10× 10 PS HRA simulations, the system meets the requirements with 1-2 lock-up
faults. However, the settling time and overshoot limits are exceeded with both 3 and 4 lock-up
faults. This is attributable to the ratio between the number of fault mode controllers and
actual fault modes within the system. As the perceptions only cover the total number of faults,
and not their location, the number of real system fault modes that need to be accommodated
by each controller is large: there are 120 unique, eﬀective2 fault location combinations for 3
faults, and 210 for 4 lock-ups. In addition, the variation in behaviour between high proportions
of lock up faults in the grounded half of the assembly and the load-side half is signiﬁcant.
This makes control design to satisfy all of these modes diﬃcult. The controllers in this case
2There are less eﬀective fault locations from a system representation and performance stand-point than
actual fault locations i.e. a fault in a parallel set of redundant actuators will produce the same behaviour,
regardless of the actual location within the parallel arrangement.
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Figure 7.23: Communication of location speciﬁc fault information.
only satisfy 90 of the possible 120 fault scenarios for the 3 lock-up fault case, and 160 of the
possible 210 for the 4 fault case.
This level of tolerance is still a large improvement on that of the passive case. However,
it is possible to improve this performance by including more perception states.
Two more perceptions are added if agents communicate at which end of the HRA the faults
have occurred (in the half nearest the grounded connection, or the half nearest the load).
Changes to the agency's communication set-up are required in order to eﬀect these location
speciﬁc perceptions. However, a relatively simple approach is available as the information
regarding how many faults are in each side of the HRA already exists in the agent system.
fllock and frlock in a5 and a6 respectively give the number of lock-ups in the left half and
right half side, once they are added to their personal fault state. If these values are attached
to the messages travelling left in communications on the left hand side, and to the right in
communications the right hand side, then the location-speciﬁc fault information is distributed.
This is further illustrated by Figure 7.23, which gives an example where the system has three
lock-up faults. In addition to this added message, a further complication is added to the
system, as it is necessary for each agent to know their location in the assembly, and agents
5 and 6 have to take a slightly diﬀerent role from the other agents, as they pass on their
perception of the fault locations.
These added perceptions improve the performance of the system as shown in Table 7.3.
The mean and maximum settling times and overshoots are signiﬁcantly reduced and the
number of tolerable modes increased. This number could be increased further through more
advanced control tuning, or the addition of further perception states, both at the cost of
added complexity within the design process.
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Table 7.3: Transient characteristics and no. of systems within the requirements under 3-4
lock up faults
RT (s) ST (s) OS (%) No. of systems
System state mean max mean max mean max within requirements
1 Perception per lock-up fault
3 lock 0.56 0.62 1.09 1.78 0.22 2.60 96/120
4 lock 0.60 0.66 1.15 2.24 0.56 4.26 160/210
2 Perceptions per lock-up fault
3 lock 0.49 0.52 0.81 1.39 0.32 2.53 119/120
4 lock 0.60 0.65 1.02 1.82 0.34 2.71 207/210
7.4.1.3 Comparison with Passive Fault Tolerant Control Performance
The control results of the preceding two sub-sections are compared to the passive fault tolerant
control results of Chapter 5 in Figures 7.24 and 7.25. Figure 7.24 compares the transient
response characteristics of the passively controlled and actively controlled example systems
and Figure 7.25 provides those under lock-up fault conditions. The settling times and rise
times are expressed as a percentage change from the nominal value, whereas the overshoot is
the actual value. The requirement threshold for each example system is also given on these
ﬁgures, and is expressed as a percentage increase on the nominal value.
It can be seen from these ﬁgures that the active fault tolerant control approach oﬀers
substantial beneﬁts in terms of performance. The percentage increase of rise times and settling
times is greatly decreased in all three example systems under the inﬂuence of loose faults. The
change in rise time is up to 12 times smaller with active fault tolerant control in the 4× 4 PS
example, and settling time is over 130 times smaller with 8 loose fault case. The overshoot
increases induced by loose faults are also signiﬁcantly reduced by the active FTC method,
and remain within the requirement boundary.
Large improvements to rise and settling time changes are also witnessed in the lock-up
fault scenarios. The overshoot, however, is increased by the active control changes, although
this stays within the requirements for the 4×4 systems. The overshoot increases in the 10×10
system exceed the requirement in the 3 and 4 lock-up fault cases, however, as mentioned in
Section 7.4.1.2, the performance can be improved by introducing more fault perceptions and
control modes.
7.4.1.4 Static Performance Summary
The static fault simulations discussed in the preceding subsections have shown that the MAC
approach taken allows a dramatic improvement in system performance. Figures 7.26 to 7.29
illustrate this further. For each system, all possible faults combinations have been simulated
and their transient performance is summarised in these ﬁgures. They show that all the fault
scenarios are accommodated within the performance requirements in the PS and SP 4 × 4
HRAs. In the 10 × 10 system, a number of lock-up fault scenarios fall outside the transient
requirements. More faults can be accommodated by adding more perceptions, as stressed by
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Figure 7.24: Comparison of active and passive fault tolerant control performance with loose
faults.
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Figure 7.25: Comparison of active and passive fault tolerant control performance with lock-up
faults.
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Figure 7.26: Transient characteristics of MAC controlled 4x4 PS HRA under all fault combi-
nations
Figure 7.29.
Overall, the results are a considerable improvement on the passive control case. However,
this performance is only achieved in the static fault state. Performance during fault detection
and reconﬁguration is considered in the next subsection.
7.4.2 Dynamic Fault Injection Simulations
Although performance during the static fault state has been shown to satisfactory, it is im-
portant to consider the aﬀects of fault detection delays, communication and control switching
within this multi-agent approach.
Analysis of the systems under fault, whilst controlled by their corresponding control law
has shown that these systems are stable. However, the reconﬁguration process in the MAC
involves switching between control laws when faults are detected, and it is well known that
unconstrained switching, even between asymptotically stable systems, can induce instability
(165), although, the nature of this instability is limited as the signals cannot escape to inﬁnity
in the ﬁnite switching times.
Stability analysis of switched linear systems has been an active area of research in the
last decades and, as such, there are several analytical ways to guarantee stability within an
unconstrained switched system. If a common Lyapunov function exists for all the possible
switched systems, then the system is asymptotically stable for any switching signal. A common
Lyapunov function may be found in a number of ways, however, this is a non-trivial task for a
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Figure 7.27: Transient characteristics of MAC controlled 4x4 SP HRA under all fault combi-
nations
Figure 7.28: Transient characteristics of MAC controlled 4x4 SP HRA under all fault combi-
nations
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Figure 7.29: Transient characteristics of MAC controlled 4x4 SP HRA under all fault combi-
nations
large family of switched systems. Alternatively, if the admissible switching path is restricted
then stability may be ensured through the use of multiple Lyapunov functions (166). Another,
simpler way to guarantee stability within a switched system is to constrain the switching. This
is usually done by enforcing a dwell time (167). Finding the minimum dwell time, however,
is also demanding for large sets of switched controllers.
These issues are not imperative for the MAC presented here, as the switching in this case
is already severely constrained. The fault detection within each agent eﬀectively determines
the switching characteristic of the system. The detection algorithms used are state-based i.e.
the subsystem is either nominal or faulty. Once the fault detection has entered the faulty
state, then it cannot return to the nominal state, unless the fault detection is reset. This
constrains the switching within the system considerably. A conservative upper-limit on the
potential number of switches exists, which is determined by the maximum number of faults
that can occur.
In addition, once a fault has been detected, and the control has been reconﬁgured, the
control law will remain constant until the fault state changes. This period in a real application
is likely to be very long, particularly in comparison to the speed of the system. Hence, the
eﬀective average dwell time of the switching signal is very large, and would be far in excess
of any value derived analytically from (168). Hence, a formal analysis of the stability under
switching is not addressed here.
Whilst switching is not considered problematic with respect to stability, the switching
characteristic does have an eﬀect on the output of the system during the reconﬁguration.
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These eﬀects are witnessed and discussed further in the dynamic fault injection simulations
that follow.
7.4.2.1 Single Fault Injection
The occurrence of a single fault at any given time instance is the most likely scenario in the
HRA. Dynamic results for the MAC controlled PS 4 × 4 HRA with 1 lock-up are shown in
Figure 7.30. A square-wave is used as the system load reference and a lock-up fault is injected
in branch 4 at t=0. The input reference and the load position for the system under nominal
conditions, and fault conditions with passive and MAC control, are given in the ﬁrst sub-plot.
The second plot provides the HRA voltage input, and shows that the input remains well
within the input limits. The third sub-plot shows the summed fault detection residuals from
the agents. It can be seen that the fault is detected at 0.25 seconds. The ﬁnal plot gives
the internal control mode of each agent. All agents have reconﬁgured their control to mode 1
(which represents the mode designed for 1 lock-up fault) by 0.3 seconds.
The response is the same as the passive case before the fault is detected, after which the
gain is increased and the response quickens. By the latter half of the ﬁrst square-wave period
the eﬀects of the reconﬁguration transients and fault state of the system have settled and the
response is very close to that of the nominal system. The eﬀects of control switching and
detection delays are minimal in this single fault case and these results are typical of the three
example HRAs with various single faults types and locations.
7.4.2.2 Multiple Fault Injection
Whilst single faults occurring at an instant are most probable, it is pertinent to consider
worst-case scenarios where many faults occur at once. Multiple faults increase detection and
communication times as well as control switching in the system. Hence, scenarios where the
system transitions from the nominal state to a maximum fault level in a single instance are
considered in this subsection.
Figure 7.31 gives the response of the 4 × 4 PS HRA where 2 lock-up faults and 4 loose
faults are injected into the system at t=0. (representing the maximum permissible faults in
this system). The loose faults are detected at 0.125 seconds and the lock-up faults at 0.4
seconds. A large transient in load position follows the reconﬁguration after detection of the
lock-up faults and a signiﬁcant amount of overshoot is incurred (≈ 11%). This large transient,
however, is not due to the fast switching between several control modes incurred after the
detection (8 switches occur in the 0.4-0.45 second time frame, Figure 7.32 shows this more
clearly). Rather, it is attributable to the large change in gain at this point.
This is further demonstrated by Figure 7.33, which shows the response of the system where
the number of switches are falsely reduced, so that all control is switched at the instance of
lock-up fault detection. The transient is still induced regardless of the reduced switching.
The MAC architecture oﬀers a solution to these gain-change induced transients, however.
The control was reconﬁgured as quickly as the fault detection and agent communication
would permit in the simulation of Figure 7.31. As the reconﬁguration is distributed, it is
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Figure 7.30: Dynamic response of 4× 4 PS MACHRA with 1 lock-up fault st t=0.
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Figure 7.31: Dynamic response of 4× 4 PS MACHRA with multiple faults at t=0.
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Figure 7.32: Fault ﬂags and control modes of agents in 4× 4 PS HRA in response to multiple
faults.
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Figure 7.34: Response of 4 × 4 PS HRA with multiple faults and a reduced reconﬁguration
rate.
possible to reconﬁgure the system more gradually if this process is delayed. This can be
easily achieved by reducing the speed of communication, which also has obvious beneﬁts for
any implementation of this scheme, as demands on the communication bandwidth will be
reduced. If the communication frequency is decreased, then the results in Figure 7.34 for the
same fault proﬁle can be achieved. The transient has now been removed from the system.
However, the time taken for the system to achieve total reconﬁguration and the output to
converge upon the nominal performance is increased. Hence, it is apparent that a trade-oﬀ
exists here between limiting transient reconﬁguration eﬀects and reducing the time that elapses
between fault occurrence and total reconﬁguration. The speciﬁc application will dictate which
aspect of performance is most important, and consequently dictate the reconﬁguration rate.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter has presented an active fault tolerant control method for high redundancy actu-
ation. Multi-agent concepts have been used to provide a structured approach to active FTC
design that deals with the complexity of HRA through the use of simple localised reconﬁg-
urable control and fault detection.
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An outline of the MAC scheme has been provided and simulation results of its application
to the three HRA example systems have been given. It was shown that MAC of HRA can
provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts in comparison to passive fault tolerant control, under the full range
of fault levels. Changes in transient characteristics are decreased substantially, whilst stability
margins are preserved, and near nominal performance can be maintained in the majority of
fault scenarios.
Control switching and reconﬁguration delay eﬀects were considered, and generally their
inﬂuence on system stability and performance was found to be minimal. In extreme fault
cases, where many faults occur in one instance, changes in the control gain can cause large
transients, which may be reduced by slowing the reconﬁguration process.
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Software Demonstrator
8.1 Introduction
The HRA is a new concept in fault tolerant actuation, and one whose conﬁguration and
operation can be diﬃcult to visualise for those outside of the project. The development of
hardware demonstrators aids this issue somewhat, and proves that these systems are control-
lable. A 2 × 2 SP HRA utilising electromechanical actuators (Figure 8.1) was developed in
an earlier stage of the project, and a 4× 4 PS electromagnetic HRA is also in the ﬁnal stages
of development.
However, the current number of elements within these hardware demonstrators is far
lower than that envisaged for a true HRA being in the order of 1-10 rather than 100+. The
physical arrangement of these demonstrators are also limited to one conﬁguration, and it
has been shown that this has a signiﬁcant aﬀect on the reliability and characteristics of the
HRA. Hence, a software demonstrator of the HRA has also been developed in order to aid
visualisation and performance assessment of larger HRAs and multiple conﬁgurations. The
key aims of this demonstration are:
• to illustrate how large numbers of small elements may form a single actuator.
• to simulate a range of HRA sizes and conﬁgurations.
• to demonstrate key concepts such as system capability.
Figure 8.1: 2× 2 SP HRA electromechanical experiment.
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• to illustrate the eﬀects of the main fault types: lock-up and loose faults.
• to display the performance of a variety of control laws.
This chapter details the development of this HRA software demonstrator.
Firstly, some requirements for the demonstrator are established. The implementation
and functionality of the resultant software demonstrator is then described and ﬁnally, some
conclusions are made
8.2 Requirements
Having stated the main aims within the introduction, the required features for meeting those
objectives are discussed within this section. The requirements of the demonstrator may be
generally divided into a number of categories:
• Functional requirements,
• Visualisation requirements,
• Usability, portability and extendability requirements.
A full list of requirements is given in Table 8.1, and each category is discussed brieﬂy in the
following sub-sections
8.2.1 Functional Requirements
The software demonstrator must oﬀer the simulation of a selection of conﬁgurations and sizes
to meet the principal objectives. Each of these simulated systems must be based upon the
real dynamics of a HRA in order to provide validity to the results it illustrates.
The simulation must operate in a real-time manner, so that the user can see the operation
of the HRA during simulation, and change simulation parameters, such as the fault state,
mid-simulation. The user should also have a choice of control options and limited control of
system inputs and noise parameters in order to see their aﬀect within the system.
8.2.2 Visualisation Requirements
The visual elements of the demonstrator should show the structure of the system clearly, so
that parties unfamiliar with control can understand the operation of the system. Also, a
representation of the HRA's structure should be given, and this should be dynamic during
simulation. A real-time indication of faults within elements should also be given in this
visualisation of the HRA.
In order to demonstrate the concepts of capability levels and system health, a visualisation
that demonstrates these features is required. Again, this should operate real-time within the
simulation.
A ﬁnal visualisation requirement is the plotting of system references, inputs and measur-
ands to inform the user of the system's operation in a more precise manner.
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Table 8.1: Software Demonstrator Requirements
1. Functional Requirements
1.1 Real-time simulation of high redundancy actuators using real models of the system.
1.2 Simulation of several conﬁgurations and HRA sizes.
1.3 Choice of a number of pre-deﬁned control laws.
1.4 Real-time fault injection of lock-up and loose faults.
1.5 User control of system inputs, noise and disturbances.
2. Visualisation Requirements
2.1 Clear visualisation of the system level structure.
2.2 Element level, real-time animation of the physical structure and dynamics of the HRA.
2.3 Indication of faults within the real-time physical representation of the system.
2.4 Dynamic real-time display of system fault state and health.
2.5 Real-time plotting of references, inputs, states and measurands.
3. Useability, Portability and Extendability Requirements
3.1 Useable by parties who are relatively unfamiliar with the simulation environment.
3.2 Encapsulation of coding and simulation elements to avoid unintentional editing.
3.3 Operational in Matlab/Simulink environment.
3.4 Operational using standard amounts of processing capability.
3.5 Portable to other machines.
3.6 Control law extendability by HRA researchers.
8.2.3 Usability, Portability and Extendability Requirements
The software demonstrator must be relatively useable for those unassociated with the project,
and be intuitive to operate. Encapsulation of subsystems and functions should help achieve
this goal, and help prevent unintentional editing. However, the underlying simulation should
not be so inaccessible to prevent future extensions.
Matlab/Simulink is chosen as the operating environment for the demonstrator, for reasons
discussed within the following section. Hence, the demonstrator should operate in the current
version of Matlab/Simulink and should be operational using a system that meets the standard
Matlab/Simulink requirements (which are currently 680MB of disk space, 1024 MB RAM).
8.3 Implementation
The software demonstrator is implemented within the Matlab/Simulink environment as this
package accommodates a number of the requirements. Firstly, Simulink has been used within
the modelling and control studies of the HRA under nominal and fault conditions, and sim-
ulation libraries for this purpose were developed. Thus producing real-time simulations for
HRAs for demonstration purposes is relatively straightforward within this environment. This
may be incorporated with Matlab's GUI development environment and subsystem masking
capabilities within Simulink to increase the clarity and usability of the simulations. Mat-
lab/Simulink also has extensive facilities for graphical visualisation and plotting. This inte-
gration of the mathematical representation of the system, the user interface and visualisation
elements makes Matlab/Simulink an attractive choice. In addition, its wide use throughout
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Figure 8.2: Software Demonstrator navigation window.
academia and industry, its platform independence and open functions makes Matlab/Simulink
suitable for use in this case.
The software demonstrator's operation is discussed in the following sub-sections.
8.3.1 Navigation Window
On starting the demonstrator, by running the HRASoftwareDemo ﬁle, the user is presented
with the navigation window shown in Figure 8.2. The user may choose the dimensions of the
system as either 4 × 4 or 10 × 10, and the conﬁguration of the system as parallel in series
or series in parallel from the drop-downs. On pressing 'OK' the corresponding simulation is
initialised. This window was created using Matlab's GUIDE tool.
8.3.2 Simulation Window
Figure 8.3 gives the simulation window that is called on selecting a 10× 10 parallel in series
system from the navigator. This is a Simulink model of the system and the demonstrator
is run and conﬁgured from this screen. The user is provided with a representation of the
simulated process from system input to output.
8.3.2.1 Conﬁguration
The blocks within this system are interactive, and allow the user to conﬁgure the simulation.
Each block is discussed below:
182
CHAPTER 8. SOFTWARE DEMONSTRATOR
Figure 8.3: Main simulation window for 10× 10 PS system.
Input block The input of system may be conﬁgured by clicking on the input block, acti-
vating the pop-up shown in Figure 8.4. The input type drop-down oﬀers a choice of a square
wave , sine wave, or constant input. The edit boxes below then allow the user to modify the
amplitude and frequency (for square wave and sine wave inputs). This pop-up is creating
by masking a sub-system which switches between input types, and controlling the switching
signal through the mask parameters. The input may be edited before or during simulation.
Control block The control block gives the user a selection of control algorithms to simulate
(Figure 8.5). The control may be set to open loop, classical control, or multi-agent control.
The algorithms used are those described in Chapters 5 and 7. On selecting a control option, the
control type is displayed on the block, and the correct controller is switched to in the subsystem
which the block masks. The control law may only be conﬁgured before simulation, as changes
in control mid-simulation are not recommended. The masking of this subsystem discourages
the user from editing the underlying control law, as the simulation is for demonstration, not
control development purposes. However, the control options are easily extendable if further
control laws are designed.
Input and sensor noise blocks The input and measurement noise blocks control the noise
within the system. On double-clicking either of the blocks, a pop-up similar to that shown
in Figure 8.6, which allows the noise to be toggled. The block displays a '1' and a green
background if the noise is switched on, and conversely a '0' and a red background if the noise
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Figure 8.4: Input selection pop-up.
Figure 8.5: Control selection pop-up.
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Figure 8.6: Input noise pop-up.
is oﬀ, allowing the user to know the state of the block without checking it. These blocks may
be edited pre and mid-simulation.
Fault injection block The ﬁnal conﬁguration element is the fault injection block. On
double-clicking this block the user is presented with the fault injection control panel shown
in Figure 8.7. This ﬁgure shows the control panel for a 10 × 10 PS system, however, other
conﬁgurations will have a slightly diﬀerent layout. The fault state of the 10 parallel branches
may be controlled from this panel. The healthy state of a parallel branch is denoted by a
fully green block with the number 10 displayed (representing the number of healthy parallel
elements). On clicking on one of the blocks, a loose fault is injected, which is signiﬁed by
a decrease of 1 in the number displayed and a drop in the green area. On reaching '0', the
next click will inject a lock-up fault, which is denoted by a red cross and a '-1'. Hence, the
particular display in Figure 8.7 shows that the system has two loose faults in it's ﬁrst parallel
branch, 3 in it's second, a lock-up in branch 5 etc. Faults may be injected real-time within
the system, however, if lock-ups are injected it is recommended that the simulation is paused
whilst the fault status is changed by the user to prevent the system stepping through fault
types whilst the simulation is running.
8.3.2.2 Simulation Visualisation
On running the simulation (by pressing the play button situated within the task bar of the
main simulation window) a number of visualisation windows are activated. A typical screen-
shot for the demonstrator during operation is shown in Figure 8.8. Each of the simulation
visualisation windows are discussed here.
HRA Animation An animation ﬁgure is activated which illustrates the HRA's operation
during simulation. Figure 8.9 provides a still from the 10× 10 PS simulation. Each element
is represented as a simpliﬁed actuator within this ﬁgure, and the inter-element masses are
shown in grey. The load mass is the ﬁnal grey mass at the right hand side. On providing
an input to the simulation, the actuation elements move transversely and injected faults are
represented by colour changes of the actuator, where red signiﬁes a lock-up and yellow a loose
fault.
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Figure 8.7: Fault injection controls.
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Figure 8.8: Typical simulation screen.
Figure 8.9: HRA animated display.
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Animated ﬁgures can be created in Matlab by drawing a ﬁgure with handle commands,
and updating the position of those handles every time step and re-drawing the ﬁgure. In
order for this animation to run real-time, however, and allow for real-time fault injection,
the animation m-code is implemented within an s-function in the simulation. S-functions
are dynamically linked subroutines that the Matlab interpreter can automatically load and
execute. The relative positions of the elements and their fault status are passed to the s-
function, which initialises the ﬁgure on simulation start up, and updates it at every time step.
A general ﬂow chart of this process (which is applicable to all the s-functions described in
this chapter) is shown in Figure 8.10 and the s-function for the 4× 4 PS HRA animation (as
this is the simplest example, having the fewest moving handles) is included in Appendix E.
Health Monitoring One of the aims of the software demonstrator was to demonstrate key
concepts such as system capability. The system's capability and fault state is dynamically
displayed within the health monitoring panel. Figure 8.11 provides a screen-shot of the health
monitoring gauge for the 10×10 PS HRA. This window oﬀers one potential way in which fault
information could be displayed and used if fault detection and health monitoring algorithms
are used. The element health gauges illustrate the number of loose and locked elements within
the system, and the capability gauges provide the resultant travel and force capability as a
percentage of the respective required capability. This dual gauge system allows the user to
further appreciate the aﬀect of faults on the system, and understand the inﬂuence of fault
location and conﬁguration on capability reductions. A system status box also oﬀers advice
on the system's health. It has three states:
• `Full Health' - The system has travel and force capability in excess of 100% i.e. it has
more capability than required. This state may be in eﬀect in the presence of faults due
to the compartmentalised redundancy within the system.
• `Critical Health - Schedule Maintenance' - This state is displayed when the system is at
100% capability for either force or travel. In this situation, one more fault in the correct
location will result in a capability below that required. Hence, whilst the system is fully
operational, maintenance should be planned.
• `Restricted Capability - Maintenance ASAP' - If the travel or force capability falls
below 100%, than this message is displayed. The system now has a capability below
that required, and the actuator should be replaced as soon as possible. However, the
system will still have some capability, as displayed within the capability gauge, and
operates in a graceful degradation region.
This health display is achieved through a combination of Matlab's GUI and animation func-
tions executed within a s-function. Fault information is sent from the simulation to the
s-function, which initialises the window using GUI functions, and updates the gauges at each
time step. The fault information is derived from the user input, not fault detection algorithms.
This is due to the limited scope of the health monitoring studies within the work of this thesis.
The aims of the software demonstrator do not include an illustration of health monitoring
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Figure 8.10: Flow chart describing operation of s-functions within the software demonstrator
that provide real-time visualisations.
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Figure 8.11: Health monitor window.
techniques, as this particular area is not a priority at this project phase. Nevertheless, the
rule-based algorithms are executed in the software demonstrator for use within the multi-
agent control. However, their output is not used within the health monitoring gauges as it is
not designed for all the control structure options. The IMM studies are also not implemented
within this demonstrator for similar reasons. If further methods of fault detection/health
monitoring are studied, however, they may be incorporated within this display with relative
ease.
Output scope Plots of key signals within the simulation is also provided during run-time
through the output scope (Figure 8.12). The system input, output and velocity are displayed
within this scope. These plots allow the user to appreciate performance changes in fault
conditions during run time. A plot output option is also oﬀered at the bottom of the screen,
which runs an m-ﬁle that plots the same signals over the entire period of the last simulation,
so that the system performance may be observed more clearly and saved if necessary.
Agent State Display The ﬁnal window activated during run-time is the agent state display,
a screen-shot of which for the 10×10 PS system is shown in Figure 8.13. This screen displays
the state of each agent in a manner similar to that shown in Figure 7.4. Each agent's local
fault state is displayed, as well as their personal model of the larger system state. This display
allows the user to see when agents have detected faults, and how the knowledge of the fault
spreads through the system. The speed of communication may be controlled by changing the
communication times in the mask dialogue of the MAC block underneath the control block,
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Figure 8.12: Simulation traces.
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Figure 8.13: Agent state display window.
although it is set at a default time which allows the user to view state changes.
Again, this display is achieved through the use of a s-function which contains plotting com-
mands that are updated every time step with the fault information provided to the function.
This data is derived from the rule-based algorithms embedded in the Stateﬂow realisation of
the multi-agent system within the simulation.
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter has detailed the development of a software demonstrator for the HRA concept.
The main objectives of this demonstrator were to:
• illustrate how large numbers of small elements may form a single actuator.
• simulate a range of HRA sizes and conﬁgurations.
• demonstrate key concepts such as system capability.
• illustrate the eﬀects of the main fault types: lock-up and loose faults.
• display the performance of a variety of control laws.
A number of requirements for the demonstrator were made in Section 8.2 in order to achieve
these objectives.
The implementation of the software demonstrator was then described in Section 8.3. This
demonstrator meets the requirements set-out in Section 8.2 as detailed in Table 8.2.
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Table 8.2: Software demonstrator requirement status
Status Comments Extendability?
1. Functional Requirements
1.1
√
Real-time simulation based upon system model dynamics. N/A
1.2
√
4× 4 and 10× 10 PS and SP options available. More sizes and conﬁgurations.
1.3
√
Open-loop, passive and multi-agent control. More control options.
1.4
√
Real-time injection of lock-up and loose faults. N/A
1.5
√
Input and sensor noise control. Add user-deﬁned force disturbance.
2. Visualisation Requirements
2.1
√
Schematic of system provided. N/A
2.2
√
Real-time animation of elements. More advanced representation.
2.3
√
Fault indicated by colour changes to elements. N/A
2.4
√
Health monitor provides status information. Use fault detection algorithms with display
2.5
√
Plots of key signals provided. N/A
3. Useability, Portability and Extendability Requirements
3.1 ∼ Demonstrator is very visual, however, no testing by outside Quantitative/qualitative assessment of
parties has been undertaken. useability could be undertaken.
3.2
√
Key Simulink subsystems have been masked, and embedded N/A
s-functions not easily editable.
3.3
√
Operational in Matlab/Simulink environment. N/A
3.4
√
Operational on standard PC. N/A
3.5
√
The demonstrator has standard requirements and is portable. N/A
3.6
√
Control functions are easily extendable for researchers N/A
involved with the project.
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The demonstrator simulates a range of HRA sizes and conﬁgurations, and allows the user
to choose between a selection of control laws, and system inputs. Dynamic visualisations
of the physical system and key signals illustrates how the HRA is structured and how it
operates. Faults may be injected within the system and the eﬀects of these faults are sum-
marised through a health monitoring panel. This aspect of the demonstrator should improve
understanding of system capability and reliability within HRA structures. Visualisation of
the multi-agent fault detection, communication and internal states is also realised within an
agent state panel.
The overall package is clear in its operation and should be useable for those relatively
familiar with Matlab/Simulink. However, this useability has not been quantiﬁed, and hence,
studies of these kind could be undertaken. Much of the underlying system models, control
algorithms etc. are hidden using masks, which makes the top-level operation clearer, whilst
allowing extensions to be made with relative ease in the future. The demonstrator operates
on a standard machine with a standard Matlab/Simulink set-up and thus, is portable.
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Conclusions & Future Work
9.1 Conclusions
This thesis has presented research relating to the high redundancy actuator concept, which
is a novel approach to achieving fault tolerant actuation through the use of large numbers of
small actuators in a highly modular, low capability topology.
Firstly, the background to fault tolerant systems was presented and it was concluded
that current actuator redundancy schemes, whilst providing fault tolerance, increase the cost,
weight and ineﬃciency of the system, and also limit the types of technology that can be
feasibly used due to their susceptibility to lock-up failures. The HRA oﬀers a solution to
these issues, potentially increasing reliability and system eﬃciency and avoiding lock-up fault
mode issues. However, the HRA is also a complex control problem, as the system is high
order, containing many moving masses, and is changeable as the system must continue to
operate in the presence of multiple element faults.
A survey of fault tolerant control methods and fault detection and diagnosis strategies
was given. A great deal of research has been made in these areas resulting in a diverse
range of methods that may be implemented. Passive fault tolerant control, where a single
robust control law is designed which must provide adequate control under all fault conditions,
is the simplest approach. However, the number of faults which may be tolerated can be
limited using this approach and resultant performance is conservative. In application to HRA
however, these issues are alleviated somewhat, as the faults have a reduced eﬀect on the
overall system.
In contrast, active fault tolerant control is where the control law is changed in response
to faults. Changes to the control law may be pre-designed or synthesised online in response
to information provided by a fault detection scheme. There are numerous methods of active
fault tolerant control and fault detection, however, the consideration of these areas is all too
often separate, with assumptions of perfect fault information and zero delays.
The objectives of this thesis were:
1. to investigate the use of moving coil actuators as elements in the high redundancy actu-
ation scheme, including the modelling of an element and assemblies, model veriﬁcation
and fault modelling.
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2. to investigate an active fault tolerant control approach for use within the HRA, and
compare its performance to a passive fault tolerant controlled system.
3. to explore possibilities for fault detection and health monitoring methods for the high
redundancy actuator.
4. to develop a software demonstrator which illustrates the operation of high redundancy
actuation systems that comprise of many elements.
To these ends, the main content of the thesis began in Chapter 3 with the modelling of moving
coil actuators from ﬁrst principles. These models were veriﬁed experimentally, and full order,
non-linear simulation models and reduced order linear control design models were formed. A
methodology for combining these actuator element models into HRA structures was presented
and their fault modes considered.
Chapter 4 presented the formulation of three HRA benchmark systems which were to be
used within the control studies that followed. The dimensioning and requirements of these
systems were based upon real applications. The three benchmark systems allow the demon-
stration of the two main HRA conﬁguration types, and two levels of element redundancy,
forming the most thorough analysis of high redundancy actuation conﬁgurations to date. The
respective fault tolerance and eﬃciency of these systems was then considered.
Subsequently, the benchmark systems were used in the design of passive fault tolerant
control in Chapter 5. A very simple approach to fault tolerant control was taken after an
analysis of the system fault modes, based upon designing a classical controller to meet re-
quirements in the nominal system, as the two major fault modes (loose and lock-up faults)
have opposite eﬀects. The resultant performance aﬀorded some fault tolerance, but the per-
formance requirements were not met for a large proportion of the potentially tolerable fault
set dictated by the capability requirements of the system.
Chapter 7 considered an active fault tolerant strategy for the HRA based on multi-agent
principles. Multi-agent systems consist of numerous simpliﬁed autonomous entities which
operate in a localised fashion and collaborate to achieve system-wide goals. This concept
is similar to that of high redundancy actuation, as the HRA consists of a large number of
low capability elements which form an actuator that achieves control objectives greater than
the capability of individual elements. Through application of multi-agent concepts, a control
strategy may be constructed which uses simple fault detection and control reconﬁguration
concepts on a localised basis to achieve a more complex control result. It also allows integration
of both fault detection and reconﬁguration in a structured manner. The rule-based fault
detection used was initially described within Chapter 6, alongside a more centralised method
of health monitoring. The control reconﬁguration used was a gain scheduling, multiple model
method. The results of the scheme showed that active fault tolerant control of this nature can
achieve much higher levels of performance, in comparison to the passive fault tolerant control
method presented. The large majority of theoretically tolerable faults were accommodated
by the scheme. However, this performance improvement comes at a cost. The resultant
control strategy is much more complex than the passive fault tolerant controller, presenting
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issues for real system implementation. Also, the performance of the system is linked with the
performance of the fault detection, and as such, the risk of system malfunction is increased
to some extent through the introduction of active fault tolerant control. Ultimately, it is the
criticality and stringency of performance requirements of the application that will dictate the
suitability of passive and active fault tolerant control. However, it has been shown that both
approaches are feasible with the HRA scheme, and the essence of the trade-oﬀs between the
two approaches has been given.
Finally, the development of a software demonstrator was presented in Chapter 8. the
purpose of this demonstrator was to visually illustrate the operation of HRAs of varying
conﬁguration and size, to complement the hardware demonstrators of the project which have
limited conﬁguration and limited numbers of elements. This demonstrator was developed
within the Matlab/Simulink environment. The resulting demonstrator meets the requirements
set out in that chapter.
9.2 Suggestions for Further Work
The work presented within this thesis has provided a signiﬁcant contribution to high redun-
dancy actuation research. However, there is much to be considered before real industrial
implementation is achieved.
Technology is one of the major development areas that needs to be addressed. The actu-
ation technology used within this thesis is for concept demonstration only. It is likely that a
diﬀerent technology will be required for eﬀective implementation of HRAs containing many
more elements. Future research may lead to piezoelectric (a discussion of which is given in
Appendix A), micro-hydraulic, or MEMs technology solutions.
The health monitoring of the HRA is an area that must also be addressed. The health
monitoring studies within this thesis are limited, as they were not the main focus of this
work. Many more methods of condition monitoring and fault detection exist which could
be implemented within this scheme, and studies should be made regarding the suitability of
these approaches.
There is much potential for extension of the multi-agent control scheme presented in this
thesis. Preliminary work has been conducted on limiting the eﬀect of misdiagnosis. If agent's
reconﬁgure their local control on detection of faults to force that fault behaviour in the local
sub-system, then the control reconﬁgurations made agency-wide will be appropriate to the
overall system behaviour. This may be achieved in the case of lock-up faults by changing
the control to ﬁx the position of the diagnosed element, for example through providing the
controller with a ﬁxed position reference and changing the controller to a strong integral loop.
Other schemes such as distribution of inputs to maximise the reliability of elements could also
be achieved through negotiation between agents.
The more general control challenges associated with the HRA have more or less been
answered by research conducted within this phase of the project. However, further control
methods could be researched and applied, perhaps to more application speciﬁc systems. Im-
plementation of the control studies within this thesis is also possible, once the electro-magnetic
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4× 4 PS HRA is completed.
Finally, the formulation of design synthesis methodologies is also an area that requires
research. The development of tools and standard procedures for moving from system require-
ment to HRA realisation. considering factors such as required reliabilities, capabilities and
dimensioning, should be formed to aid and promote industrial implementation.
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Piezoelectric actuation and its suitability for use within 
high redundancy actuation
Report following the Piezoelectric Actuation Workshop, IMechE,  2009.
Jessica Davies (j.davies@lboro.ac.uk)
1. Introduction
Piezoelectric actuation is an emerging technology based upon the converse piezoelectric effect, where 
a mechanical strain is produced in response to an applied electric field in materials such as Lead 
Zirconate  Titanate  (PZT).  This  report  provides  a  brief  summary  of  current  piezoelectric  actuation 
technology, followed by a discussion of the impact and relevance to high redundancy actuation.
2. Current Piezoelectric Actuator Technology
Piezoelectric actuators encompass a number of different configurations which tend to fall into one of 
the following categories:
• Stack  actuators –  Stack  actuators  comprise  of  a  number  of  ceramic  disks  arranged 
mechanically  in  series  and  electrically  in  parallel.  This  arrangement  allows  increased 
displacement at a reduced voltage. Stack actuators can withstand high pressures and exhibit 
the highest stiffness.
• Amplified  piezo  actuators –  Although  stack  actuators  provide  high  forces,  their  travel 
capability is small. Travel can be increased if the stack is combined with some mechanical 
elements that amplify the motion, at the expense of a reduction in force capability. Hydraulic 
amplification is also possible [2, 6].
• Piezoelectric benders – Bender actuators are formed by gluing a piezoceramic strip to a 
passive  metal  substrate.  The  ceramic  expands  or  contracts  in  proportion  to  the  applied 
voltage,  whilst  the metal  substrate does not  change in length.  This results in a deflection 
proportional to the voltage input. As in amplified piezo actuators, the movement is amplified 
and the force reduced.
• Piezoelectric  motors  –  Piezoelectric  motors  are  usually  rotational  devices  that  operate 
through frictional  transmission of  small,  repetitive  movements.  They are  often driven at  a 
resonant frequency in order to extract the maximum mechanical output. Linear, non-resonant 
motors, such as inchworm motors are also available. Generally, piezo motors are low speed 
and high torque in comparison to DC motors.
A more detailed discussion of these piezo actuation types can be found in [4].
3. Implications for High Redundancy Actuation
HRA requires small-scale actuation technology. Piezoelectric actuators meet this requirement with unit 
sizes typically in the order of mm-cm, however, micro-scale actuators are possible [5]. Other aspects 
of their suitability for use within HRA are considered in the following subsections.
Page 1 of 4 22/11/2009
3.1. Operational Capabilities
A general indication of the travel and force capabilities of current piezo actuators is given in Figure 1. 
A wide range of operational capabilities are available, which should make dimensioning for any given 
HRA application  possible.  Travel  capabilities  are  effectively  unlimited if  linear  translation  of  piezo 
motors is implemented. Whereas high forces could be provided by stacked actuators for applications 
such as active railway suspension. 
Figure 1 - Travel and force capabilities of piezo electric actuators.
3.2. Fault Modes
The piezoceramic itself has no moving parts, and as such, the likelihood of failure is reduced. Most 
failures occur due to excessive mechanical stress. PZT ceramics are brittle, and unable to withstand 
tensile or shear forces, torque or mechanical shock. Measures must be taken to protect the actuators 
from these forces.
Temperature is also often stated as an issue in piezoelectric actuators. PZT materials have a hard 
operational  limit  dictated  by  the  Curie  temperature,  above  which  the  material  permanently  loses 
polarisation.  This  temperature  is  in  the  order  of  200-300C°. However,  in  practise  the  operating 
temperature must be lower than this to avoid de-polarisation effects (approx. 100 C°). Temperature 
changes also induce thermal expansion within the material, changing the displacement capabilities of 
the piezo actuator. Significant positioning variations are possible if operating over a wide temperature 
region.
PZT ceramics must be encapsulated to protect them from moisture. Failures can occur if humidity or 
conductive  materials  such  as  metal  dust  degrade  this  insulation,  leading  to  irreparable  dielectric 
breakdown.
The likelihood of these fault types will not be reduced through packaging many piezoelectric actuators 
together in a HRA, as they are common mode failures. 
However, faults are also possible within the electric drive of the system (i.e. short-circuit, open-circuit) 
and in any mechanical  element  that  translates the piezoceramic’s  movement  (i.e.  jamming faults, 
loose faults). These faults are conceivably accommodated by a HRA structure.
3.3. Configuration
As piezo  actuators  are  small  with  low  displacement  capabilities,  multi-actuator  arrangements  are 
common.  Piezoceramics  are  routinely  used  in  serial  configurations  in  actuation  stacks.  Parallel 
deployment to increase force capabilities is also suggested by Cedrat (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 - Serial and parallel arrangement of amplified piezo actuators taken from [1].
An architecture that combines both series and parallel actuation is shown in Figure 3. Two sets of 
quasi-serial  actuators  are  arranged  in  a  parallel  push-pull  configuration.  Whilst,  the  push-pull 
configuration is used in an attempt to eliminate thermal effects, it has the added effect of increased 
force. Travel is also amplified as the serial stacks push against each other. Configurations of this sort 
could be extended to form a HRA.
Figure 3 - Diamond frame piezo actuator [3].
3.4. Control
In contrast to many other types of actuation, piezo actuators are commonly operated open-loop, as 
displacement is approximately equal to the drive voltage. Hysteresis, non-linearity and creep effects 
limit  accuracy,  however.  Closed-loop control  is  necessary  to  ensure long-term stability  and linear 
performance. Charge or current control is preferred to voltage control, as this eliminates hysteresis 
effects.
3.5.  Costs
Generally,  the  piezo  actuators  cost  in  the  region  of  a  few hundred  pounds.  However,  the  main 
expense seems to be in  the required amplifiers,  which  cost  in the region of  £1000. Piezoelectric 
actuators  require  high  voltage  drivers  that  can  deliver  200-2000  Volts  peak-to-peak  at  high 
bandwidths. 
4. Conclusions
Piezo electric  actuators  offer a  compact  solution for  high speed,  accurate  operation,  that  can be 
tailored for a wide range travel and force requirements, making this an attractive technology for HRA.
However, consideration should be given to issues such as thermal operation limits, mechanical stress, 
and costs. If piezo materials are to be used within a HRA, an integrated design approach is important. 
The electrical drive circuit; mechanical positioning and coupling; and environment protection need to 
be incorporated into the design if a reliable solution is to be achieved. Given this, collaboration with 
piezo specialists, such as Cedrat, may be considered.
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 Low Cost, Ultracompact
±2 g Dual-Axis Accelerometer
 ADXL311
FEATURES 
Low cost 
High resolution 
Dual-axis accelerometer on a single IC chip 
5 mm × 5 mm × 2 mm CLCC package 
Low power < 400 µA (typ)  
X-axis and Y-axis aligned to within 0.1° (typ)  
BW adjustment with a single capacitor 
Single-supply operation 
High shock survival 
APPLICATIONS 
Tilt and motion sensing in cost-sensitive applications  
Smart handheld devices 
Computer security  
Input devices 
Pedometers and activity monitors 
Game controllers 
Toys and entertainment products 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
The ADXL311 is a low cost, low power, complete dual-axis 
accelerometer with signal conditioned voltage outputs, all on a 
single monolithic IC. The ADXL311 is built using the same 
proven iMEMS® process used in over 100 million Analog 
Devices accelerometers shipped to date, with demonstrated 
1 FIT reliability (1 failure per 1 billion device operating hours). 
The ADXL311 will measure acceleration with a full-scale 
range of ±2 g. The ADXL311 can measure both dynamic 
acceleration (e.g., vibration) and static acceleration (e.g., 
gravity). The outputs are analog voltages proportional to 
acceleration. 
The typical noise floor is 300 µg/√Hz allowing signals below 
2 mg (0.1° of inclination) to be resolved in tilt sensing appli-
cations using narrow bandwidths (10 Hz). 
The user selects the bandwidth of the accelerometer using 
capacitors CX and CY at the XFILT and YFILT pins. Bandwidths 
of 1 Hz to 2 kHz may be selected to suit the application. 
The ADXL311 is available in a 5 mm × 5 mm × 2 mm  
8-terminal hermetic CLCC package 
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Figure 1. Functional Block Diagram
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SPECIFICATIONS 
Table 1. TA = 25oC, VDD = 3 V, RBIAS = 125 kΩ, Acceleration = 0 g, unless otherwise noted.) 
Parameter Conditions Min Typ Max Units 
SENSOR INPUT Each Axis     
Measurement Range   ±2  g 
Nonlinearity Best Fit Straight Line  0.2  % of FS 
Aligment Error1   ±1  Degrees 
Aligment Error X Sensor to Y Sensor  0.01  Degrees 
Cross Axis Sensitivity2   ±2  % 
SENSITIVITY Each Axis     
Sensitivity at XFILT, YFILT VDD = 3 V 140 167 195 mV/g 
Sensitivity Change due to Temperature3 Delta from 25°C  −0.025  %/°C 
ZERO g BIAS LEVEL Each Axis     
0 g Voltage XFILT, YFILT VDD = 3 V 1.2 1.5 1.8 V 
0 g Offset vs. Temperature Delta from 25°C  2.0  mg/°C 
NOISE PERFORMANCE      
Noise Density @25°C  300  µg/√Hz RMS 
FREQUENCY RESPONSE      
3 dB Bandwidth At Pins XFILT, YFILT  6  kHz 
Sensor Resonant Frequency   10  kHz 
FILTER      
RFILT Tolerance 32 kΩ Nominal  ±15  % 
Minimum Capacitance At Pins XFILT, YFILT 1000   pF 
SELF TEST      
XFILT, YFILT Self Test 0 to 1  45  mV 
POWER SUPPLY      
Operating Voltage Range  2.7  5.25 V 
Quiescent Supply Current   0.4 1.0 mA 
Turn-On Time   160 × CFILT + 0.3  ms 
TEMPERATURE RANGE      
Operating Range  0  70 °C 
                                                                    
1 Alignment error is specified as the angle between the true and indicated axis of sensitivity ( ). Figure 1
2 Cross axis sensitivity is the algebraic sum of the alignment and the inherent sensitivity errors. 
3 Defined as the output change from ambient to maximum temperature or ambient to minimum temperature. 
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ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM RATINGS 
Table 2. 
Parameter Rating 
Acceleration  
(Any Axis, Unpowered) 
3,500 g, 0.5 ms 
Acceleration  
(Any Axis, Powered, VDD = 3 V) 
3,500 g, 0.5 ms 
VDD –0.3 V to +0.6 V 
Output Short-Circuit Duration,  
(Any Pin to Commom) 
Indefinite 
Operating Temperature Range –55°C to +125°C 
Storage Temperature –65°C to +150°C 
Stresses above those listed under Absolute Maximum Ratings 
may cause permanent damage to the device. This is a stress rat-
ing only and functional operation of the device at these or any 
other conditions above those indicated in the operational sec-
tion of this specification is not implied. Exposure to absolute 
maximum rating conditions for extended periods may affect 
device reliability. 
Table 3. Package Characteristics 
Package Type θJA θJC Device Weight 
8-Lead CLCC 120°C/W TBD°C/W <1.0 gram 
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TYPICAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
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Figure 2. X-Axis Zero g BIAS Output Distribution 
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Figure 3. Y-Axis Zero g BIAS Output Distribution 
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Figure 4. X-Axis Output Sensitivity Distribution at XOUT 
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Figure 5. Y-Axis Sensitivity Distribution at YOUT 
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Figure 6. Normalized Sensitivity vs. Temperature 
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Figure 7. Noise Density Distribution 
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Figure 8. Typical Supply Current vs. Temperature 
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Figure 9. Typical Turn-On Time 
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THEORY OF OPERATION 
The ADXL311 is a complete, dual-axis acceleration measure-
ment system on a single monolithic IC. It contains a polysilicon 
surface-micromachined sensor and signal conditioning cir-
cuitry to implement an open-loop acceleration measurement 
architecture. The output signals are analog voltage proportional 
to acceleration. The ADXL311 is capable of measuring both 
positive and negative accelerations to at least ±2 g. The acceler-
ometer can measure static acceleration forces, such as gravity, 
allowing it to be used as a tilt sensor. 
The sensor is a surface-micromachined polysilicon structure 
built on top of the silicon wafer. Polysilicon springs suspend the 
structure over the surface of the wafer and provide a resistance 
against acceleration forces. Deflection of the structure is meas-
ured using a differential capacitor that consists of independent 
fixed plates and central plates attached to the moving mass. The 
fixed plates are driven by 180° out of phase square waves. Accel-
eration will deflect the beam and unbalance the differential 
capacitor, resulting in an output square wave whose amplitude is 
proportional to acceleration. Phase sensitive demodulation 
techniques are then used to rectify the signal and determine the 
direction of the acceleration. 
The output of the demodulator is amplified and brought off-
chip through a 32 kΩ resistor. At this point, the user can set the 
signal bandwidth of the device by adding a capacitor. This 
filtering improves measurement resolution and helps prevent 
aliasing. 
Applications 
POWER SUPPLY DECOUPLING 
For most applications, a single 0.1 µF capacitor, CDC, will ade-
quately decouple the accelerometer from noise on the power 
supply. However, in some cases, particularly where noise is pre-
sent at the 100 kHz internal clock frequency (or any harmonic 
thereof), noise on the supply may cause interference on the 
ADXL311 output. If additional decoupling is needed, a 100 Ω 
(or smaller) resistor or ferrite beads may be inserted in the sup-
ply line of the ADXL311. Additionally, a larger bulk bypass  
capacitor (in the 1 µF to 4.7 µF range) may be added in parallel 
to CDC. 
SETTING THE BANDWIDTH USING CX AND CY 
The ADXL311 has provisions for bandlimiting the XOUT and 
YOUT pins. Capacitors must be added at these pins to implement 
low-pass filtering for antialiasing and noise reduction. The 
equation for the 3 dB bandwidth is 
( ) ( )( )YX,dB CF ×π= kΩ322/13–  
or, more simply  
( )YX,dB CF /F53– µ=  
The tolerance of the internal resistor (RFILT) can vary typically as 
much as ±15% of its nominal value of 32 kΩ; thus, the band-
width will vary accordingly. A minimum capacitance of 1000 pF 
for CX and CY is required in all cases. 
Table 4. Filter Capacitor Selection, CX and CY 
Bandwidth Capacitor (µF) 
10 Hz 0.47 
50 Hz 0.10 
100 Hz 0.05 
200 Hz 0.027 
500 Hz 0.01 
5 kHz 0.001 
SELF TEST 
The ST pin controls the self-test feature. When this pin is set to 
VDD, an electrostatic force is exerted on the beam of the acceler-
ometer. The resulting movement of the beam allows the user to 
test if the accelerometer is functional. The typical change in 
output will be 270 mg (corresponding to 45 mV). This pin may 
be left open circuit or connected to common in normal use. 
RBIAS SELECTION 
A bias resistor (RBIAS) must always be used. If no resistor is pre-
sent, the ADXL311 may appear to work but will suffer degraded 
noise performance. The value of the resistor used is not critical. 
Any value from 50 kΩ to 2 MΩ can be used. Using a 2 MΩ  
resistor rather than a 50 kΩ will save roughly 25 µA of supply 
current. 
Design Trade-Offs for Selecting Filter 
Characteristics: The Noise/BW Trade-Off 
The accelerometer bandwidth selected will ultimately determine 
the measurement resolution (smallest detectable acceleration). 
Filtering can be used to lower the noise floor, which improves 
the resolution of the accelerometer. Resolution is dependent on 
the analog filter bandwidth at XOUT and YOUT.  
The output of the ADXL311 has a typical bandwidth of 5 kHz. 
The user must filter the signal at this point to limit aliasing  
errors. The analog bandwidth must be no more than half the 
A/D sampling frequency to minimize aliasing. The analog 
bandwidth may be further decreased to reduce noise and  
improve resolution.  
The ADXL311 noise has the characteristics of white Gaussian 
noise that contributes equally at all frequencies and is described 
in terms of µg/√Hz, i.e., the noise is proportional to the square 
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root of the bandwidth of the accelerometer. It is recommended 
that the user limit bandwidth to the lowest frequency needed by 
the application, to maximize the resolution and  
dynamic range of the accelerometer.  
With the single pole roll-off characteristic, the typical noise of 
the ADXL202E is determined by  
( ) ( )6.1Hz/300 ××µ= BWgNOISERMS  
 At 100 Hz the noise will be 
( ) ( ) ggNOISERMS m8.36.1100Hz/300 =××µ=  
Often the peak value of the noise is desired. Peak-to-peak noise 
can only be estimated by statistical methods. Table 5 is useful 
for estimating the probabilities of exceeding various peak val-
ues, given the rms value. 
Table 5. Estimation of Peak-to-Peak Noise 
Peak-to-Peak 
Value 
% of Time That Noise Will Exceed Nominal 
Peak-to-Peak Value 
2 × RMS 32 
4 × RMS 4.6 
6 × RMS 0.27 
8 × RMS 0.006 
 
The peak-to-peak noise value will give the best estimate of the 
uncertainty in a single measurement. Table 6 gives the typical 
noise output of the ADXL311 for various CX and CY values. 
Table 6. Filter Capacitor Selection (CX, CY) 
Bandwidth 
(Hz) 
CX, CY  
(µF) 
RMS Noise 
(mg) 
Peak-to-Peak Noise 
Estimate (mg) 
10 0.47 1.2 7.2 
50 0.1 2.7 16.2 
100 0.047 3.8 22.8 
500 0.01 8.5 51 
USING THE ADXL311 WITH OPERATING 
VOLTAGES OTHER THAN 3 V 
The ADXL311 is tested and specified at VDD = 3 V; however, it 
can be powered with VDD as low as 2.7 V or as high as 5.25 V.  
Some performance parameters will change as the supply  
voltage is varied. 
The ADXL311 output is ratiometric, so the output sensitivity  
(or scale factor) will vary proportionally to supply voltage. At 
VDD = 5 V the output sensitivity is typically 312 mV/g. 
 
The zero g bias output is also ratiometric, so the zero g output is 
nominally equal to VDD/2 at all supply voltages. 
The output noise is not ratiometric but absolute in volts; there-
fore, the noise density decreases as the supply voltage increases. 
This is because the scale factor (mV/g) increases while the noise 
voltage remains constant. 
The self-test response is roughly proportional to the square of 
the supply voltage. At VDD = 5 V, the self-test response will be 
approximately equivalent to 800 mg (typical). 
The supply current increases as the supply voltage increases. 
Typical current consumption at VDD = 5 V is 600 µA. 
Using the ADXL311 as a Dual-Axis 
Tilt Sensor 
One of the most popular applications of the ADXL311 is tilt 
measurement. An accelerometer uses the force of gravity as an 
input vector to determine the orientation of an object in space.  
An accelerometer is most sensitive to tilt when its sensitive axis 
is perpendicular to the force of gravity, i.e., parallel to the earth’s 
surface. At this orientation, its sensitivity to changes in tilt is 
highest. When the accelerometer is oriented on axis to gravity, 
i.e., near its +1 g or –1 g reading, the change in output accelera-
tion per degree of tilt is negligible. When the accelerometer is 
perpendicular to gravity, its output will change nearly 17.5 mg 
per degree of tilt, but at 45° degrees, it is changing only at  
12.2 mg per degree and resolution declines. 
DUAL-AXIS TILT SENSOR: CONVERTING 
ACCELERATION TO TILT 
When the accelerometer is oriented so both its X-axis and  
Y-axis are parallel to the earth’s surface, it can be used as a two 
axis tilt sensor with a roll axis and a pitch axis. Once the output 
signal from the accelerometer has been converted to an accel-
eration that varies between –1 g and +1 g, the output tilt in de-
grees is calculated as follows: 
( )gAAPITCH X 1/SIN=  
( )gAAROLL Y 1/SIN=  
Be sure to account for overranges. It is possible for the acceler-
ometers to output a signal greater than ±1 g due to vibration, 
shock, or other accelerations. 
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Experiment Data
Table B.1: Frequency Sweep Data for Free-Moving Actuator Before Oﬀsetting (03/08/07).
Frequency Response: Magnitude (dB) and Phase (deg)
Freq. (Hz) Coil-Current Position Acceleration Actuator Input
2 −47.07∠− 7.43 18.16∠257 −35.51∠77.00 −25.82∠− 8.149
3 −40.67∠− 4.31 21.51∠224 −24.9∠45.00 −19.28∠− 33.00
5 −31.80∠− 24.20 23.59∠186.12 −14.12∠7.00 −12.65∠− 61.27
7 −26.16∠− 41.70 3.70∠158.50 −8.15∠− 21.60 −9.28∠− 78.30
10 −21.03∠− 66.20 22.60∠127.00 −3.09∠− 52.90 −6.30∠− 95.89
15 −16.80∠− 97.30 19.80∠90.90 1.27∠− 89.50 −3.66∠− 114.60
20 −14.90∠− 120.70 16.80∠63.90 3.20∠− 116.00 −2.28∠− 126.80
35 −13.79∠− 162.60 8.12∠15.51 4.27∠− 165.10 −0.69∠− 147.20
50 −14.50∠− 183.00 1.04∠− 8.60 3.3∠− 189.70 −0.29∠− 157.00
75 −16.25∠− 198.80 −8.00∠− 28.47 1.51∠− 210.20 −0.065∠− 164.50
100 −17.65∠− 205.70 −14.60∠− 39.39 −0.07∠− 221.70 −0.01∠− 168.40
150 −19.56∠− 210.80 −23.20∠− 49.90 −2.07∠− 233.46 0.04∠− 172.10
200 −20.76∠− 211.80 −29.00∠− 61.00 −3.30∠− 245.00 0.04∠− 174.10
350 −22.48∠− 212.70 −39.25∠− 111.30 −4.50∠− 302.00 0.065∠− 176.50
400 −− 22.76∠− 213.40 −57.00∠− 140.00 −16.11∠− 304.50 0.067∠− 176.80
500 −23.25∠− 214.70 −58.30∠− 92.00 −16.30∠− 262.29 0.078∠− 177.00
600 −23.58∠− 216.30 −57.80∠− 74.90 −12.56∠− 259.37 0.083∠− 177.80
700 −23.82∠− 218.30 −62.29∠− 123.00 −15.20∠− 278.70 0.083∠− 178.00
800 −24.02∠− 220.40 −65.47∠− 113.10 −14.43∠− 273.00 0.088∠− 178.20
900 −24.17∠− 222.80 −68.25∠− 124.00 −13.53∠− 279.90 0.092∠− 178.40
1000 −24.30∠− 225.30 −74.00∠− 149.00 −13.39∠− 314.20 0.096∠− 178.50
1200 −24.53∠− 230.70 −78.00∠− 74.00 −16.49∠− 281.00 0.1042∠− 178.60
1400 −24.70∠− 236.30 −72.00∠− 83.00 −13.81∠− 282.00 0.1212∠− 178.90
1800 −25.02∠− 248.20 −66.90∠84.00 −9.58∠− 433.00 0.1307∠− 178.80
2000 −25.18∠105.70 −78.8∠80.21 −28.16∠− 383.10 0.129∠− 178.90
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Table B.2: Frequency Sweep Data for Clamped Actuator Before Oﬀsetting (06/08/07).
Frequency Response: Magnitude (dB) and Phase (deg)
Freq. (Hz) Coil-Current Actuator Input
2 −42.68∠26.65 −31.22∠26.97
3 −34.10∠2.16 −22.30∠33.517
5 −25.29∠− 35.44 −13.30∠− 32.21
7 −20.90∠− 62.35 −8.85∠− 57.41
10 −17.54∠− 90.66 −5.37∠− 83.31
15 −15.18∠− 120.50 −2.792∠− 109.40
20 −14.31∠− 139.50 −1.66∠− 124.90
35 −14.08∠− 170.10 −0.55∠− 147.30
50 −14.75∠− 185.40 −0.26∠− 156.90
75 −16.05∠− 198.50 −0.104∠− 164.40
100 −17.19∠− 205.10 −0.04∠− 168.20
150 −18.91∠− 210.70 0.002∠− 172.00
200 −20.06∠− 212.60 0.03∠− 173.90
350 −21.90∠− 214.50 0.05∠− 176.40
400 −22.23∠− 215.00 0.056∠− 176.80
500 −22.78∠− 216.20 0.059∠− 177.40
600 −23.14∠− 217.90 0.071∠− 177.70
700 −23.41∠− 219.80 0.073∠− 178.00
800 −23.62∠− 221.90 0.082∠− 178.10
900 −23.81∠− 224.30 0.084∠− 178.30
1000 −23.93∠− 226.70 0.1045∠− 178.40
1200 −24.20∠− 232.00 0.1028∠− 178.60
1400 −24.41∠− 237.50 0.1028∠− 178.80
1800 −24.78∠− 249.30 0.1313∠− 178.90
2000 −24.88∠− 255.40 0.1671∠− 179.00
Table B.3: Measurement Oﬀsets.
Oﬀset
Current:
Input to PCI cards has a 0.2Ω resistance. +13.98 dB
Actuator Input Voltage:
Ampliﬁer has a factor of 1/11. +20.83 dB
Position Encoder:
0.5µm per count, plus factor of 0.01 in Simulink setup. +66.02 dB
Accelerometer:
0.528 V per 2 g or 26.91 mV per m
s2
. +31.4 dB
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Parameter Identiﬁcation
Algorithm B.1 Parameter identification Matlab code
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------%
% Parameter Identification
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------%
% solve identification criteria, with initial parameter estimates X0
fsolve(@ident_criteria,[X0])
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------%
function [c] = ident_criteria(p)
% Function creates a criteria c which evaluates to zero when the frequency
% response of the model matches that of the experiment data
%
% This function is for matching to the clamped coil voltage-coil current
% response. The input are initial values for [L1 Lm R23 R1]
% Define system parameters - assign value or parameter number
L1=p(1); %Determine L1
Lm=p(2); %Determine Lm
R23=p(3); %Determine R2|3
R1=p(4); %Determine R1
% Define system volt-coil current
sys=tf([Lm R23],[Lm*L1 (Lm*(R23+R1)+L1*R23) R1*R23]);
% Experiment Frequency Response Data
freq=[2 3 5 7 10 15 20 35 50 75 100 150 200 350 400 500 600 700 800 900 ...
1000 1200 1400 1800 2000]';
magcurc=([-18.3100 -18.6200 -18.8400 -18.9000 -19.0200 -19.2380...
-19.5000 -20.3801 -21.3400 -22.7960 -24.0000 -25.7620 -26.9400...
-28.8000 -29.1360 -29.6890 -30.0610 -30.3330 -30.5520 -30.7440...
-30.8845 -31.1528 -31.3628 -31.7613 -31.8971])';
phascurc=[-0.3200 -1.3530 -3.2300 -4.9400 -7.3500 -11.1000...
-14.6000 -22.8000 -28.5000 -34.1000 -36.9000 -38.7000 -38.7000...
-38.1000 -38.2000 -38.8000 -40.2000 -41.8000 -43.8000 -46.0000...
-48.3000 -53.4000 -58.7000 -70.4000 -76.4000]';
% Model response
sys=frd(sys,freq,'Units','Hz');
response=squeeze(sys.response);
% Difference between experimental response and model response
damp = magcurc - 20.*log10(abs(response));
dph = phascurc - 180./ pi .* phase(response);
% Frequency Weights
w = [ ones(3,1) .* 0.1; ones(9,1) ; ones(3,1).*0.1 ; ones(10,1)*0.001];
% Criteria - minimise difference
c = sum(abs(damp.*w).^2)*10 + sum (abs(dph.*w).^2);
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Example Models
Using the element models derived in the Chapter 3, and the methodology for modelling HRA
conﬁgurations also presented there, models of the three application examples described in
Chapter 4 are provided here. The models provided use the reduced order LTI element model,
as this produces the overall model used in the control design.
4× 4 Parallel-in-Series HRA Model
The 4x4 PS HRA is arranged as shown in Figure C.1. The system has 4 moving masses, hence
the reduced order cut-bobbin model, stated in equation C.1 has 8 states.
Element 11 Element 21 Element 31
Element 12 Element 32
Element 13 Element 23 Element 33
Load
Element 14 Element 24
Element 22
Element 34
2
m 
1
m 
Element 41
Element 42
Element 43
Element 44
3
m 
Figure C.1: 4x4 PS HRA
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A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
C
.
E
X
A
M
P
L
E
M
O
D
E
L
S

x¨1
x˙1
x¨2
x˙2
x¨3
x˙3
x¨4
x˙4

=

− (Fa1+Aa2)m1 −
(Fb1+Ab2)
m1
Fa2
m1
Fb2
m1
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fa2
m2
Fb2
m2
− (Fa2+Fa3)m2 −
(Ab2+Ab3)
m2
Fa3
m2
Fb3
m2
0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Fa3m3
Fb3
m3
− (Fa3+Fa4)m3 −
(Fb3+Fb4)
m3
Fa4
m3
Fb4
m3
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 Fa4m4
Fb4
m4
−Fa4m4 −
Fb4
m4
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

...
•

x˙1
x1
x˙2
x2
x˙3
x3
x˙4
x4

+

U1
m1
− U2m1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 U2m2 − U3m2 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 U3m3 − U4m3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 U4m4
0 0 0 0

•

u
′
1
u
′
2
u
′
3
u
′
4
 (C.1)
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where:
Fai =
∑
n=1:4
(
(k2i,n + di,nRi,n)
Ri,n
)
, Fbi =
∑
n=1:4
ri,n
Ui =
[
ki1
Ri1
ki12
Ri12
ki3
Ri3
ki4
Ri4
]
, u
′
i =
[
ui1 ui2 ui3 ui4
]′
In this example the values of m1to m3 are four times the usual element mass (0.52 kg)
and m4 is 2 kg. The other parameters are equal to those stated in Chapter 3.
4× 4 Series-in-Parallel HRA Model
Figure C.2 depicts the 4x4 SP HRA. This system has many more moving masses, in compar-
ison to the PS 4x4 HRA, and hence the model has more states (26 in all).
Element 11 Element 21 Element 31
Element 12 Element 32
Element 13 Element 23 Element 33
Load
Element 14 Element 24
Element 22
Element 34
Element 41
Element 42
Element 43
Element 44
11
m 
12
m 
13
m 
14
m 
23
m 
22
m 
21
m 
m 
24
33
m 
32
m 
31
m 
m 
34
Figure C.2: 4x4 SP HRA

c˙1
c˙2
c˙3
x¨4
x˙4
 =

Ab1 Ac1 0 0 0
Aa2 Ab2 Ac2 0 0
0 Aa3 Ab3 I(Ac3) 0
0 0 A4 −
∑
Fa1:4
m4
−
∑
Fb1:4
m4
0 0 0 1 0
 •

c1
c2
c3
x˙4
x4
 ...
+

U11 −U12 0 0
0 U22 −U23 0
0 0 U33 −U34
0 0 0 U4
0 0 0 0
 •

u
′
1
u
′
2
u
′
3
u
′
4

where:
cn =
[
x˙n1 xn1 x˙n2 xn2 x˙n3 xn3 x˙n4 xn4
]′
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Aan =

Aan1 0 0 0
0 Aan2 0 0
0 0 Aan3 0
0 0 0 Aan4
 , Aani =
[
Fani
mni
Fbni
mni
0 0
]
Abn =

Abn1 0 0 0
0 Abn2 0 0
0 0 Abn3 0
0 0 0 Abn4
 , Abni =
[
− (Fani+Fani+1)mni −
(Fbni+Fbni+1)
mni
1 0
]
Acn =

Acn1 0 0 0
0 Acn2 0 0
0 0 Acn3 0
0 0 0 Acn4
 , Aani =
[
Fani+1
m11
Fbni+1
m11
0 0
]
A4 =
[
Fa41
m4
Fb41
m4
Fa43
m4
Fb42
m4
Fa43
m4
Fb43
m4
Fa44
m4
Fb44
m4
]
Upn =

kn1
Rn1mpi
0 0 0
0 kn2Rn2mpi 0 0
0 0 kn3Rn3mpi 0
0 0 0 kn3Rn3mpi
 , U4 =
[
k41
R41m4
k42
R42m4
k43
R43m4
k44
R44m4
]
In this SP conﬁguration m1to m3 represent the mass of each element, and as such are
equal to the single element mass stated in Chapter 3 (0.13 kg). As in the PS example, the
load mass is 2 kg and the other parameters are equal to those stated in Chapter 3.
10× 10 Parallel-in-Series HRA Model
The structure of the 10 × 10 Parallel in Series HRA is the same as the 4 × 4 PS system
(Figure C.1) but with 10 serial banks of 10 parallel elements. A state-space description is
given below.

c˙1
c˙2
...
c˙10
 = A •

c1
c2
...
c10
+B •

u
′
1
u
′
2
...
u
′
10
 (C.2)
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A =

Ab1 Ac1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aa2 Ab2 Ac2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Aa3 Ab3 Ac3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 Aa4 Ab4 Ac4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Aa5 Ab5 Ac5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 Aa6 Ab6 Ac6 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 Aa7 Ab7 Ac7 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 Aa8 Ab8 Ac8 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aa9 Ab9 Ac9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aa10 Ab10

B =

U11 −U12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 U22 −U23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 U33 −U34 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 U44 −U45 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 U55 −U56 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 U66 −U67 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 U77 −U78 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U88 −U89 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U99 −U910
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U1010

where:
cn =
[
x˙n xn
]′
, Aan =
[
Fan
mn
Fbn
mn
0 0
]
,
Abn =
[
− (Fan+Aan+1)mn −
(Fb1n+Abn+1)
mn
1 0
]
, Acn =
[
Fan+1
mn
Fbn+1
mn
0 0
]
,
Ui =
[
ki1
Ri1
ki2
Ri2
· · · ki10Ri10
]
, u
′
i =
[
ui1 ui2 · · · ui10
]′
The values of m1to m9 in this example are ten times that of the usual element mass
(1.3 kg) and the load mass m10 is 6 kg. The other parameters are equal to those stated in
Chapter 3.
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Multi-Agent Control
Fixed Outer-Loop Control Values
The control values of the PI controllers (which take the form shown in equation D.1) for the
three example systems are given in Table D.1.
Cpi = Gpi
τpis+ 1
s
(D.1)
Table D.1: Fixed PI control gains for MAC of HRA examples
System Gpi τpi
PS 4× 4 HRA 5.5 0.65
SP 4× 4 HRA 5.5 0.65
PS 10× 10 HRA 3.0 3.3
Look-up Table Control Parameters
The look-up tables containing the control parameters of the inner loop multi-agent control
(Figure D.1) are provided in Tables D.2 to D.4.
Figure D.1: Inner-loop multi-agent control.
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Table D.2: Look-up table of control parameters for MAC of PS 4× 4 HRA.
Perception State Control Parameters
Loose faults Lock-up faults Gff Gpa τpa αpa
0 0 1/4 11 0.038 0.456
1 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.47
2 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.525
3 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.562
4 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.637
5 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.68
6 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.76
7 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.81
8 0 1/4 11 0.037 0.91
0 1 1/3 11 0.028 0.336
0 2 1/2 11 0.019 0.228
1 1 1/3 11 0.03 0.36
2 1 1/3 11 0.04 0.48
3 1 1/3 11 0.043 0.52
4 1 1/3 11 0.05 0.60
5 1 1/3 11 0.05 0.60
6 1 1/3 11 0.06 0.72
1 2 1/2 11 0.023 0.28
2 2 1/2 11 0.03 0.36
3 2 1/2 11 0.035 0.42
4 2 1/2 11 0.042 0.50
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Table D.3: Look-up table of control parameters for MAC of SP 4× 4 HRA.
Perception State Control Parameters
Loose faults Lock-up faults Gff Gpa τpa αpa
0 0 1/4 11 0.038 0.46
1 0 1/4 11 0.048 0.57
2 0 1/4 11 0.077 0.92
0 1 1/3 11 0.034 0.41
0 2 1/3 11 0.030 0.36
0 3 1/3 11 0.028 0.34
0 4 1/3 11 0.026 0.31
0 5 1/2 11 0.024 0.29
0 6 1/2 11 0.023 0.28
0 7 1/2 11 0.021 0.25
0 8 1/2 11 0.020 0.24
1 1 1/3 11 0.044 0.53
1 2 1/3 11 0.036 0.43
1 3 1/2 11 0.034 0.41
1 4 1/2 11 0.032 0.38
1 5 1/2 11 0.027 0.32
1 6 1/2 11 0.024 0.29
2 1 1/3 11 0.066 0.79
2 2 1/3 11 0.060 0.71
2 3 1/2 11 0.050 0.59
2 4 1/2 11 0.042 0.50
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Table D.4: Look-up table of control parameters for MAC of PS 10× 10 HRA.
Perception State Control Parameters
Loose faults Lock-up faults Gff Gpa τpa αpa
0 0 1/10 2.5 0.14 1.68
0 1 1/9 2.5 0.13 1.50
0 2 1/8 2.5 0.11 1.32
0 3 1/6 2.5 0.096 1.15
0 4 1/7 2.5 0.078 0.94
1-4 0 1/10 2.5 0.14 1.77
5-8 0 1/10 2.5 0.13 1.90
9-12 0 1/10 2.5 0.12 1.94
13-16 0 1/10 2.5 0.11 2.04
17-20 0 1/10 2.5 0.10 2.14
21-24 0 1/10 2.5 0.11 2.25
25-28 0 1/10 2.5 0.12 2.15
29-32 0 1/10 2.5 0.14 2.49
33-36 0 1/10 2.5 0.14 2.60
37-40 0 1/10 2.5 0.14 2.84
1-4 1 1/9 2.5 0.14 1.67
5-8 1 1/9 2.5 0.13 1.70
9-12 1 1/9 2.5 0.12 1.70
13-16 1 1/9 2.5 0.11 1.75
17-20 1 1/9 2.5 0.10 1.90
21-24 1 1/9 2.5 0.11 1.90
25-28 1 1/9 2.5 0.12 2.10
29-32 1 1/9 2.5 0.14 2.25
33-36 1 1/9 2.5 0.14 2.40
1-4 2 1/8 2.5 0.13 1.35
5-8 2 1/8 2.5 0.12 1.41
9-12 2 1/8 2.5 0.11 1.54
13-16 2 1/8 2.5 0.1 1.60
17-20 2 1/8 2.5 0.11 1.75
21-24 2 1/8 2.5 0.12 1.80
25-28 2 1/8 2.5 0.14 1.95
29-32 2 1/8 2.5 0.14 2.10
1-4 3 1/7 2.5 0.12 1.15
5-8 3 1/7 2.5 0.11 1.30
9-12 3 1/7 2.5 0.10 1.54
13-16 3 1/7 2.5 0.11 1.60
17-20 3 1/7 2.5 0.12 1.75
21-24 3 1/7 2.5 0.14 1.80
25-28 3 1/7 2.5 0.14 1.95
1-4 4 1/6 2.5 0.11 1.43
5-8 4 1/6 2.5 0.10 1.54
9-12 4 1/6 2.5 0.11 1.72
13-16 4 1/6 2.5 0.12 1.89
17-20 4 1/6 2.5 0.14 2.04
21-24 4 1/6 2.5 0.14 2.17
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Software Demonstrator
Animation Coding
function [sys ,x0,str ,ts] = HRAAnimation_4x4PS(t,x,u,flag ,pausetime)
%=====================================================================
%
% 4x4 HRA Animation S-function.
% Jessica Davies , Loughborough University 01/02/2009
%
%=====================================================================
switch flag ,
%================%
% Initialization %
%================%
case 0,
[sys ,x0 ,str ,ts]= mdlInitializeSizes;
%========%
% Update %
%========%
case 2,
sys=mdlUpdate(t,x,u,pausetime );
%=========%
% Not use %
%=========%
case { 1, 3, 4, 9 },
sys = [];
%==================%
% Unexpected flags %
%==================%
otherwise
error(['Unhandled flag = ',num2str(flag )]);
end
%==========================================================================
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% mdlInitializeSizes
% Return the sizes , initial conditions , and sample times for the S-function.
%==========================================================================
function [sys ,x0,str ,ts]= mdlInitializeSizes
sizes = simsizes;
sizes.NumContStates = 0;
sizes.NumDiscStates = 0;
sizes.NumOutputs = 0;
sizes.NumInputs = 8;
sizes.DirFeedthrough = 1;
sizes.NumSampleTimes = 1;
sys = simsizes(sizes);
%
% initialize the initial conditions
%
x0 = [];
%
% str is always an empty matrix
%
str = [];
%
% initialize the array of sample times , for the pendulum demo ,
% the animation is updated every 0.1 seconds
%
ts = [0.1 0];
%
% create the figure , if necessary
%
LocalHRAInit;
% end mdlInitializeSizes
%==========================================================================
% mdlUpdate
% Update the animation.
%==========================================================================
function sys=mdlUpdate(t,x,u,pausetime)
Fig = get_param(gcbh ,'UserData ');
if ishandle(Fig),
if strcmp(get(Fig ,'Visible '),'on'),
ud = get(Fig ,'UserData ');
LocalHRASets(t,ud ,u,pausetime );
end
end;
sys = [];
% end mdlUpdate
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%==========================================================================
% LocalHRASets
%==========================================================================
function LocalHRASets(time ,ud ,u,pausetime)
u = u([1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8]);
xA = u(1);
xB = u(2);
xC = u(3);
xD = u(4);
TxA = makehgtform('translate ',[xA 0 0]);
TxB = makehgtform('translate ',[xB 0 0]);
TxC = makehgtform('translate ',[xC 0 0]);
TxD = makehgtform('translate ',[xD 0 0]);
ElementLetter =['A' 'B' 'C' 'D'];
for i=5:8;
if i==5;
if u(i)==4; %All elements healthy
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
elseif u(i)==3; %One element loose
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
elseif u(i)==2; %Two elements loose
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
elseif u(i)==1; %Three elements loose
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ','k','linewidth ' ,1)
elseif u(i)==0; %Four elements loose
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ' ,[1 0.8 0.2],'linewidth ' ,2)
elseif u(i)==-1; %Elements locked
set(ud.GndElement1 ,'EdgeColor ','r','linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement2 ,'EdgeColor ','r','linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement3 ,'EdgeColor ','r','linewidth ' ,2)
set(ud.GndElement4 ,'EdgeColor ','r','linewidth ' ,2)
end
else
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if u(i)==4; %All elements healthy
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
elseif u(i)==3; %One element loose
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
elseif u(i)==2; %Two elements loose
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
elseif u(i)==1; %Three elements loose
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''k'',''linewidth '' ,1)'])
elseif u(i)==0; %Four elements loose
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '' ,[1 0.8 0.2],''linewidth '' ,2)'])
elseif u(i)==-1; %Elements locked
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '1,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''r'',''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '2,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''r'',''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '3,'...
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'''EdgeColor '',''r'',''linewidth '' ,2)'])
eval(['set(ud.Case' ElementLetter(i-5) '4,'...
'''EdgeColor '',''r'',''linewidth '' ,2)'])
end
end
end
set(ud.ElementA ,...
'Matrix ',TxA);
set(ud.ElementB ,...
'Matrix ',TxB);
set(ud.ElementC ,...
'Matrix ',TxC);
set(ud.ElementD ,...
'Matrix ',TxD);
set(ud.TimeField ,...
'String ',num2str(time ));
% Force plot to be drawn
pause(pausetime );
drawnow;
% end LocalHRASets
%
%=============================================================================
% LocalHRAInit
% Local function to initialize the animation. If the animation window already
% exists , it is brought to the front. Otherwise , a new figure window is
% created.
%=============================================================================
function LocalHRAInit
sys = get_param(gcs ,'Parent ');
TimeClock = 0;
RefSignal = 0;
Tx0 =makehgtform('translate ' ,[0 0 0]);
xA = 0;
xB = 0;
xC = 0;
xD = 0;
TxA =makehgtform('translate ',[xA 0 0]);
TxB =makehgtform('translate ',[xB 0 0]);
TxC =makehgtform('translate ',[xC 0 0]);
TxD =makehgtform('translate ',[xD 0 0]);
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% The animation figure handle is stored in the HRA block 's UserData.
% If it exists , initialize the elements
Fig = get_param(gcbh ,'UserData ');
if ishandle(Fig),
FigUD = get(Fig ,'UserData ');
set(FigUD.TimeField ,...
'String ',num2str(TimeClock ));
set(FigUD.ElementA ,...
'Matrix ',TxA);
set(FigUD.ElementB ,...
'Matrix ',TxB);
set(FigUD.ElementC ,...
'Matrix ',TxC);
set(FigUD.ElementD ,...
'Matrix ',TxD);
set(FigUD.Ground ,...
'Matrix ',Tx0)
% bring it to the front
figure(Fig);
return
end
% the animation figure doesn 't exist , create a new one and store its
% handle in the animation block 's UserData
FigureName = 'HRA Visualisation ';
Fig = figure (...
'Units ', 'pixel ' ,...
'Name', FigureName ,...
'NumberTitle ', 'off' ,...
'IntegerHandle ', 'off' ,...
'Resize ', 'off' ,...
'Position ', [2 33 711 415]);%[25 25 560 420]);
AxesH = axes (...
'Parent ', Fig ,...
'Units ', 'pixel ' ,...
'xtick ', [],...
'xticklabel ', '' ,...
'ytick ', [],...
'yticklabel ', '' ,...
'visible ', 'on' ,...
'box', 'on' ,...
'color ', [0.9608 0.9765 0.9922]);
axis([-5 30 -5 5]*0.011)
%Set Ground Elements
GndOrigin =-5.5;
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Ground=hgtransform;
Gnd=line ([ -1.5 -1.5]*0.011 ,[ -3.5 3.5]*0.011 ,...
'Parent ',Ground ,'erasemode ','none','linewidth ' ,2);
for i=1:4,
eval(['GndElement ' num2str(i) '=rectangle(''Position '','...
'[-1 GndOrigin+i*2 2 1]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',Ground ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['GndElementConnet ' num2str(i) '='...
'line ([ -1.5 -1]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',Ground ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
end
% Moving Elements A
ElementA=hgtransform;
set(ElementA ,'Parent ',AxesH)
Aorigin =0;
%Set up elements , cases and connections for branch A
for i=1:4,
eval(['ElementABar ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Aorigin Aorigin ]*0.011 ,[ -5.5+i*2 -4.5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementA ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['ElementAConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Aorigin Aorigin +2.5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementA ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['CaseA ' num2str(i) '='...
'rectangle(''Position '', [Aorigin +5 -5.5+i*2 2 1]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementA ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['CaseAConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Aorigin +4.5 Aorigin +5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementA ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
end
%Set Mass A
MassA=rectangle('Position ', [Aorigin +2.5 -3.5 2 7]*0.011 ,...
'Parent ',ElementA ,'erasemode ','none','linewidth ' ,1.2,...
'facecolor ' ,[0.5 0.5 0.5]);
% Moving Elements B
ElementB=hgtransform;
set(ElementB ,'Parent ',AxesH)
Borigin =6;
%Set up elements , cases and connections for branch B
for i=1:4,
eval(['ElementBBar ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Borigin Borigin ]*0.011 ,[ -5.5+i*2 -4.5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementB ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['ElementBConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Borigin Borigin +2.5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementB ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
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eval(['CaseB ' num2str(i) '='...
'rectangle(''Position '', [Borigin +5 -5.5+i*2 2 1]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementB ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['CaseBConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Borigin +4.5 Borigin +5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementB ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
end
%Set Mass B
MassB=rectangle('Position ', [Borigin +2.5 -3.5 2 7]*0.011 ,...
'Parent ',ElementB ,'erasemode ','none','linewidth ' ,1.2,...
'facecolor ' ,[0.5 0.5 0.5]);
% Moving Elements C
ElementC=hgtransform;
set(ElementC ,'Parent ',AxesH)
Corigin =12;
%Set up elements , cases and connections for branch C
for i=1:4,
eval(['ElementCBar ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Corigin Corigin ]*0.011 ,[ -5.5+i*2 -4.5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementC ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['ElementCConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Corigin Corigin +2.5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementC ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['CaseC ' num2str(i) '='...
'rectangle(''Position '', [Corigin +5 -5.5+i*2 2 1]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementC ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['CaseCConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Corigin +4.5 Corigin +5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementC ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
end
%Set Mass C
MassC=rectangle('Position ', [Corigin +2.5 -3.5 2 7]*0.011 ,...
'Parent ',ElementC ,'erasemode ','none','linewidth ' ,1.2,...
'facecolor ' ,[0.5 0.5 0.5]);
% Moving Elements D
ElementD=hgtransform;
set(ElementD ,'Parent ',AxesH)
Dorigin =18;
%Set up elements , cases and connections for branch D
for i=1:4,
eval(['ElementDBar ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Dorigin Dorigin ]*0.011 ,[ -5.5+i*2 -4.5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementD ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
eval(['ElementDConnect ' num2str(i) '='...
'line([ Dorigin Dorigin +2.5]*0.011 ,[ -5+i*2 -5+i*2]*0.011 ,'...
'''Parent '',ElementD ,''erasemode '',''none'',''linewidth '' ,1.2);']);
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end
%Set Mass D
MassD=rectangle('Position ', [Dorigin +2.5 -3.5 2 7]*0.011 ,...
'Parent ',ElementD ,'erasemode ','none','linewidth ' ,1.2,...
'facecolor ' ,[0.5 0.5 0.5]);
uicontrol (...
'Parent ', Fig ,...
'Style ', 'text' ,...
'Units ', 'pixel' ,...
'HorizontalAlignment ','right ' ,...
'String ', 'Time: ' ,...
'Position ', [20 20 60 20])
TimeField = uicontrol (...
'Parent ', Fig ,...
'Style ', 'text' ,...
'Units ', 'pixel', ...
'HorizontalAlignment ','left' ,...
'String ', num2str(TimeClock ),...
'Position ', [80 20 60 20]);
FigUD.GndElement1 = GndElement1;
FigUD.GndElement2 = GndElement2;
FigUD.GndElement3 = GndElement3;
FigUD.GndElement4 = GndElement4;
FigUD.CaseA1 = CaseA1;
FigUD.CaseA2 = CaseA2;
FigUD.CaseA3 = CaseA3;
FigUD.CaseA4 = CaseA4;
FigUD.CaseB1 = CaseB1;
FigUD.CaseB2 = CaseB2;
FigUD.CaseB3 = CaseB3;
FigUD.CaseB4 = CaseB4;
FigUD.CaseC1 = CaseC1;
FigUD.CaseC2 = CaseC2;
FigUD.CaseC3 = CaseC3;
FigUD.CaseC4 = CaseC4;
FigUD.ElementA = ElementA;
FigUD.ElementB = ElementB;
FigUD.ElementC = ElementC;
FigUD.ElementD = ElementD;
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FigUD.TimeField = TimeField;
FigUD.Ground = Ground;
FigUD.Block = get_param(gcbh ,'Handle ');
set(Fig ,'UserData ',FigUD);
drawnow
% store the figure handle in the animation block 's UserData
set_param(gcbh ,'UserData ',Fig);
% end LocalHRAInit
249
Appendix F
Publications
250
Modelling of High Redundancy
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Abstract: This paper presents the modelling of a moving coil actuator for use as an element in a
High Redundancy Actuator (HRA). A single element model is derived from first principles and
verified using experimental data. This model is subsequently used to describe an approach
to deriving models of multi-element HRAs and determine the effect of a variety of faults,
chosen to be appropriate for the electro-magnetic technology, on the behaviour of multi-element
assemblies.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Fault Tolerant Control and Actuator Redundancy
A fault may be defined as a defect or imperfection that
occurs in the hardware or software of a system. Faults in
automated processes will often cause undesired reactions
which could manifest as failures , where an expected action
is not completed by the overall system. The consequences
of failures could include damage to the plant, its environ-
ment, or people in the vicinity of that plant [Blanke et al.,
2001]. Fault tolerant control aims to prevent failures and
achieve adequate system performance in the presence of
faults.
The majority of research to date has concentrated on
sensor faults. Significant advances have been made in this
area, however, most of these strategies are not applicable
to actuator faults. This is attributable to the fundamental
differences between actuators and sensors. Sensors deal
with information, and measurements may be processed or
replicated analytically to provide fault tolerance. However,
actuators must deal with energy conversion, and as a result
actuator redundancy is essential if fault tolerance is to be
achieved in the presence of actuator faults. Actuation force
will always be required to keep the system in control and
bring it to the desired state [Patton, 1991]. No approach
can avoid this fundamental requirement.
The common solution is to use some form of over-actuation
in which the fault-free system has more control action
than needed. For critical systems, the normal approach
involves straightforward replication of the actuators, e.g.
3 or 4 actuators are used in parallel for aircraft flight
control systems. Each redundant actuator must be capable
of performing the task alone and possibly override the
other faulty actuators. This over-engineering however,
incurs penalties as cost and weight are increased and
subsequently efficiency is reduced.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation
Figure 1. High Redundancy Actuator.
The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) concept is a novel
approach to actuator fault tolerance, inspired by human
musculature. A muscle is composed of many individual
muscle cells, each of which provides a minute contribution
to the force and the travel of the muscle. These properties
allow the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient to
individual cell damage.
The HRA project aims to use the same principle of coop-
eration to provide intrinsic fault tolerance using existing
technology. To achieve this, a high number of small ac-
tuator elements are assembled in parallel and in series to
form one highly redundant actuator (see Figure 1). Faults
within the actuator will affect the maximum capability,
but through robust control, full performance can be main-
tained without either adaptation or reconfiguration.
The HRA is an important new approach within the overall
area of fault-tolerant control. When applicable, it can pro-
vide actuators that gracefully degrade, and that continue
to operate at close to nominal performance in the presence
of multiple faults in the actuator elements. The HRA
research project has already studied the use of electro-
mechanical technology [Du et al., 2007] in order to as-
sess the concept’s viability. Progress towards an electro-
magnetic HRA is also under way [Steffen et al., 2007a].
1.3 Overview
This paper presents the modelling of a moving coil ac-
tuator that is intended to be the building block of an
electro-magnetic HRA. Derivation of the element model
from operating principles and equivalent circuits is pro-
vided in Section 2. Section 3 describes the experimental
identification of the parameters and verification of the
model. The modelling of faults in a single element is given
in Section 4. Section 5 details the modelling of element
assemblies, the effect of faults in which is discussed in
Section 6. Finally, the paper’s conclusions are made in
Section 7 which includes comments on the future direction
of this research.
2. MODELLING OF A SINGLE ACTUATION
ELEMENT
In order to construct a multi-element actuation system, it
is first necessary to model a single actuation element i.e. a
moving coil actuator provided by SMAC UK Ltd. [SMAC,
2004]. This modelling will be addressed here.
2.1 Operating Principles
Figure 2 illustrates the basic components a moving coil
Figure 2. Moving Coil Actuator.
actuator. It comprises a moving coil wound round the cen-
tre pole of a magnetic assembly that produces a uniform
magnetic field perpendicular to the current conducted in
the coil. On providing a voltage, a current flows in the
coil generating a force which is parallel to the direction
of travel. This force causes the coil, and the rod which
is mounted to it, to move. The force is proportional to
the current in the coil, the number of turns, and the flux
strength.
The copper coil is wound round an aluminium bobbin,
which forms part of the piston carriage. This aluminium
bobbin surrounds the centre pole of the magnet, forming a
circuit, and as such, as it moves within the magnetic field,
eddy currents are induced within it. These eddy currents
produce magnetic fields that oppose the external magnetic
field and thus oppose the movement of the coil causing a
Figure 3. Magnetic flux within the static system.
damping effect. In addition, eddy currents are also induced
within the bobbin by the changing current in the coil. This
aspect of the moving coil actuator in question complicates
the modelling procedure as the usual resistor inductor
circuit that is used to model the electrical characteristics is
no longer appropriate. Hence, a different approach, based
on magnetic principles is taken to the modelling of this
system.
As the system contains electrical, magnetic and mechan-
ical elements, electrical analogies will be used to derive
one homogeneous model. The actuation element will be
modelled in two stages: firstly the electrical subsystem
which characterises the force produced by the electrical
input, and then the mechanical subsystem upon which this
force is acting. Equivalent circuits will be formulated for
both subsystems and then they will be combined using
dynamical laws to produce one overall equivalent circuit
for the element.
2.2 Electrical Subsystem
Figure 3 illustrates the flux within the system. The figure
shows the iron core surrounded by three coil circuits:
the moving coil with its voltage input u1 and winding
resistance R1; a second circuit representing the bobbin,
which is effectively a closed-turn with resistance R2; and
a third coil representing the inductive and resistive core
losses. The majority of the flux flows in the iron core, and
is shown in Figure 3 as ΦM . Φ1 is the flux linking the coil
and Φ2 is the flux flowing in the bobbin. Φb is the flux that
links the coil and the bobbin. Finally, the core losses are
denoted as Φ3.
Using the following expressions for the magnetomotive
force (m.m.f.) that creates the flux and the electromotive
force (e.m.f.) created across the coils by the changing flux:
F =<Φ (1)
E =N
dΦ
dt
(2)
The three circuit equations can be defined:
u1 =N1
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ1 + ΦB) + R1I1 (3)
0 =N2
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ2 + ΦB) + R2I2 (4)
Figure 4. Electrical subsystem equivalent circuit.
0 =N3
d
dt
(ΦM + Φ3) + R3I3 (5)
and using the m.m.f. law, analogous to Ampere’s law,
<Φ = N I and substituting terms in N< for inductances
gives:
u1 =N1
(
LM
dIm
dt
+ L1
dI1
dt
+ LB
d
dt
(I1 + I2)
)
+R1I1 (6)
0 =N2
(
LM
dIm
dt
+ L2
dI2
dt
+ LB
d
dt
(I1 + I2)
)
+R2I2 (7)
0 =N3
(
LM
dIm
dt
+ L3
dI3
dt
)
+R3I3 (8)
where Im = I1 + I2 + I3. These equations describe the ele-
ment without mechanical movement i.e. when the bobbin
is clamped. Hence, the mode represents only the electrical
subsystem. Some simplifications may be made as L2 and
L3 are much smaller than Lm and LB and thus they may
be removed with little affect on the system [Chai, 1998].
The resultant equivalent circuit is shown in Figure 4 , and
the following transfer function may be derived:
IR1
uin
=
LBLms
2 + (LBR3 + LmR5)s + R2R3
LBLmL1s3 + c1s2 + c2s + R1R2R3
(9)
where:
R4 = (R1 + R2), R5 = (R2 + R3)
c1 = (Lm(LBR4 + L1R5) + LBL1R3)
c2 = (R2(LmR1 + L1R3) + R3R4(LB + Lm))
2.3 Mechanical Subsystem
The mechanical subsystem is a typical second order system
consisting of the moving mass of the element and any stiff-
ness and damping within the system with an input force
originating from the electrical subsystem. Using New-
ton’s Law the mechanical subsystem can be described by
the equation of motion given in equation (10).
x¨ =
1
m
F− d
m
x˙− r
m
x (10)
Using the current-force analogy, this mechanical subsys-
tem can also be described by an equivalent circuit that has
a current input analogous to the electrical force supplying
three parallel components:
• a capacitance, Cm representing the moving mass,
• a resistor, Rd representing the damping within the
mechanical system, as well as the damping caused by
the velocity induced eddy currents,
Figure 5. Final equivalent circuit.
• and an inductor, Lr representing any stiffness within
the system.
2.4 Full Model
The full model can be created by combining the two
subsystems with the dynamics of the system. There are
two equations that describe the flow of energy between
the two subsystem circuits: the Lorentz force law and
Faraday’s law of induction.
The current flowing perpendicular to the flux density
results in a force known as the Lorentz force:
F = BNlI (11)
This force moves both the coil and the bobbin, therefore
a force is generated by both I1 and I2:
F = BNlI1 + BNlI2 = k(I1 + I2) (12)
The magnetic flux density, B is assumed to be constant
over the travel of the coil/bobbin. The number of turns N
and the conductor turn length l are also constant and so
BNl may be combined to produce one force constant k.
This force is the input to the mechanical subsystem.
As the coil and bobbin are allowed to move in the field,
their movement will generate counter-electromotive forces
within their circuits which can be expressed as below:
E =BNlx˙ = kx˙ (13)
The derivative x˙ is the perpendicular component of the
velocity of the wire relative to the flux lines. The voltage
equations (6) and (7) are augmented as below to include
the counter-electromotive force:
u1 =N1
(
LM
dIm
dt
+L1
dI1
dt
+LB
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R1I1+x˙k (14)
0 =N2
(
LM
dIm
dt
+LB
d
dt
(I1+I2)
)
+R2I2+x˙k (15)
In the mechanical-electrical analogy, velocity is equivalent
to voltage, and thus the voltage across the capacitor in the
mechanical circuit is x˙. As both the counter-electromotive
force equation and the Lorentz force equation have a
factor of k, the transfer of force between the two subsystem
circuits is equivalent to a transformer with a turns ratio of√
k. The mechanical components can be transferred to the
primary electrical side by multiplying them by the square
of the turn ratio, producing the final equivalent circuit
as shown in Figure 5. The final system parameters are
displayed in Table 1.
Table 1. System Parameters
Symbol Meaning
R1 Coil winding resistance
L1 Coil inductance
R2 Bobbin (eddy current) Resistance
R3 Core loss resistance
LB Bobbin-coil inductance
Lm Mutual inductance
Rd Resistor equivalent of mechanical damping
Lr Inductor equivalent of mechanical friction
Cm Capacitor equivalent of moving mass
k Force constant
From the equivalent circuit, the following state-space ex-
pression can be formed:

I˙R1
I˙LB
I˙L3
x¨
x˙
=

−R4
L1
R2
L1
0 0 0
R2
LB
−R5
LB
R3
LB
−k
LB
0
0
R3
Lm
−R3
Lm
0 0
0
k
Cm
0
−k
CmRd
−k
CmLr
0 0 0 1 0

•

IR1
ILB
IL3
x˙
x
+

1
L1
0
0
0
0
•uin (16)
3. MODEL VERIFICATION & PARAMETER
IDENTIFICATION
Frequency sweeps were made on a single actuation el-
ement in order to determine the parameter values and
verify the model. Three signals were measured: the po-
sition and acceleration of the rod, and the coil current.
Frequency responses for these signals were obtained over
the frequency range 1-2000Hz with the coil free-moving.
A frequency sweep for coil current was also carried out
with the coil clamped mid-way along its travel. This aids
the identification process as clamping the coil removes the
mechanical dynamics from the system.
Only two parameters could be measured directly: the
moving mass, Cm and the force constant, k. The moving
mass was weighed and the force constant determined by
applying a known current to the element and measuring
its force using a scales. These two parameters determine
the capacitance Cm as Cm = mk2.
The remaining parameters were found by fitting the model
to the frequency response data using the optimisation
toolbox. The frequency data was entered into Matlab and
weights were applied to favour the magnitude response
and the 10 − 100 Hz region and remove the influence of
the high frequency regions in the position/acceleration
responses. Known model values were set and the remaining
parameters defined as values to be determined. The model
response was then matched to the measured data by defin-
ing the difference between them as a scalar function, and
using the Matlab function ‘fsolve’ to find a minimum of
the function through variation of the parameters, starting
from an initial estimate.
The clamped frequency response was used first in the
fitting process, as this system has fewer parameters. The
clamped system transfer function was stated in equa-
tion (9). The results suggested that the effect of the
inductance LB (symbolising the flux linking the bobbin
Figure 6. Model and Experimental Frequency Response of
Free-Moving Coil: Voltage-Acceleration.
Figure 7. Model and Experimental Frequency Response of
Free-Moving Coil: Voltage-Current.
and the coil) on the system was negligible. Thus, LB
was removed from the model, simplifying it by a degree.
The new clamped subsystem model is as described in
equation (17). Hence, the parameters Lm, L1, R1 and R2|3
were determined from this response.
IR1
uin
=
Lms + R2|3
LmL1s2+(Lm(R2|3+R1)+L1R2|3)s+R1R2|3
(17)
where:
R2|3 =
R2R3
(R2 + R3)
The free-moving current and position responses were used
to determine the remaining model parameters. The ratio
between R2 and R3 was determined, allowing values for
each to be found. The mechanical parameters Lr and Rd
did not have a significant affect on the system and thus
are set very high. The frequency responses of the model
and measured data for the free-moving system are shown
in Figures 6 and 7.
The model provides a good fit to the measured data
between 5 − 100 Hz,which is the critical frequency range.
Figure 8. Faults represented in the equivalent circuit a
single actuation elements.
The discrepancies present in the acceleration and position
response at higher frequencies are due to unmodelled
mechanical resonances. There may also be some skin
effects present in the high frequencies, which could be
modelled. However, this would increase the model order
significantly.
In the acceleration frequency response, a discrepancy be-
low 5 Hz can also be observed. This difference is at-
tributable to stiction. Again, the inclusion of the stiction
dynamics in the model is not considered worthwhile as this
would introduce non-linearities into the system. However,
transient response data suggests that the stiction is signif-
icant and that its inclusion in the model may be necessary
in the future.
4. FAULT MODELLING IN A SINGLE ELEMENT
As the HRA is being developed in the interest of fault
tolerance, it is necessary to model potential faults that
can be injected into the system. Three main fault cases
have been identified and modelled to date, namely:
• Mechanical Loose - A mechanically loose actuation
element loses the ability to exert force between its
two end points. Thus, a mechanically loose element
behaves as if it is not there.
• Mechanical Lock-up - An element loses the ability to
change the length between its two end points. This
may occur if the coil of the first actuation element is
deformed and touches the magnet. This fixes the mass
with respect to the reference point, and consequently
the relative position and the speed are constant.
• Power Loss - This fault is where the electrical input
to the actuation element is lost, or the coil circuit
becomes open circuit, but the mechanical subsystem
continues to operate.
These faults are easily represented in the electrical equiv-
alent circuit format. Figure 8 illustrates where the equiv-
alent circuit for an actuation element needs to be shorted
or severed to represent the given faults. A loss of power
is realised by breaking the circuit so that the electrical
power supply is disconnected. The mechanical loose fault is
similar, as the force applied to the mass is lost. As current
is equivalent to force in the current analogy, and the
capacitance Cm represents the mass, the current supply
to this component ICm must be removed, and thus the
circuit is opened at this point. The mechanical lock-up
fault requires the capacitor to be short circuited: the force
applied to the mass is bypassed, fixing the masses velocity
and position relative to the preceding element or surface.
Figure 9. Parallel and serial assemblies using circuit analo-
gies.
5. MODELLING OF ACTUATION ASSEMBLIES
Having developed a model for a single actuation element,
multi-element assemblies can now be constructed to form
a HRA. The current focus of the project is on planar
assemblies and thus the elements are arranged either se-
rially, or in parallel, or in serial/parallel combinations.
The optimum configuration of actuation elements, in ac-
cordance with the high redundancy actuation concept, is
discussed in [Steffen et al., 2007a], and hence will not be
addressed here. This section will merely address the issue
of creating models of possible actuation assemblies using
SMAC moving coil actuators as actuation elements.
The use of electrical analogies in the model derivation
allows multi-element actuator models to be created by
replicating and interconnecting the equivalent circuit ac-
cording to the assembly structure. For example, if two
actuation elements are arranged in parallel and act upon
a common load, their forces add and act upon one mov-
ing mass. Thus, the element equivalent circuit capacitor
branch currents ICm1 and ICm2 add and flow through one
combined capacitor, or alternatively each current flows
separately through two parallel capacitors that add to
make the moving mass as shown in Figure 9.
If actuators are connected in series, the first moving mass
has the force of the first element and an opposing force
from the second element acting upon it, and the second
moving mass has the second element force applied to it. In
electrical equivalence terms this means the first capacitor
Cm1 has the current ICm1−ICm2 and the second capacitor
Cm2 has the current ICm2 and thus the two circuits are
connected as shown in Figure 9.
More complicated assemblies can be modelled based on
these two fundamental circuits.
6. FAULTS IN ACTUATION ASSEMBLIES
The equivalent circuit representation of the model provides
an intuitive insight into the effect of the faults on multi-
element assemblies. To illustrate this point, the equivalent
circuit fault model for a two-by-two series-in-parallel sys-
tem, as shown in Figure 10, is given in Figure 11.
In the example assembly, elements one and two work
upon masses m1 and m2 respectively. m1 and m2 are the
combined mass of the moving mass of elements 1 and 2 the
casing mass of 3 and 4, respectively. The casing masses of
Figure 10. Two-by-two series-in-parallel assembly.
Figure 11. Faults represented in the equivalent circuit for
a two-by-two series-in-parallel assembly.
actuation elements 1 and 2 are not included in the diagram
as they are fixed to a surface. actuation elements 3 and 4
both apply their force to m3, which is the combined mass
of the moving masses of elements 3 and 4 and the load
mass. The effect of faults on this system, with reference to
the equivalent circuit diagram, is discussed below.
6.1 Power Loss
A power loss fault in any of the actuation elements removes
the influence of the electrical subsystem on the associated
mechanical subsystem, but does not affect the flow of force
between the systems. Hence theoretically, this HRA can
withstand up to three power losses without complete loss
of force to the load.
6.2 Mechanical Loose
A mechanical loose fault in actuation elements 1 or 2
results in loss of current to Cm1 or Cm2respectively. In
mechanical terms, this means that the force on m1 or m2
is lost, rendering that serial branch inoperable. The same
applies to elements 3 and 4, as a loose fault in either will
result in a reduction of current to Cm3(a+b). However, the
remaining un-loose serial branch will continue to provide
force to the load mass in either case, resulting in a
theoretically operational system.
If both serial branches suffer a loose fault however, current
to Cm3(a+b) will be lost completely, resulting in the failure
of this HRA configuration.
6.3 Mechanical Lock-up
A mechanical lock-up in elements 3 or 4 results in the
short-circuiting of the capacitance Cm3(a+b), hence fixing
x3and x˙3 with respect to the previous masses. If elements
1 or 2 lock-up, then their respective capacitor is short-
circuited and thus the states of the associated mass are
fixed with respect to the fixed surface. The system will
remain theoretically operational as long as one element in
each serial branch remains un-locked.
These observations confirm the logical deductions that
parallel elements reduce the effect of loose mechanical
faults, but do not aid fault tolerance in the case of mechan-
ical lock-ups. Conversely, serial elements improve fault
tolerance to mechanical lock-ups, as the other element
remains effective, but are vulnerable mechanically loose
faults. The quantification of fault tolerance within high
redundancy actuators is further discussed in [Steffen et al.,
2007b].
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a model for a moving coil actuator has been
derived with the intention of using it as a single element
within an electro-magnetic HRA. The model was verified
using experimental data and the parameter values were
identified. The modelling of faults appropriate to moving
coil technology in a single element was considered and the
formulation of assembly models using equivalent circuits
was discussed. Finally, the effect of faults on multi-element
assemblies was considered and an example given. This
modelling provides a foundation for the control studies
planned for the future. The control studies planned within
the project take two directions: robust control strategies
and self-organising control.
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Abstract: The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) project investigates the use of a relatively
high number of small actuation elements, assembled in series and parallel in order to form a
single actuator which has intrinsic fault tolerance. Both passive and active methods of control
are planned for use with the HRA. This paper presents progress towards a multiple model
control scheme for the HRA applied through the framework of multi-agent control.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Fault Tolerant Control and Actuator Redundancy
A fault may be deﬁned as a defect or imperfection that
occurs in the hardware or software of a system. Faults in
automated processes will often cause undesired reactions
which could manifest as failures, where an expected action
is not completed by the overall system. The consequences
of failures could include damage to the plant, its environ-
ment, or people in the vicinity of that plant [Blanke et al.,
2001]. Fault tolerant control aims to prevent failures and
achieve adequate system performance in the presence of
faults.
The majority of research to date has concentrated on
sensor faults. Signiﬁcant advances have been made in this
area, but most of these strategies are not applicable to
actuator faults. This is attributable to the fundamental
diﬀerences between actuators and sensors. Sensors deal
with information, and measurements may be processed or
replicated analytically to provide fault tolerance. Actua-
tors, however, must deal with energy conversion, and as a
result actuator redundancy is essential if fault tolerance is
to be achieved in the presence of actuator faults. Actuation
force will always be required to keep the system in control
and bring it to the desired state [Patton, 1991].
The common solution for critical systems involves straight-
forward parallel replication of actuators. Each redundant
actuator must be capable of performing the task alone
and possibly override the other faulty actuators. This
over-engineering incurs penalties as cost and weight are
increased and subsequently, eﬃciency is reduced.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation and Multi-Agent Control.
The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) concept is a novel
approach to actuator fault tolerance, inspired by human
musculature. A muscle is composed of many individual
cells, each of which provides a minute contribution to the
force and the travel of the muscle. These properties allow
the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient to individual
cell damage.
The HRA project aims to use the same principle of
co-operation to provide intrinsic fault tolerance using
existing technology. To achieve this, a high number of
small actuator elements are assembled in parallel and
series to form one high redundancy actuator (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. HRA and MAS.
Faults in elements will aﬀect the maximum capability, but
through control techniques, required performance can be
maintained.
The HRA is an important new approach within the overall
area of fault-tolerant control. When applicable, it can
provide actuators that have graceful degradation, and that
continue to operate at close to nominal performance even
in the presence of multiple faults in the elements.
The main focus of the HRA project thus far has utilised
robust control techniques. These techniques have been
shown to be theoretically viable for fault tolerant control
of low levels of redundancy [Du et al., 2007], and testing
of these results on a two-by-two electromechanical rig is in
its ﬁnal stages [Du et al., 2008].
Electro-magnetic actuation is now being considered as a
candidate element within the HRA, the modelling of which
in both nominal and fault condition has been detailed in
[Davies et al., 2008]. Research is ongoing into the robust
control of these elements at higher levels of redundancy
[Steﬀen et al., 2007]. Results to date suggest that robust
control should be a satisfactory method of achieving fault
tolerant control of these structures. Indeed, the robust,
passive 1 control approach is attractive, as its simplicity
and constancy mitigate many of the associated problems
with active control methods. However, research into more
intelligent, active approaches is also an objective of the
HRA project, to ascertain the levels of fault tolerance and
nominal performance attainable in comparison to passive
methods.
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are the focus of this active
fault tolerance scheme. MAS was chosen as an intelligent
approach to controlling the HRA as the two concepts are
strongly related (Figure 1). Both are inspired by natural
mechanisms which utilise vast numbers of relatively simple
cells/processes to form complex structures/behaviours.
1.3 Overview
This paper presents the concepts and objectives of apply-
ing MAS to an electro-magnetic HRA with an example
of Multi-Agent Control (MAC) applied to a parallel-series
(PS) HRA. Section 2 brieﬂy introduces agent concepts and
discusses the rationale behind MAC of HRA. The current
MAC scheme is described in Section 3, from both an agent
and agency architecture perspective. Section 4 details sim-
ulation results of a MA controlled 4x4 HRA in comparison
to a global control scheme with the injection of faults into
the system The further development of the multi-agent
scheme is discussed in Section 5 and conclusions are made
in Section 6.
2. MULTI-AGENT CONTROL OF A HIGH
REDUNDANCY ACTUATOR (MACHRA)
2.1 Concepts of Multi-Agent Systems
An agent is a physical or virtual entity situated in its envi-
ronment, which acts autonomously and ﬂexibly within its
purview to achieve goals in a real-time manner [Jennings
et al., 1998]. A MAS therefore, is a collection of agents
that are socially coupled and collaborate to achieve some
objective, which in the case of MAC is the control of a
system.
These agent characteristics resemble the concept of closed-
loop control, which achieves objectives through sens-
ing and acting. However, there are important diﬀerences
within the agent concept. The most obvious diﬀerence is
the social interaction and negotiation that exists between
agents. Also, the agent philosophy is strongly associated
with localisation, a point emphasised by [Ferber, 1999].
According to [Weiss, 1999], agent concepts are most bene-
ﬁcial and applicable in applications that have one or more
of the following attributes:
Modularity/Decentralisation - A physically or func-
tionally modular system is naturally identiﬁable with an
agent structure. Similarly, agents are useful in a decen-
tralised system, as they may be associated with distributed
subsystems and their pro-active capabilities allow low-level
1 In this context, passive refers to a static control structure and
algorithm.
decisions to be made locally, facilitating the management
of large systems.
Changability/Ill-structure - The modular and decen-
tralised nature of agents allow the structure of the agency,
or agents themselves, to be changed with minimum im-
pact to the system, providing a robust adaptable solution.
This is important in systems that are likely to change
frequently, or ill-structured systems where the domain
structure is not completely speciﬁed or static.
Complexity - A complex system, with many interacting
elements and behaviours, can be served well by an agent
approach, as problems may be solved in a more eﬃcient
and timely manner.
2.2 Why Take a Multi-Agent Approach to HRA Control?
In addition to the inherent similarities of HRA and MAS,
the HRA is likely to beneﬁt from a multi-agent approach
as it displays many of the properties in Section 2.1.
The key rationale for combining MA concepts with HRA,
however, is the structuring of both of these concepts. The
HRA, viewed as a whole is a complex system, but if viewed
as a collection of simpler, similar (if not identical), physi-
cally distributed modules, the complexity and changeable
nature of the system's dynamics and structure can be
handled at a local level, allowing objectives to be met with
greater speed and eﬃciency. MASs facilitate the control of
such decompositions, and due to their communicative and
ﬂexible qualities, potentially provide greater robustness
and adaptability in fault situations.
The structuring of control is often neglected in the ﬁeld of
control engineering as the problem is stated in the form of
a single plant model [van Breemen and de Vries]. The HRA
is a complex, highly structured system, with well deﬁned
interactions between simple elements. An unstructured
approach will have diﬃculties dealing with this complexity.
MAC can replicate the structure of the HRA, which should
simplify the individual control algorithms. The process
industry acknowledges that the structuring of control is
an important issue when applied to a decomposed system,
thus it is given more attention in this ﬁeld and numerous
MACS have been proposed in this application area e.g.
[Wang and Wang, 1997] .
The actual control technique implemented in the agent is
peripheral to the MA scheme. Classic or modern designs
based on multiple model approaches can be implemented,
with the MA concept providing the mechanism for intelli-
gently deciding which controller to employ locally. Adap-
tive controllers could also be applied, again with the agents
providing the decomposition of the problem.
Essentially, agent methods provide a framework to apply
active control, fault detection and health monitoring to the
HRA, whilst avoiding some of the issues associated with
active control. Multiple model control schemes often have
one active global controller, and a supervisor that decides
which controller should be active. This centralisation can
create problems with bumpless transfer, as large control
signal changes can occur when switching between schemes
and the supervisor becomes a single point of failure,
increasing the systems reliance upon fault detection. In
addition to this, a global view on the system can make
faults more complex to diagnose. These centralisation
issues are negated by MAC, as are issues associated with
adaptive control.
The unpredictability of centralised adaptive control schemes
should be alleviated somewhat by the decentralisation
MAC oﬀers. Undesirable changes within modules will have
less aﬀect on the system as a whole, perhaps even with
other agents adapting to counter-balance the unwanted
behaviours. Localisation of control may also improve on
response speed issues associated with adaptive control.
Nonetheless, MA concepts are not without their own
potential disadvantages. Delays incurred by deliberation
or communication and negotiation procedures may cause
issues, as can the non-consensus of agents, which can
lead to incompatible actions being taken or decisional
instability. Issues can also arise in situations where agents
fail to communicate or if they fail completely.
2.3 MACHRA Objectives
The objectives for the use of MAC in this project include
those made for the control of the HRA with robust
techniques, namely:
• Control of the elements resulting in a uniﬁed dynamic
for the HRA.
• Nominal or acceptable behaviour of the HRA in
element fault conditions.
• Graceful degradation of the HRA as fault levels
increase beyond their critical point.
• Health and capability monitoring of the elements for
maintenance/operator use.
If the inclusion of intelligence within the control scheme is
to be justiﬁed then the MA controlled HRA must achieve
tangibly more in comparison to passive methods. Thus,
the objective for MAC of an HRA also include:
Increased reliability - Robust techniques can be limited
in the number of faults or fault types they can accommo-
date. The structure of the HRA alleviates this problem
somewhat, as the number of elements reduces the overall
aﬀect of faults on the system. Nevertheless, a more intelli-
gent scheme, such as multi-agents, may accommodate even
greater fault levels and fault types.
Improved nominal performance - Passive fault ac-
commodation methods require the controller design to be
robust enough to produce adequate performance during
faulty conditions. This can lead to conservative perfor-
mance in nominal conditions. An active control scheme
can oﬀer an increase in nominal performance as the control
action can be changed in fault situations. Agent schemes
may also provide performance enhancement due to their
potential to pre-empt situations.
3. MACHRA SCHEME
The MACHRA scheme is currently in the investigative
stage, concentrating on parallel in series (PS) conﬁgura-
tions with lock-up and loose faults. Intital agent archi-
tectures and agency structures have been designed and
simulated.
At present, Matlab/Simulink is used to create and simulate
HRA assemblies, details of which can be found in [Davies
et al., 2008]. Stateﬂow is used to simulate the inner rule-
based logic of the agents and their communication. This
provides a fast prototyping tool of the agents for use with
Matlab/Simulink.
3.1 Agency Architecture
Figure 2. MACHRA agency architecture
The term agency architecture refers to the conﬁguration
of multiple agents on the macro scale. Figure 2 displays
the MACHRA scheme's agency architecture for a m × n
HRA PS conﬁguration. There is an agent per parallel
branch of elements, each of which is responsible for the
control and detection of faults within its elements. In
this conﬁguration, lock-up faults will render the parallel
branch inoperative, adding that branch's weight to the
load of its neighbouring branches. However, loose faults
will not aﬀect the travel capability of that branch, as
long as one operational element remains: PS assemblies
have inherent fault tolerance to this fault type. Diﬀerent
conﬁgurations will provide more or less inherent tolerance
to these faults, hence the conﬁguration must be chosen to
suit the application.
All agents within this scheme are identical and peers,
consistent with the spirit of MAC where no hierarchy
should exist. A global set-point for the whole HRA is
given to each agent, as well as local position sensory
input from its branch. Communication between agents is
broadcast to all, however each message is addressed and
the recipient agent only reads the messages that are from
its immediate structural neighbours to save time when
large numbers of elements are used. If lock-up faults occur,
the agent's structural neighbours will change and thus
diﬀerent messages become relevant.
3.2 Agent Architecture
The current agent architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
This architecture has similarities with subsumption, ﬁrst
introduced by [Brooks, 1986], that uses behaviours layered
in order of abstraction to produce more complex emergent
behaviors in a reactive time-frame. This reactivity is key
in the HRA as, due to the fast dynamics of the electro-
magnetic elements, a purely deliberative architecture may
not provide the response times needed.
Figure 3. MACHRA agent architecture
The most reactive, basal behaviors are situated on the
bottom layer, in this case the Control Module (CM), which
provides the drive signal to the element based on the global
set-point. A multiple model control scheme is employed
within this design as the CM contains a look-up table with
simple classical control designs based on the number of
active agents structurally surrounding the agent e.g. more
control action is required if an element's neighbour locks.
The Fault Detection Module (FDM) is the most abstracted
layer, and thus aﬀects those below it. As its name suggests,
the FDM detects faults within its element. At the current
stage of development, one fault type (lock-up faults) is
detected. Future agents will have more than one module,
arranged either as peers in a single layer or as separate
layers ordered by the severity of the fault type. The module
contains rule-based logic which determines the fault status
of the element based on sensory information and internal
knowledge.
The middle layer is the Fault Communication Module
(FCM). This module communicates the fault status and
global capability estimate to other agents, receiving mes-
sages of the same content from other agents. This informa-
tion is also passed to the CM, where it is used to choose a
controller and decide what portion of the overall global
set-point to make its objective. In the absence of this
information, the CM assumes nominal conditions if no pre-
vious communication with the FCM has been made, and
last known conditions in the presence of communication
history.
One shortcoming of the subsumption architecture, accord-
ing to [van Breemen and de Vries], is its inability to
combine information from diﬀerent layers. This problem is
negated in the MACHRA agent structure, as information
is stored within an inter-accessible knowledge module.This
module contains both knowledge given to the agent on
start-up and that deduced within the individual modules.
Another commonly cited inadequacy of the subsumption
scheme is the lack of consideration of previous events. This
is not the case within the MACHRA architecture, as the
modules have previous state-based behaviours, making the
agent not purely reactive, but hybrid in nature.
4. MAC VS GLOBAL CONTROL SIMULATIONS
An example that illustrates the potential of MAC of HRA,
in comparison to centralised passive control, is provided
Table 1. Fault Cases
Case Description HRA State
Nom. All elements are healthy Healthy & capable
F1 Branch nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
F2 2 branches nearest load locked Faulty and critical
F3 3 branches nearest load locked Graceful degrade
Table 2. Requirements
Performance Requirements
Travel Window ±0.015m (2× element travel)
Overshoot <2%
Rise Time <0.5s
Settling Time <0.75s
in this section. The HRA system chosen is a 4x4 PS
conﬁguration with an overall travel control objective. The
elements work upon a load that is twice as large as the
inter-element masses and for the purposes of this example
it is assumed that the HRA is over-dimensioned by a factor
of two i.e. the maximum required travel is twice the travel
of a single element 2 .
As the PS assembly has natural tolerance to loose faults
in terms of travel control, they will not be considered
here. However, element lock-ups immobilise the parallel
branches, and thus will be considered. Theoretically, a
4x4 system, of this dimensioning, may incur up to eight
lock-up faults and still be capable of meeting its travel
requirement. However, in a worst-case scenario, where sin-
gle lock-ups occur in diﬀerent branches, two lock-ups will
bring the travel capability to critical point. Hence, faults
will be injected in this worst-case manner, as described in
Table 1.
4.1 Control Schemes
Figure 4 portrays the global and MAC control schemes. In
the global scheme, a single, phase advance controller is de-
signed to meet arbitrary transient requirements, displayed
in Table 2, with good stability margins
Two MAC control schemes are included in this paper.
The ﬁrst scheme, MACS1 has set-point redistribution only.
Each agent has a phase advance controller 3 designed
to meet the requirements in the nominal case. In fault
conditions, the reduction in capability is communicated to
other agents, and the extra travel required is distributed
amongst the remaining active elements, minus the lock-up
position of the faulty element. The control algorithm in
each agent remains unchanged.
The second scheme, MACS2 utilises the same control
algorithms as MACS1 under nominal conditions. The set-
point redistribution described in MACS1 is also present.
However, another controller per fault condition is designed
and implemented when faults occur. Hence, this scheme
illustrates set-point redistribution with a multiple model
control scheme.
2 This is an unrealistically low element mass-to-load ratio and high
level of over-dimensioning for a HRA due to the relatively low level
of redundancy used in this example.
3 The controllers in each agent are identical, as this reduces design
time and aids veriﬁcation for high integrity applications.
Figure 4. Global and agent control schemes
4.2 Comparison of Control under Fault Conditions
All faults were injected at t=0 and the set-point was an
attainable travel in the worst fault case. Figure 5 shows
a step response of the three control schemes under these
conditions and their characteristics are summarised in
Table 3. The simulations show that as faults occur, the
increasing load slows the response.
Figure 5. Step response for global control, MACS1 and
MACS2
Table 3. Global control, MACS1 and MACS2
simulations
Fault Case Overshoot Rise Time Settling Time
Glob. Nom. 1.80% 0.30s 0.45s
Glob. F1 0.37% 0.40s 0.62s
Glob. F2 0% 0.63s 1.14s
Glob. F3 0% 1.38s 2.48s
MACS1 Nom. 1.83% 0.30s 0.44s
MACS1 F1 0.95% 0.30s 0.45s
MACS1 F2 0% 0.30s 0.54s
MACS1 F3 0% 0.36s 0.73s
MACS2 Nom. 1.83% 0.30s 0.44s
MACS2 F1 1.01% 0.30s 0.45s
MACS2 F2 0.42% 0.30s 0.46s
MACS2 F3 0% 0.30s 0.49s
Comparing the global scheme to MACS1, it can be ob-
served that the transient performance of the globally con-
trolled HRA degrades to a greater extent than that of
the MA controlled system with input redistribution only.
The rise time and settling time increase signiﬁcantly with
each fault in the global case, whereas very little change is
observed until three of the four branches are locked in the
MAC case. This result illustrates that the localisation of
control in this manner is favourable in comparison to the
global approach.
The results shown in Table 3 for MACS2 are an im-
provement on those for MACS1. The rise time does not
lengthen under any fault condition, and the change in
settling time is signiﬁcantly reduced. In addition to these
marginal improvements, it can be seen from Figure 5, that
the transient response envelope is tightened in general
when using a multiple model control algorithm.
The MACHRA schemes simulated in this example oﬀer
signiﬁcantly improved performance under fault conditions
in comparison to a simple global control technique. How-
ever, it must also be acknowledged that the fault levels
and over-dimensioning present in this example are much
higher than those conceived by the HRA concept, and less
distinction between the control schemes will be present
with higher order conﬁgurations. Ultimately, the necessity
for inclusion of active control strategies such as MAC will
be dictated by the stringency of the requirements on a
speciﬁc application.
4.3 Fault Detection and Control Reconﬁguration Delays
The results discussed in Section 4.2 assumed that fault
detection and control reconﬁguration in the MA schemes
was instantaneous, which is unrealistic. If Stateﬂow is
used to simulate the multi-agent type fault detection,
communication and control reconﬁguration then a delay
is introduced, providing a more realistic representation.
Figure 6 is a pulse train simulation of the previous MAC
scheme's, simulated with Stateﬂow. As previously, all
faults were injected at t=0 and an attainable travel de-
mand was made.
The reconﬁguration of the MACSs can be observed in
the ﬁrst pulse rise, resulting in a slower response. This is
particularly pronounced where three faults need to be de-
tected and communicated. However, in the remaining op-
erational period, where no faults occur, there are no delay
Figure 6. Pulse train for global control, MACS1 and
MACS2 with delays
aﬀects, and as such the response obtained in the previous
section applies. This ephemeral performance degradation
on fault injection may be considered acceptable in a real
application, as faults are likely to be an infrequent event.
5. PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS
The development of a MAC scheme for the HRA is in
its early stages and as such, many developments are
envisaged. These include the improvement and extension
of current fault detection schemes, and control in terms
of the controlled variables and design techniques. The
conﬁgurations to which the MAC is applied must also be
extended to series-parallel and mixed conﬁgurations.
Changes to the architecture of the MAC scheme may be
investigated and robust testing procedures are required, as
many questions exist to the scheme's reliability. In addition
to the robustness checking usually associated with control
system design, situations where faults are misdiagnosed,
communication is lost, and agents malfunction must be
considered. Also, issues regarding feasibility at very high
levels of redundancy must be addressed.
The practical testing of MAC on a experimental electro-
magnetic HRA is also planned, which should give an
indication of such a scheme's performance in a real-world
situation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
MAC potentially provides an active fault tolerant solution
to controlling the HRA that improves on the nominal and
faulty performance of passive schemes, whilst negating
some of the issues associated with control reconﬁguration.
The simulation of a suggested agent/agency architecture
was included within an example that compared MAC
with a more traditional global scheme. This example
illustrated that requirements can be met under greater
fault levels with the assistance of MA concepts, using
input redistribution alone or in conjunction with localised
multiple model control.
Many further developments for the MACHRA are planned
including the practical testing on an experimental HRA
rig, which will help ascertain the feasibility of MAC for
this application.
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Abstract: The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) project investigates the use of a relatively
high number of small actuation elements, assembled in series and parallel in order to form a
single actuator which has intrinsic fault tolerance. Both passive and active methods of control
are planned for use with the HRA. This paper presents a multiple-model control scheme for a
10x10 HRA applied through the framework of multi-agent control.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Traditional Approaches to Fault Tolerant Actuation
In automated processes, faults in hardware or software
will often produce undesired reactions. These faults could
result in failures, where the system as a whole does not
complete an expected action. Failures can cause damage
to the plant, its environment, or people in the vicinity of
that plant [Blanke et al., 2001]. Fault Tolerant Control
(FTC) aims to prevent failures and their consequences by
providing adequate system performance in the presence of
faults.
The majority of FTC research to date has concentrated on
sensor faults. Signiﬁcant advances have been made in this
area, but most of these strategies are not applicable to
actuator faults. This is attributable to the fundamental
diﬀerences between actuators and sensors. Sensors deal
with information, and measurements may be processed or
replicated analytically to provide fault tolerance. Actua-
tors, however, must deal with energy conversion, and as a
result actuator redundancy is essential if fault tolerance is
to be achieved in the presence of actuator faults. Actuation
force will always be required to keep the system in control
and bring it to the desired state [Patton, 1991].
The common solution for fault tolerant actuation in crit-
ical systems involves straightforward parallel replication
of actuators. Each redundant actuator must be capable
of performing the task alone and possibly override the
other faulty actuators. This solution is over-engineered,
reducing the eﬃciency of the system i.e. in triplex systems
200% more capability, cost and weight than required is
introduced to ensure a certain level of reliability.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation
High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) is a novel approach
to actuator fault tolerance that aims to reduce the over-
engineering incurred by traditional approaches. The HRA
concept is inspired by musculature, where the tissue is
composed of many individual cells, each of which provides
a minute contribution to the overall contraction of the
muscle. These characteristics allows the muscle, as a whole,
to be highly resilient to individual cell damage.
This principle of co-operation in large numbers of low
capability modules can be used in fault tolerant actuation
to provide intrinsic fault tolerance. The HRA uses a high
number of small actuator elements, assembled in parallel
and series to form one high redundancy actuator (see
Figure 1). Faults in elements will aﬀect the maximum
Figure 1. HRA and MAS.
capability, but through control techniques, the required
performance can be maintained. This allows the same
level of reliability to be attained in exchange for less over-
dimensioning.
The HRA is an important new approach within the overall
area of fault tolerant control. When applicable, it can
provide actuators that have graceful degradation, and that
continue to operate at close to nominal performance even
in the presence of multiple faults in the elements.
1.3 Control of High Redundancy Actuation
The main focus of the HRA project thus far has utilised
robust control methods. These techniques have been shown
to be theoretically viable for fault tolerant control of low
levels of redundancy [Du et al., 2007], and successful prac-
tical testing of these results on a two-by-two electrome-
chanical HRA was achieved.
More recently, electromagnetic actuation has been used
as elements of the HRA, the modelling of which in both
nominal and fault condition has been detailed in [Davies
et al., 2008b]. Research is ongoing into the robust control
of these elements at higher levels of redundancy [Steﬀen
et al., 2007]. Results to date suggest that robust control
should be a satisfactory method of achieving fault tol-
erant control of these structures. Indeed in most cases,
the robust, passive 1 control approach is attractive, as its
simplicity and constancy mitigate many of the associated
problems with active control methods. However, research
into more intelligent, active approaches is also an objective
of the HRA project, to ascertain the levels of fault toler-
ance and nominal performance attainable in comparison
to passive methods.
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are the focus of this active
fault tolerance scheme. MAS was chosen as an intelligent
approach to controlling the HRA as the two concepts are
strongly related (Figure 1).
1.4 Overview
[Davies et al., 2008a] presented a Multi-Agent Control
(MAC) scheme for a 4x4 HRA, which was found to be
advantageous in terms of fault tolerance in comparison to a
passive approach. However, it was questioned whether the
approach would still provide tangible beneﬁts at higher,
more realistic levels of redundancy. Hence, this paper
extends the application of MAC concepts to a 10x10 HRA
to address this issue. In addition, the possibility of fault
misdiagnosis is also considered. Section 2 brieﬂy introduces
agent concepts and discusses the rationale behind MAC of
HRA. The current MAC scheme is described in Section 3.
Section 4 then provides details of the control of a 10x10
HRA using passive and MAC means.
2. MULTI-AGENT CONTROL OF A HIGH
REDUNDANCY ACTUATOR (MACHRA)
2.1 Multi-Agent Control
An agent is a physical or virtual entity situated in its envi-
ronment, which acts autonomously and ﬂexibly within its
purview to achieve goals in a real-time manner [Jennings
et al., 1998]. A MAS, therefore, is a collection of agents
that are socially coupled and collaborate to achieve objec-
tives, which in the case of MAC are the control objectives
of the application.
These agent characteristics resemble the concept of closed-
loop control, which achieves objectives through sens-
ing and acting. However, there are important diﬀerences
within the agent concept. The most obvious diﬀerence is
the social interaction and negotiation that exists between
agents. Also, the agent philosophy is strongly associated
with localisation, a point emphasised by [Ferber, 1999].
2.2 Rationale for Multi-Agent Control of HRA
MAS and HRA are conceptually similar (Figure 1). Both
are inspired by natural mechanisms which utilise vast num-
bers of relatively simple cells/processes to form complex
structures/behaviours.
1 In this context, passive refers to a static control structure and
algorithm.
This similarity in their structuring is the key rationale
for combining MA ideas with HRA. The structuring of
control is often neglected in the ﬁeld of control engineering
as the problem is stated in the form of a single plant
model [van Breemen and de Vries, 2000]. The process
industry acknowledges that the structuring of control is
an important issue when applied to a decomposed system,
thus it is given more attention in this ﬁeld and numerous
MACS have been proposed in this application area e.g.
[Wang and Wang, 1997].
The HRA is a complex, highly structured system, with
well-deﬁned interactions between simple elements. An un-
structured approach will have diﬃculties dealing with this
complexity. However, if the HRA is viewed as a collection
of simpler, similar (if not identical), physically distributed
modules, the complexity and changeable nature of the
system's dynamics and structure can be handled at a
local level, allowing objectives to be met with greater
speed and eﬃciency. MASs facilitate the control of such
decompositions, allowing simple control algorithms in con-
junction with simple fault detection methods at a local
level to achieve greater robustness and adaptability in fault
situations.
Agents also avoid some of the issues associated with active
control. Multiple-model control schemes often have one
active global controller, and a supervisor that decides
which controller should be active. A centralised supervisor
becomes a single point of failure, increasing the systems
reliance upon fault detection. In addition to this, a global
view on the system can make faults more complex to
diagnose. These centralisation issues are negated by MAC,
as are issues associated with adaptive control.
The unpredictability of centralised adaptive control schemes
should be alleviated by the decentralisation MAC oﬀers.
Undesirable changes within modules will aﬀect the sys-
tem as a whole to a lesser extent, perhaps even with
other agents adapting to counter-balance the unwanted
behaviours. Localisation of control may also improve on
response speed issues associated with adaptive control.
Nonetheless, there are a number of potential issues asso-
ciated with MASs that require careful attention such as
deliberation, communication and negotiation delays, agent
non-consensus and communication failure.
2.3 MACHRA Objectives
The HRA project's objectives include:
• Control of the elements resulting in a uniﬁed dynamic
for the HRA.
• Nominal or acceptable behaviour of the HRA in
element fault conditions.
• Graceful degradation of the HRA as fault levels
increase beyond their critical point.
If the inclusion of intelligence in the control scheme is to
be justiﬁed then the MA controlled HRA must achieve
tangibly more in comparison to passive methods. Thus,
the objective for MAC of an HRA also include:
Increased reliability - Robust techniques can be limited
in the number of faults or fault types they can accommo-
date. The structure of the HRA alleviates this problem, as
the number of elements reduces the overall aﬀect of faults
on the system. Nevertheless, a more intelligent strategy
may accommodate even greater fault levels and fault types.
Improved nominal performance - Passive fault ac-
commodation methods require the controller design to be
robust enough to produce adequate performance during
faulty conditions. This can lead to conservative perfor-
mance in nominal conditions. An active control scheme
can oﬀer an increase in nominal performance as the control
action can be changed in fault situations.
3. MACHRA SCHEME
The MACHRA scheme is currently in the investigative
stage, concentrating on parallel in series (PS) conﬁgura-
tions with lock-up and loose faults. Initial agent archi-
tectures and agency structures have been designed and
simulated.
At present, Matlab/Simulink is used to create and simulate
HRA assemblies, details of which can be found in [Davies
et al., 2008b]. Stateﬂow is used to simulate the inner rule-
based logic of the agents and their communication. This
provides a fast prototyping tool of the agents for use with
Matlab/Simulink.
The agent conﬁguration and internal structuring was de-
tailed in [Davies et al., 2008a]. A brief overview of the
MACHRA scheme is provided here.
3.1 Agency Architecture
Figure 2. MACHRA agency architecture
The architecture of an agency is the conﬁguration of
multiple agents on a macro scale. Figure 2 displays the
MACHRA scheme's agency architecture for a m×n HRA
PS conﬁguration. There is an agent per parallel branch of
elements, each of which is responsible for the control and
detection of faults within its elements and communication
of faults to other agents.
All agents within this scheme are identical and peers,
consistent with the spirit of MAC where no hierarchy
should exist. A ﬁxed outer control loop provides each
agent with an identical set-point. Communication between
agents is broadcasted via a bus. However, agents only
consider messages from structural neighbours. If lock-up
faults occur, the agent's structural neighbours will change
and thus diﬀerent messages become relevant.
3.2 Agent Architecture
Figure 3. MACHRA agent architecture
The current agent architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
This architecture has similarities with subsumption, ﬁrst
introduced by [Brooks, 1986], that uses behaviours layered
in order of abstraction to produce more complex emergent
behaviors in a reactive time-frame. This reactivity is key
in the HRA as, due to the fast dynamics of the electro-
magnetic elements, a purely deliberative architecture may
not provide the response times needed.
The Fault Detection Module (FDM) is the most abstracted
layer, and thus aﬀects those below it. As its name suggests,
the FDM detects faults in its elements. Currently, only one
fault type (lock-up faults) is detected. Future agents will
have more than one module, arranged either as peers in a
single layer or as separate layers ordered by the severity
of the fault type. The module contains rule-based logic
which determines the fault status of the element based on
sensory information and internal knowledge.
If a fault is detected, this information is passed to the
Fault Communication Module (FCM) where it is relayed
to other agents. Fault status messages from other agents
are also received here.
The most reactive layer is the Control Module (CM), which
provides the drive signal to the element based on the set-
point, and its knowledge of the system status. A multiple-
model control scheme is employed, as the CM contains a
look-up table with simple classical control designs based
on the number of active elements in the system.
Finally, a knowledge module containing both knowledge
given to the agent on start-up and that deduced within
the individual modules links the layers.
4. CONTROL OF A 10X10 HRA
This section will consider the control of a 10x10 HRA
using MAC concepts and a passive control approach for
comparison. [Davies et al., 2008a] gave an example of MAC
applied to a 4x4 system. As this system had a relatively low
level of modular redundancy in terms of the HRA concept,
the eﬀects of faults on the system were relatively large. A
10x10 system is a more appropriate level of redundancy for
the HRA concept and thus it is worthwhile reconsidering
the eﬀectiveness of active FTC in a system where faults
have less aﬀect. In addition, the eﬀects of reconﬁguration
Table 1. Requirements
Performance Requirements
Travel Window ±0.06m (6× element travel)
Overshoot <2%
Rise Time <0.75s
Settling Time <1.20s
Table 2. Fault Cases
Case Description HRA State
Nom. All elements are healthy Healthy & capable
FC1 Branch nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC2 2 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC3 3 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC4 4 branches nearest load locked Critical fault level
delays and fault detection errors will be considered in the
MAC scheme.
4.1 Case Study System
The HRA system considered in this paper is, as previously
stated, a 10x10 system in parallel-series (PS) conﬁgura-
tion, which is structured as shown in Figure 2, with ten
branches of ten parallel elements arranged serially.
The actuation elements currently being used within the
project are SMAC electromagnetic actuators [SMAC,
2004]. The modelling of these actuators was considered
in [Davies et al., 2008b], and will not be detailed here. A
simpliﬁed 2 state element model is used in this example,
making the overall system 20th order.
The control is designed to meet some transient require-
ments, suitable to the system's technology with good sta-
bility margins. These requirements are given in Table 1.
The PS conﬁguration of HRA is most aﬀected by lock-
up faults, as a locked element will ﬁx its whole parallel
branch of elements from the preceding surface to the next.
Loose faults are naturally accommodated by this struc-
ture, as parallel elements compensate for loose elements
in the branch. Thus, lock-up faults are considered in this
example.
It is assumed that this system is designed for an applica-
tion with travel requirements that need at least 6 of the 10
parallel branches to be operational. Hence, up to 4 lock-up
faults in separate branches would be tolerable in this case
and this level of faults will be considered here. 1-4 faults
are injected in a worst-case manner (in separate branches),
as described in Table 2.
4.2 Control Schemes
Figure 4 represents both the passive control and MAC
schemes.
The passive scheme has cascaded classical controllers de-
signed to meet the control objectives in nominal condi-
tions. The inner loops have a phase advance compensator
controlling the local position of each parallel branch of
elements. This spreads the travel between the elements
equally. An outer loop controller is then included to control
the overall travel of the HRA as a whole. Proportional-
Figure 4. Global and agent control schemes
integral control is used in the outer loop to achieve the
steady state requirements.
This passive control scheme is used as the base for the
MAC approach. Under nominal conditions, the MA con-
trolled system is identical to the passively controlled sys-
tem. When a fault is detected by an agent, however, this
fault is communicated throughout the agency and the
control laws are changed. The outer loop is not reconﬁg-
ured, as this would compromise the localisation of fault
detection and reconﬁguration decision, producing a single
point of failure, as mentioned previously.
The feed-forward gain in the agent's control module is
changed to redistribute the travel demand of the system
i.e. if the system was nominal and one element locks then
the gain would be changed from 1/10 to 1/9, as there are
nine active element branches remaining.
In addition to this, the parameters in the local phase
advance controller are also reconﬁgured. This is necessary
as lock-ups in the system eﬀectively increase the mass of
the system: operational elements now have to work upon
the dead mass of the faulty actuator as well as the load. An
increase in the speed of the local controller can improve the
performance of the remaining operational elements. Hence,
in the agent's control module there is a look-up table of
pre-computed control parameters based on the number of
locked element branches in the system. In eﬀect, this is a
decentralised multiple-model control scheme, as there are
a number of local controller designs based on fault models
of the system.
It would also be possible to apply adaptive control using
this approach. However, a multiple-model based approach
was favoured as this aids veriﬁcation of robustness and
stability that would be necessary for high integrity appli-
cations for which HRA is intended for.
4.3 Simulation of Fault Cases
Figure 5 displays the response of the passively controlled
and MAC schemes under nominal and faulty conditions
as previously described in Table 2, when a step change of
0.05m in the reference was applied at t=0. All faults were
introduced at the beginning of the simulation. Table 3
gives the gain margins and transient characteristics of
these responses.
Figure 5. Step response of passive and MAC 10x10 HRA
Table 3. Passive control and MAC HRA
Fault Case Over- Rise Settling Gain Phase
shoot Time Time Margin Margin
Nominal 1.88% 0.68s 1.03s ∞ 74deg
Passive FC1 1.01% 0.75s 1.20s ∞ 76deg
Passive FC2 1.01% 0.88s 1.48s ∞ 79deg
Passive FC3 1.01% 1.05s 1.85s ∞ 82deg
Passive FC4 1.10% 1.33s 2.26s ∞ 86deg
MACS FC1 1.68% 0.68s 1.04s ∞ 74deg
MACS FC2 1.70% 0.68s 1.04s ∞ 75deg
MACS FC3 1.96% 0.71s 1.07s ∞ 75deg
MACS FC4 1.94% 0.73s 1.29s ∞ 77deg
It can be observed that lock-up faults cause the system to
slow. In the passive control case, the rise time and settling
time increase signiﬁcantly, and the requirements are not
met when two or more actuation branches are locked.
In the MAC case, the increase in rise time and settling
time can be reduced signiﬁcantly, producing a response
that is very similar to nominal conditions. The transient
requirements are met in all fault conditions, apart from
the settling time requirement in FC4.
These results illustrate that a MAC approach can provide
near nominal performance in a realistically scaled HRA
under realistic fault levels. This is an improvement on the
passive control case.
4.4 Reconﬁguration Delays
The MAC results given in Section 4.3 assumed that faults
were detected and communicated instantaneously within
the MAC architecture. This is not a realistic assumption.
The detection of faults will take some ﬁnite period, as will
the communication of these faults to the other agents. In
addition, on receiving fault messages, the agents will take
time to change their control parameters, and if multiple
faults occur simultaneously, multiple messages get passed
throughout the agency, and an agent will eﬀectively step
through these parameters until the ﬁnal fault status has
settled.
All of these eﬀects must be considered in the simulation
if the results are to resemble reality. Figure 6 shows the
transient responses of a more realistic MAC 10x10 HRA in
comparison to the previous passive control case and MAC
without delays. The fault detection, communication and
control reconﬁguration are all simulated using Stateﬂow,
which introduced delays into the system.
Figure 6. Transient response of passive, ideal MAC and
MAC with delays
A square-wave input is applied to the system and all faults
were injected at t=0. The response shows that in the
ﬁrst half period of the input, delay eﬀects are present in
the more realistic MAC scheme. However, after all faults
are detected, communicated and control reconﬁgured the
system's behaviour returns to that of the ideal MAC case.
Figure 7. Initial response of passive, ideal MAC and MAC
with delays
Figure 7 shows the initial response in more detail. Total
reconﬁguration of the system was attained after 0.35s.
This delay increases the settling time and overshoot of
the response in the ﬁrst half period. The overshoot limit
is exceeded in FC1, FC2 and FC3. If this was critical,
then the agent's control reconﬁguration could be adjusted
to slow down reconﬁguration, or reduce control gains until
the fault state is stable. The eﬀects of delays would also be
Table 4. False detection
No.of False Detects 1 2 3 4
Overshoot 1.88% 4.04% 6.16% 8.18%
Phase Margin 72deg 70deg 68deg 66deg
Table 5. False detection with reconﬁguration
No.of False Detects 1 2 3 4
Overshoot 1.58% 1.51% 1.66% 1.57%
Phase Margin 74deg 74deg 74deg 75deg
lessened if the faults did not occur simultaneously, which
is likely to be the case in a real situation.
4.5 Misdiagnosis in MACHRA
Misdiagnosis of faults in active FTC systems can be
problematic. If the system adapts to a change that has
not actually occurred in the system, then the results could
degrade performance, cause faults or induce instability.
Equally, if the system's control relies upon faults being
detected and a fault is not detected then the results could
be similar. Misdiagnosis of faults in this particular system
will be considered brieﬂy here.
Undetected faults should not cause problems in this par-
ticular scheme. At worst, the system's response will be
that of the passive case. The system will become slower,
but stability will be maintained. This is due to the outer
loop control. If no outer loop was in place, the same
response under working fault detection conditions could
be achieved. However, an undetected fault would result in
a signiﬁcant steady state error for the overall HRA as the
feed-forward agent control gains are not reconﬁgured.
False detection of faults in this MAC scheme will result
in gain and inner control law changes, which could lead
to instability. Table 4 gives the overshoot, gain and phase
margins in the case of 1-4 false lock-up detections. The
phase margin decreases, but the system retains stability.
The overshoot, however, rises signiﬁcantly. This is unlikely
to be acceptable in an application, however four false de-
tections may also be unlikely given a robust fault detection
algorithm.
The ﬂexibility of a MAC scheme can handle this problem
through further reconﬁguration. If the control law of the
`locked' agent is changed to force those elements into a
locked state at time of detection, then this decrease of
the stability margins can be avoided. This approach was
applied and simulation results are shown in Table 5. On
the triggering the FDM, the input reference of the agent
is ﬁxed to the local position at time of detection and the
controller is changed to a PI compensator. This forces the
system to behave as the detected fault case. Subsequently,
the phase margin is not eroded and the overshoot limit
achieved.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The case for MAC of HRA has been made and the current
MAC scheme described. It has been shown that, at this
moderately high level of modular redundancy for HRA,
MAC still provides signiﬁcant beneﬁts in comparison to
passive control under realistic fault levels. Near nominal
performance can be maintained in worst case fault scenar-
ios.
Reconﬁguration delays in MAC can aﬀect the response
until full reconﬁguration has been achieved. These eﬀects
may be considered acceptable, due to their ephemeral
nature. Non-detection will result in the performance of
a passive system. However, false detections will result in
decreases in the stability margins. MAC oﬀers a solution
to this problem, by reconﬁguring the control of agents that
have detected a fault.
Practical testing of MAC on a experimental electro-
magnetic HRA is planned, which should give an indication
of such a scheme's performance in a real-world situation.
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Abstract: The High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) project investigates the use of a relatively high number
of small actuation elements, assembled in series and parallel in order to form a single actuator which has
intrinsic fault tolerance. Both passive and active methods of fault tolerant control are being considered
for use with the HRA. In either approach, some form of health monitoring is required to indicate the
requirement for reconfiguration in the latter case and the need for maintenance in the former. This paper
presents a method of detecting faults in a HRA using an Interacting multiple-model (IMM) algorithm.
Keywords: Fault detection, Fault diagnosis, Kalman filters, Multiple model
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Traditional Approaches to Fault Tolerant Actuation
In automated processes, faults in hardware or software will
often produce undesired reactions. These faults can result in
failures, where the system as a whole does not complete an
expected action, possibly causing damage to the plant, its
environment, or people in the vicinity of that plant [Blanke
et al., 2001]. Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) aims to prevent
failures and their consequences by providing adequate system
performance in the presence of faults.
The majority of FTC research to date has concentrated on sen-
sor faults. Significant advances have been made in this area,
but most of these strategies are not applicable to actuator faults.
This is attributable to the fundamental differences between ac-
tuators and sensors. Sensors deal with information, and mea-
surements may be processed or replicated analytically to pro-
vide fault tolerance. Actuators, however, must deal with energy
conversion, and as a result actuator redundancy is essential to
keep the system in control and bring it to the desired state in the
presence of actuator faults [Patton, 1991].
The common solution for fault tolerant actuation in critical
systems involves straightforward parallel replication of actua-
tors. Each redundant actuator must be capable of performing
the task alone and possibly override the other faulty actuators.
This solution is over-engineered, reducing the efficiency of the
system i.e. in triplex systems 200% more capability, cost and
weight than required is introduced to ensure a certain level of
reliability.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation
High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) is a novel, state-of-the-
art approach to actuator fault tolerance that aims to reduce
the over-engineering incurred by traditional approaches. The
HRA concept is inspired by musculature, where the tissue is
composed of many individual cells, each of which provides a
minute contribution to the overall contraction of the muscle.
These characteristics allows the muscle, as a whole, to be highly
resilient to individual cell damage.
This principle of co-operation in large numbers of low capabi-
lity modules can be used in fault tolerant actuation to provide
intrinsic fault tolerance. The HRA uses a high number of small
actuator elements, assembled in parallel and series to form one
high redundancy actuator (see Figure 1). Faults in elements will
affect the maximum capability, but through control techniques,
the required performance can be maintained. This concept al-
lows the same level of reliability to be attained in exchange for
less over-dimensioning.
Figure 1. High Redundancy Actuation.
The HRA is an important new approach within the overall
area of fault tolerant control. When applicable, it can provide
actuators that operate at the desired level of performance in the
presence of multiple faults in actuator elements, and gracefully
degrade after the designed level of fault tolerance has been
exceeded.
1.3 High Redundancy Actuation and Fault Detection
The project thus far has investigated two methods of controlling
the HRA: robust control (passive fault tolerance) and reconfigu-
red control (active fault tolerance) [Dixon et al., 2009, Davies
et al., 2008a, Steffen et al., 2008]. Both of these approaches, to
different extents, require some form of fault detection (FD). In
the latter case, a clear indication of the HRA’s remaining capa-
bility, and thus it’s fault state is required in order to reconfigure
the control laws appropriately. In passive control, the controller
is static and thus not reliant on the fault state. However, health
monitoring of the system is still required to indicate to a user
the remaining capability of the HRA or indicate requirement
for maintenance if fault levels approach the performance limits.
1.4 Overview
This paper presents an approach to fault detection for a HRA
using an Interacting Multiple-Model (IMM) methods. Section
2 describes the modelling of HRA that uses electromagnetic
actuation technology. The IMM algorithm is outlined in Section
3, and simulation results of its application to parallel, serial
and mixed configuration elements are discussed in Section 4.
Finally, conclusions are made in Section 5 and future work is
considered.
2. HRA MODELLING
This paper assumes that the underlying technology of the HRA
is electromagnetic, moving coil actuation, which is similar to
a voice-coil in operation. Many other technologies are possible
and indeed, the next stage of the project aims to address which
technology will be best suited to manufacturing HRAs with
large numbers of elements. However, many technologies will
lead to a model with a similar structure to that presented here.
2.1 Single Element
The full order modelling of a moving coil actuator and of
HRA configurations using these actuation elements is presented
in [Davies et al., 2008b]. However, this paper will utilise a
simplified version of this model.
A moving coil actuator typically comprises a coil wound round
the centre pole of a magnetic assembly that produces a uniform
magnetic field perpendicular to the current conducted in the
coil. On providing a voltage, a current flows in the coil (inver-
sely proportional to the input resistance Rin), which generates a
force known as the LORENTZ force:
F = BNlI = kI =
k
Rin
v (1)
Where B is the magnetic flux density, N is the number of turns
and l is the length of the conductor. These are all constant and
thus may be combined to form a single force constant, k. This
force causes the coil, and the rod which is mounted to it, to
move. The movement of the coil in the field generates a counter-
electromotive force which can be expressed as below:
E = BNlx˙ = kx˙ (2)
Where the derivative x˙ is the perpendicular component of the
velocity of the wire relative to the flux lines i.e. the velocity of
the coil.
The force produced by the electrical/magnetic part of the sys-
tem acts upon the mechanical part which consists of the moving
mass of the element and any stiffness and damping. Hence,
Figure 2. Parallel elements
Figure 3. Serial elements
using NEWTON’s second law of motion, the following second
order model for the actuator can be derived:
mx¨ =
k
Rin
v− k
2 +Rind
Rin
x˙− rx , (3)
where v is the input voltage, m is the moving mass, d is the
damping factor, and r is the stiffness Choosing x˙ and x as states
leads to the following state space model:[
x¨
x˙
]
=
−k2 +RindRinm − rm
1 0
[ x˙
x
]
+
[ k
Rinm
0
]
v (4)
2.2 Parallel Elements
When elements are arranged in parallel (Figure 2), their forces
act on a combined mass. Hence, assuming a common input
voltage, the model for n parallel elements is:[
x¨
x˙
]
=
−∑i=ni=1 Kim −∑i=ni=1 rim
1 0
[ x˙
x
]
+
 ∑i=ni=1 Kinim
0
v (5)
where:
Ki =
k2i +Rin(i)di
Rin(i)
and Kini =
ki
Rin(i)
2.3 Serial Elements
If a number of elements n are arranged serially (Figure 3) then
the system contains n moving masses. Forces produced by the
elements act not only on their moving mass, but also counter-act
upon the preceding moving mass. The model of three elements
in series is then:
x¨1
x¨2
x¨3
x˙1
x˙2
x˙3
=

a13 a14 a15 a16 0 0
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25 a26
0 0 a31 a32 a33 a34
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0


x˙1
x˙2
x˙3
x1
x2
x3
+

b1
b2
b3
0
0
0
v (6)
where:
ai1 =
Ki−1
mi
, ai2 =
ri−1
mi
ai3 =−Ki +Ki+1mi , ai4 =−
ri + ri−1
mi
ai1 =
Ki+1
mi
, ai2 =
ri−+1
mi
, bi =
Kini−Kini+1
mi
Models of higher numbers of serial elements follow this mo-
del’s structure. Also, models of mixed configuration arrange-
ments which are necessary for creating HRAs can be construc-
ted using these basic equations.
2.4 Element faults
Three fault types are considered within this paper; overheating,
loose faults and lock-up faults. Overheating of an actuation
element may be represented as an increase in the resistance i.e.
an increase in Rin.
A loose fault is where the actuation element loses the ability
to translate force between its end points. Hence, a loose fault
in a parallel assembly will reduce the force exerted on the
mass. In serially connected elements, this fault is terminal as it
effectively fails the whole serial branch. Thus, it is only useful
to consider loose faults where elements are arranged in parallel.
A lock-up fault is where an element loses the ability to change
the length between its two end points. This may occur if
the coil of an actuation element is deformed and touches the
magnet. This fixes the mass with respect to the reference
point, and consequently the relative position and the speed are
constant. In serially connected elements, this adds the mass of
the locked element to the preceding element, and removes the
mechanical states of that element from the system model. In
parallel arrangements, this fault locks the whole assembly from
end-to-end. Therefore, this fault type will only be considered
where there are serial elements.
3. INTERACTING MULTIPLE-MODEL APPROACH
Conventional multiple-model estimation methods use a bank of
filters, each of which is based on a model of the system when it
is in a particular mode. The outputs of these filters are combined
with a probabilistically weighted sum to achieve an overall state
estimate.
However, there is no interaction between the filters, and as such
the approach is not suited to situations where the parameters
or structure of the system changes [Zhang and Jiang, 2001].
Nonetheless, non-interacting methods of multiple-model esti-
mation have been applied to FD applications, where sudden
parameter and structural changes to the system occur using
ad hoc solutions [Menke and Maybeck, 1995, Napolitano and
Swaim, 1991].
The Interacting multiple-model (IMM) method, developed in
the field of tracking [Blom and Bar-Shalom, 1988, Bar-Shalom
et al., 2001] deals with these issues. In the IMM approach, the
initial estimate at the beginning of each iteration is a mixture
of recent estimates from the filters. As a result the accuracy of
estimation is increased and dependency on the previous mode
history is introduced. This increases its suitability to detecting
faults and thus it has been applied within this field [Mehra et al.,
1998, Zhang and Jiang, 2001, Hayashi et al., 2006, Hashimoto
et al., 2007, Hayashi et al., 2008].
Figure 4. IMM estimation
3.1 IMM Estimation Algorithm
A depiction of the IMM estimation algorithm is shown in
Figure 4 . A number of filters (in this case Kalman filters) are
designed based on m models of the system modes.
Also, a mode transition probability matrix pi j is defined where
the element i j represents the probability of transition from
mode i to mode j. This may be based on knowledge of fault
type frequency and likelihood when the system is in a certain
state. The IMM algorithm has four main stages:
• Mixing
• Mode matched filtering
• Mode probability calculation
• Combination of estimates
Mixing The first stage of the IMM algorithm involves the
mixing of all the filters estimated values and covariances from
the previous iteration (xˆi(t−1) and P
i
(t−1) for i = 1 : m) and the
mixed probability, ρi| j(t−1) to produce the input to the filters:
xˆ0 j(t−1) =
m
∑
i=1
xˆ j(t−1)ρi| j(t−1), j = 1, ...m (7)
P0 j(t−1) =
m
∑
i=1
ρi| j(t−1)
{[
xˆ j(t−1)− xˆ
0 j
(t−1)
]
(8)
·
[
xˆ j(t−1)− xˆ
0 j
(t−1)
]T}
(9)
where ρi| j(t) in the previous time step was calculated by:
ρi| j(t−1) =
1
c¯ j
pi jρi(t−1), i, j = 1, ...,m (10)
c¯ j =
m
∑
i=1
pi jρi(t−1), j = 1, ...,m (11)
Mode matched filtering The Kalman filter algorithms are then
obtained based on the discrete system. For a discrete system:
x(t+1) = Fx(t)+Gu(t)+w(t) (12)
y(t) = Hx(t)+Lu(t)+ v(t) (13)
where w(t) and v(t) are the plant and measurement noise res-
pectively with covariances of Q and R. Both are assumed to be
white Gaussian with zero mean. The Kalman filter algorithms
can then be expressed as:
xˆ j(t/t−1) = F
j(xˆ0 j(t−1/t−1) +D
ju(t−1) (14)
xˆ j(t/t) = xˆ
j
(t/t−1) +K
j
(t)
[
y(t)− (H j(xˆ j(t/t−1))+L ju(t)
]
(15)
K j(t) = P
j
(t/t−1)H
j T
(t/t−1)S
j−1
(t) (16)
S j−1(t) = H
j
(t/t−1)P
j
(t/t−1)H
j T
(t/t−1) +R
j
(t−1) (17)
P j(t/t−1) = F
j
(t−1)P
0 j
(t/t−1)F
j T
(t−1) +G
j
(t−1)Q
j
(t−1)G
j T
(t−1) (18)
P j(t/t) = P
j
(t/t−1)−K
j
(t)S
j
(t)K
j T
(t) (19)
Mode Probability Calculation The mode probability, ρ j(t)
(for mode j at time t) is then updated based on the likelihood
function Λ for each mode filter:
ρ jt =
Λ j(t)c¯ j
∑mi=1Λi(t)c¯i
(20)
Λ j(t) =
∣∣∣2piS j(t)∣∣∣− 12exp[−12(y(t)−(H j xˆ j(t/t−1) +L ju(t)))T (21)
·
(
S j(t)
)−1(
y(t)−
(
H j xˆ j(t/t−1) +L
ju(t)
))]
(22)
The mode probabilities give a time-varying estimate on the
likelihood of the system state being one of the model-based
modes and thus they are used in the indication of fault type
for FD applications. The probabilities are smoothed using a
moving average window.
Combination of Estimates Finally, the combined state esti-
mate xˆ(t) and covariance P(t) are derived by weighting the es-
timated state and the mixed covariance for each mode with the
mode probabilities:
xˆ(t) =
m
∑
j=1
xˆ j(t)ρ j(t) (23)
P(t) =
m
∑
j=1
ρ
j(t)
[
P j(t)+
[
xˆ j(t)−xˆ
]
·
[
xˆ j(t)−xˆ(t)
]T ] (24)
4. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
This section discusses the simulation results of the IMM ap-
proach when applied to first purely parallel and serial config-
urations to illustrate that overheating, loose and lock-up faults
can be diagnosed in these structures. The diagnosis of faults in
a mixed configuration of parallel and serial elements will then
be considered briefly.
In each case the simulation is set-up as shown in Figure 5.
The elements receive a shared input from a classical controller,
designed for good transient characteristics and frequency mar-
gins from voltage input to load position. The system is given
a sine wave input reference with an amplitude that uses its
full range of travel (±15mm). The known input and measured
output is passed to the IMM algorithm which produces mode
probabilities and a mixed state estimate.
Figure 5. IMM Simulation
Figure 6. Mode probabilities for parallel elements
4.1 Parallel Elements
IMM FD is applied to three parallel elements here. The IMM
estimator is designed based on the following modes:
• Mode 1: Nominal system
• Mode 2: Overheating, a resistance increase of 20%
• Mode 3: Overheating, a resistance increase of 50%
• Mode 4: 1 Loose element
• Mode 5: 2 Loose elements
The transition matrix pi j is set such that the probability of no
transition from the current state is 0.999 and 2.5× 10−5 for
transitions to the other modes.
The measured output is the position of the load. A very small
value of covariance is used for the noise on the measured
position (5× 10−12m), as the glass encoder used has an rms
noise value of 1µm. The plant noise covariance Q is set at
1×10−5V, as this gives a noise level in the order of mV.
Simulation Results The simulation results shown in Figure 6
are the mode probabilities produced from the IMM algorithm
for the parallel elements system with changing fault state. At
t = 0, the system is nominal, after which at 5s intervals the
system fault state is changed from mode 2 through to mode 5.
It can be seen that during each fault state, the correct mode
is diagnosed with a high probability after approximately 0.5s
except mode 4. The probability of mode 4 takes longer to rise
due to its similarity to the nominal state.
In a realistically scaled HRA, the levels of parallel redundancy
(used in conjunction with serial redundancy) will be higher e.g.
10 or more parallel elements. A greater similarity between the
nominal system and small proportions of loose faults will exist.
This may make the clear diagnosis of low numbers of loose
faults more difficult. However, if the behaviour of a HRA with
a very low proportion of loose elements is sufficiently near the
nominal behaviour, then detection of these faults at this fault
level is not crucial, as the health status of the HRA will be high
and control reconfiguration will not be necessary.
Figure 7. Mode probabilities for serial elements
4.2 Serial Elements
Three serial elements with overheating and lock-up faults are
used in this example. As the location of a lock-up fault in the
system will result in slightly different fault models, more modes
are needed to diagnose lock-ups within serial elements. There-
fore, the IMM estimator in this instance uses the following nine
modes:
• Mode 1: Nominal system
• Mode 2: Overheating, a resistance increase of 20%
• Mode 3: Overheating, a resistance increase of 50%
• Mode 4: Element 1 lock-up
• Mode 5: Element 2 lock-up
• Mode 6: Element 3 lock-up
• Mode 7: Elements 1 and 2 lock-up
• Mode 8: Elements 1 and 3 lock-up
• Mode 9: Elements 2 and 3 lock-up
The transition matrix pi j is set such that the probability of
no transition from the current state is 0.999 and 1.25× 10−5
for transitions to the other modes. Relative positions were
used as the measured quantities in the simulation. Relative
measurements were chosen over absolute as the HRA rig in
development will have position encoders on each element. The
noise covariance for each sensor the same as that used in the
parallel example. The plant noise covariance is also the same as
that used in the parallel case.
Estimation in the presence of actuator lock-ups presents a spe-
cial issue, particularly when actuators are arranged in series.
The fault model for a serial assembly of n actuation elements
with one locked element will effectively be a model for n− 1
elements with one mass augmented with the locked element’s
mass (if it is not the ground connected mass). When actua-
tors lock at a non-zero point along their travel, this unknown
position is not included in the fault model and thus position
estimation and correct mode identification (without velocity
information) becomes difficult.
One solution to this problem is to include in the fault model a
high damping factor in the faulty element’s dynamics. This will
incorporate the locked position into the estimation resulting in
a more accurate overall estimation and accurate mode identifi-
cation. This approach is used within this simulation.
Simulation Results The resulting mode probabilities for an
example fault profile simulation are shown in Figure 7. The
mode probabilities in the example are typical of all fault pro-
files. The correct mode is clearly indicated in each time period.
More fluctuation of the mode probabilities is present during
nominal conditions and overheating in comparison with the
parallel element results. This may be explained by the increased
number of sensors in the system. In this case three sensors are
Figure 8. Parallel in Series 3×3 system
used, each measuring a smaller quantity than the one measure-
ment in the parallel case. However, the same noise covariance
is present on each sensor. Thus there is more noise present in
the system. These fluctuations are less prevalent when actuation
elements lock, as this fault mode is more removed from the
nominal behaviour.
4.3 Parallel in Series HRA
Having illustrated that it is possible to diagnose overheating,
loose faults and lock-up faults in purely parallel or serial
arrangements of elements, the application of IMM FD to a
system that contains both parallel and serial elements is briefly
considered. A 3×3 Parallel in Series (PS) system (Figure 8) is
used as an example.
This configuration has relatively high intrinsic tolerance to
loose faults. Loose faults in the parallel branches will have little
affect on the system until there are loose faults in every branch
i.e. one loose fault in every parallel branch is equivalent to one
loose branch in a purely parallel system. Hence, at least 2 loose
faults (but at maximum 4 if they are divided equally between
two branches) can occur before a reduction in force capability
is observed.
The system has less tolerance to lock-up faults, however. A
locked element will lock a whole parallel branch, reducing its
travel capability by a third and thus the same fault tolerance is
achieved as in a purely serial arrangement.
Many more mode filters are required to cover all the possible
fault combinations within this system. As before, 3 modes are
required to diagnose nominal conditions and two levels of ove-
rheating; 2 for diagnosing 2 reductions in force capability (i.e.
loose faults within the system); and 6 modes for diagnosing
travel capability reductions (lock-up faults). However, if we
were to consider occasions where both force and travel capa-
bilities are reduced, as would be necessary for a HRA, then the
required number of modes rises to 23. Considering that this is
a quite low level of redundancy, then this number is high. In a
higher order, more realistically dimensioned HRA containing,
for example 10×10 elements, then using the current approach
to mode allocation, 2286 modes would be needed to diagnose
all the fault combinations for up to 50% reduction in force and
travel capabilities.
Simulation Results The higher number of modes in this
example does not affect the diagnosis quality. An example
simulation for the 3× 3 PS system is shown in Figure 9. The
system is nominal for the first 5s period, followed by a lock-up
in element 1 at t=5. Loose faults resulting in a 1/3 loss of force
capability are injected at t=10, and element 2 locks at t=15.
Finally, another loose fault in the remaining unlocked branch
occurs at t=20. In each case, the correct mode is diagnosed with
short detection delays. The state in 15s-20s is more difficult
Figure 9. PS system mode probabilities (modes with low pro-
babilities removed from plot for clarity)
to diagnose as it is similar to no loose faults and 1/3 force
capability, but the correct mode is still clearly indicated. The
higher number of modes, however, does affect the required
simulation run-time for the IMM algorithm.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discussed the utilisation of IMM techniques to
achieve fault detection in a HRA. Simulation results of the
IMM method applied to parallel elements, serial elements and a
small mixed configuration HRA were presented. These results
suggested that, using a comprehensive set of mode filters, it is
possible to detect overheating faults; location independent loose
element faults; and location specific lock-up faults. However,
the required number of modes for detection in low level re-
dundancy HRA is relatively large, and for more realistically di-
mensioned HRA (100+ elements) the required number becomes
much greater. This may make real-time diagnosis unfeasible.
However, in HRA applications, the location of the locked
element is not of interest. Only the actuator’s remaining travel
or force capability is required to give an indication of health, or
reconfigure global control laws 1 . Hence, if a simplified model
of the system is used with the IMM algorithm, where each mode
filter represents a level of capability, the number of required
modes would be limited dramatically. This approach will be
the focus of the next stage of work on this specific area of
the HRA project’s research. Also, the development of a 4× 4
experimental rig for the HRA is underway and application of
these fault detection techniques to further assess their feasibility
is planned.
This approach to fault detection is by no means the only one
that can be taken to meet the requirements of this application.
Indeed, the project aims to examine other fault detection and
health monitoring methods in the future. A comparison may
then be made between the fault detection types to further assess
the effectiveness and feasibility of using this IMM approach
with the HRA.
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Abstract—: The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA project
investigates the use of large numbers of small actuation elements
to achieve fault tolerance. The large number of components
involved poses a unique challenge from a control perspective.
This paper presents the two main options to control the HRA:
using robust control (passive fault tolerance), and reconfigurable
control (active fault tolerance). The robust controller is designed
using H∞ methods, and handles the different system behaviours
of the HRA with only small changes to the closed-loop system. In
contrast, control reconfiguration detects the fault and changes the
control laws accordingly. Multi-Agent System (MAS) concepts are
used to apply localised multiple-model control and fault detection
on an individual element level. The results of both approaches
are compared to illustrate the trade-off between the complexity
of the control approach and the resulting performance under
different fault situations.
Index Terms—high redundancy actuator, fault-tolerant control,
active fault tolerance, passive fault tolerance, fault accommoda-
tion, robust control, control reconfiguration, multi-agent systems.
I. HIGH REDUNDANCY ACTUATION
High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) is a new approach to
fault tolerant actuation, where an actuator comprises a large
number of actuation elements (see Figure 1). Faults in the
individual elements can be accommodated without resulting in
a failure of the complete actuation system.
The concept of the HRA is inspired by musculature. A
muscle is composed of many individual cells, each of which
provides only a minute contribution to the force and the travel of
the muscle. The aim of this project is to use the same principle
of co-operation of high levels of low capability elements to
provide intrinsic fault tolerance.
An important feature of the HRA is that the actuator elements
are connected both in parallel and in series. Serial elements
allow the HRA to tolerate element lock-ups whilst parallel
Figure 1. Configuration of a High Redundancy Actuator
elements allow tolerance of ’loose’ failure modes. Clearly, a
combination of serial and parallel elments will have a degree of
tolerance to both. However, the post fault performance depends
on how robust the HRA controller is to faults.
HRA model complexity presents a problem for typical multi-
variable control approaches (see [1], [2]). Models that include
each actuation element explicitly will inevitably be high order,
particulary for the envisioned levels of modular redundancy
e.g. 10x10 or more.
This paper presents two control concepts to deal with both
the complexity of the system and with the occurence of faults.
The first concept uses robust control. The design of the robust
controller can be performed with a reduced model, leading to
a low complexity controller.
The second method is to use Multi-Agent System concepts to
apply a decentralised active control and fault detection scheme.
Each actuation element is controlled by an individual agent.
Again, this leads to a low complexity controller, as only the
dynamics of single element have to be considered. By detecting
and communicating faults, this structure is able to respond to
faults, and compensate their effect on the overall behaviour of
the HRA.
Section 2 presents the model of the HRA. Sections 3 and 4
present the robust control and the multi-agent control approach.
Example results are compared in Section 5, leading to the
conclusion and outlook in Section 6.
II. HRA MODEL
This paper assumes that the underlying technology of the
actuator is electromagnetic actuation, which is similar to a
voice-coil in operation. Other technologies are possible, many
of which lead to a similar model.
Single Element
An individual actuation element can be modelled as a spring-
damper system, following Newton’s second law of motion (see
[3] for full details):
mx¨ = ki−dx˙− rx , (1)
where x is the position, m is the moving mass, k is the input
coefficient, d is the damping factor (accounting for mechanical
and electrical damping), r is the elasticity of the spring, i is
the current input and x is the position of the mass. Choosing
x and x˙ as states leads to the following state space model:
d
dt
(
x˙
x
)
=
( − dm − rm
1 0
)(
x˙
x
)
+
( k
m
0
)
i . (2)
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Figure 2. 4x4 Parallel-in-Series (PS) HRA
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Figure 3. Simplified system of 4 serial elements
Nominal System
This paper will address the control of a 4× 4 system
arranged in parallel and series as shown in (Figure 2 . As
mentioned previously, the inclusion of each element’s dynamics
will increase the size of the model. However, each group of
four parallel elements can be simplified to one equivalent
(stronger) element, because they all act on the same moving
mass (Figure 3) . Using this simplification, the state-space
model of the fault-less SISO system is
d
dt
x = Ax+Bu (3)
y = Cx (4)
with
A =

A1,2(m1) A2(m1) O O
A2(m2) A2,3(m2) A3(m2) O
O A3(m3) A3,4(m3) A4(m3)
O O A4(m3) A4,5(m4)
 (5)
B =
(
k1− k2
m1
0
k2− k3
m2
0
k3− k4
m3
0
k4
m4
0
)T
(6)
C = (0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1) , (7)
where
Ai(m) =
( di
m
ri
m
0 0
)
(8)
Ai, j(m) =
(
− di+d jm −
ri+r j
m
1 0
)
(9)
are submatrices, x = (x˙1 x1 x˙2 x2 x˙3 x3 x˙4 x4)T is the state, u is
the input, and y is the output of the system. The parameter
vectors used here are
m = (0.2 0.2 0.2 1)T kg
d = (13 12.5 11.5 10 0)T Ns/m
r = (1.3 1.25 1.15 1 0)T N/m
k = (13 12.5 11.5 10 0)T N/V .
The choice of the slightly different coefficients is deliberate, to
compensate for the higher mass that the lower elements have
E l e m e n t  1 E l e m e n t  2 E l e m e n t  3
m  1 m  2 m  3
E l e m e n t  4
L o a d
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Figure 4. Lock-up faults
to move. This choice aligns the dynamics of the elements, so
that they move synchronously (see [4] for further details). If
all inputs receive the same value, this gives the simple SISO
system transfer function
G0(s) = 10
1
(s+2.4)(s+0.104)
. (10)
The remaining six poles at −205, −119, −38.1, −0.1003,
−0.1001 and −0.1 are cancelled with input de-coupling zeros
due to the specific parameter choice.
Behaviour with Faults
This paper only addresses lock-up faults, as they have the
more challenging effect on the dynamics compared to loose
faults or faults in the electrical circuit of the coil for this
configuration. If an element locks up, this means that the two
masses it links are moving at the same speed, so that they can
be considered as one larger mass (Figures 4).
The resulting 6 state model follows the same structure of
the nominal model, but the parameters have to be rearranged
according to the position of the fault. As a result, the pole-zero
cancellation of the nominal system is no longer perfect, which
means that the higher order modes have some limited influence
on the behaviour. This is in addition to the obvious change
in system amplification and in the position of the faster pole.
For example, if element 4 locks, then the resulting transfer
function is:
GF4(s)=9.58
s+187.4
s+187.7
s+64.9
s+66
1
(s+3.03)(s+0.103)
. (11)
In each fault location case, the resultant behaviour is very
similar. See [5] for a more detailed discussion of the deviation
introduced by the fault.
If two elements within the system lock, then the effect on
the system will be greater, because the structure of the model
changes. Essentially two pairs of states are unified, and all
interactions with the remainder of the model have o be updated.
However, as in the single fault case the resultant behaviours
are similar regardless of the fault location.The SISO transfer
functions for the lock-up of elements 3 and 4 is
GF34(s)=8.93
s+129.9
s+131.9
1
(s+4.293)(s+0.1024)
. (12)
III. ROBUST CONTROLLED HRA
The robust controller is designed using H∞ loop shaping.
This is a two-step process: first a classical controller is
designed following rather conservative design rules, and then
this controller is used as a weighting function for the design of
an H∞ optimal controller, which further robustifies the initial
controller.
The classical controller is designed as a PI controller with
phase advance for the nominal model GP. (This structure has
the advantage of PID of being realisable, so no approximation
is necessary in the implemenation.) The two zeros are placed
to cancel the two poles of the system. Both the nominal and
the fault models are taken into account, so the average values
−3 and −0.104 are chosen. The free pole is put at −100 to
force a fast system response, and the gain is set to achieve
critical damping. This leads to the PID controller
GPID(s) = 252
s+3
s+100
s+0.104
s
. (13)
While both the gain and the span of the phase advance
compensator may seem rather high, this is not a practical
problem, because the position (given in m) is measured optically
with a resolution of 1µm.
This controller is then used as a weighting function for the
H∞ loop shaping design [6]. H∞ loop shaping introduces further
damping in the system which results to a robust stability radius
of e=0.63. Of course, different weighting functions will result
in different robust stability radius results that either emphasise
further (increasing e) or less (decreasing e) robustness to
coprime uncertainty.
The overall controller transfer function is
Gopt(s) = 305
s+102
s+100
s+3
s+2.996
s+2.88
s+144
s+0.104 . (14)
The extra elements, compared to the original PID weight,
introduced from the loop-shaing design are evident. Applying
balanced truncation (or even by inspection) the controller size
can be reduced down to a PID form. The reduced controller is
thus
Gred(s) = 305
s+2.89
s+141
s+0.104
s
, (15)
Such a reduction is possible when starting with an appropriate
PID weighting function (i.e. appropriately robust behaviour).
For completeness, Figure 5, illustrates the plant, target loop
and actual loop designs. The difference between the optimal
controller and reduced controller is very small.
The reduced controller is working as expected with the
linear system. However, control saturation is an issue due to
the fast speed of response. The phase advance filter creates a
short but very high spike, and standard anti-windup measures
are not sufficient to maintain a good step response. Shaping
of the reference trajectory could prevent this, but a simpler
solution is proposed here: the unrealised input is saved in
an integrator and released later when the limits allow it. The
resulting controller shown in Figure 6 achieves a good step
response across different amplitudes.
IV. MULTI-AGENT CONTROLLED HRA
An agent is a physical or virtual entity situated in its
environment, which acts autonomously and flexibly within
its purview to achieve goals in a real-time manner [7]. A
Multi-Agent System (MAS), therefore, is a collection of agents
Figure 5. Behaviour with Different Controllers
Figure 6. Implementation of the robust controller
that are socially coupled and collaborate to achieve objectives,
which in the case of Multi-Agent Control (MAC) are the control
objectives of the application.
These agent characteristics resemble the concept of closed-
loop control. However, there are important differences within
the agent concept such as social interaction and negotiation.
Also, the agent philosophy is strongly associated with localisa-
tion, a point emphasised by [8].
MAS concepts are used as an intelligent approach to
controlling the HRA as the two concepts are strongly related.
They both use large numbers of simple elements/processes,
coupled structurally or by communication, to achieve objectives
that are beyond the capability and sensory knowledge of the
individual parts.
This similarity in their structuring is the key rationale for
combining MAS ideas with HRA (a fuller discussion is given
in [9]). The complexity and changeable nature of HRA can be
handled at a local level if it is viewed as a collection of simpler,
similar, physically distributed modules. MASs facilitate the
control of such decompositions, allowing the application of
simple control algorithms in conjunction with simple fault
detection methods at a local level to achieve greater robustness
and adaptability in fault situations.
This decentralisation also provides advantages in comparison
to other active fault tolerant control methods. There is no single
point of failure as in systems with supervisors, and the affects
of possible mis-reconfiguration are reduced.
MAC Structure
Figure 7 shows the control configuration of the MAC scheme
used in this example.
Figure 7. MAC scheme
Figure 8. Agent architecture
There is a fixed outer-loop compensator which controls the
overall position of the HRA using a load position measurement.
This provides a command to the inner-loop agent controllers,
which control the local position of each element (or bank of
parallel elements). Figure 8 illustrates the agent architecture.
There is a feedforward gain that distributes the command
between the active agents and an inner-loop controller based
on a number of fault models of the system. Hence, this MAC
scheme is effectively a decentralised gain scheduling and
multiple-model control scheme.
The agent uses its local sensory information to detect faults
in its element using simple rule-based logic. On detecting a
fault, this is communicated to the other agents neighbour-to-
neighbour. If a fault message is received, the agent updates
its health status knowledge and reconfigures its control. The
feedforward gain is adjusted to redistribute the input between
the remaining active agents and the inner-loop compensator is
reconfigured using a look-up table of pre-computed controller
parameters based on the number of active elements in the
system.
MAC Design
The MAC controllers are designed to match the behaviour
of the robust control approach under nominal conditions. The
final phase advance compensator used in the robust approach
is used as the inner-loop control under nominal conditions.
A PI controller for the outer loop is then designed to match
the behaviour of the robust control scheme through manual
tuning. The following PI controller was found to provide a
Table I
TRANSIENT CHARACTERISTICS
Rise Settling Over- Steady-State
Time Time shoot Error
Robust Nom. 0.082s 0.14s 1.26% 0
Robust 1 Fault 0.088s 0.19s 0% 0
Robust 2 Faults 0.13s 0.56s 0% 0
MAC Nom. 0.084s 0.14s 0.96% 0
MAC 1 Fault 0.084s 0.14s 0.41% 0
MAC 2 Faults 0.089s 0.15s 0.40% 0
good match:
GMACPI(s) = 22.5
0.165s+1
s
, (16)
When a fault is detected, the remaining agents reschedule
the feedforward gain from 1/4 to 1/3. The inner-loop phase
advance controller’s time constant, τ is decreased to 80% of
it’s original value. This reconfiguration retains the nominal
system performance. If two faults are detected the feedforward
gain is changed to 1/2, as two active elements remain, and τ,
is decreased to 60%. Again, this reconfiguration provides a
response very close to that of the nominal case.
As in the robust control case, whilst this control scheme
works well with a linear system, control saturation is an issue.
This can be remedied by applying the same approach described
in Figure 6 to each inner-loop branch, or by using a simple
rate limiter with each inner-loop compensator.
V. EXAMPLE SIMULATION
This section will consider the performance of the two
proposed control approaches in nominal and faulty conditions.
Two fault cases are considered, the first where one element
is locked (thus locking its entire parallel branch of elements),
and the second where two separate element branches become
locked. The location of the locked elements within the HRA is
of little importance, as was discussed in Section II. The faults
were introduced into the system at t=0 and a constant input
reference of 0.1m was applied. The limits of the system are
included within the simulation, and the anti-wind up strategies
described earlier were in place.
Simulation Results
Figure 9 gives the resulting response of these simulations
and Table I summarises their transient characteristics. The
individual travels of each element in the HRA are also given
in Figure 10.
It can be observed from Figure 9 that the response of the
passive robust controller and the MAC scheme are very similar.
Figure 10 shows that, in the nominal case, the individual
elements in both control approaches move in unison.
This unified dynamic is lost in both cases when faults
occur. The distribution of travel amongst the elements is equal,
however, their velocity differs as the pole-zero cancellation in
the model is not perfect in the fault case. The MAC scheme has
the potential to compensate for this, but, this would increase
the number of pre-computed control laws needed significantly,
Figure 9. Step response of robust controlled and multi-agent controlled HRA
in nominal and faulty conditions
Figure 10. Individual element response of robust controlled and multi-agent
controlled HRA in nominal and faulty conditions
making the scheme more complicated and increasing the
verification effort required for high integrity applications.
The overall dynamic of the system is a more pertinent
consideration in the HRA concept. When one element lock-
up occurs in the HRA, the effective load within the system
increases slowing the response. In the robust control case, a
slight increase in the rise and settling time occurs, and the
overshoot diminishes. The change in behaviour is very small,
and most likely tolerable in an application. However, two lock-
up faults within the system causes a more dramatic rise in the
settling time of the robust control scheme.
The MAC approach provides a response that is very close
to the nominal behaviour under both fault conditions.
Delays in Active Control
The simulation of multi-agent control provided in this
example is idealised. No delays were incurred in the detection
of faults, their communication or reconfiguration. This is not a
realistic assumption as these tasks will require a finite amount
of time. Figure 11 gives the transient response to a square-
wave input of the passive robust controlled HRA, the idealised
MAC scheme and a MAC scheme with its fault detection and
reconfiguration delays simulated in the Stateflow toolbox.
With one lock-up in the non-ideal MAC, the fault is detected
at t=0.05s and all communication and reconfiguration is
completed by 0.1s. This delay causes a slight deterioration in
the performance in the first transient. The subsequent behaviour
is that of the ideal MAC, as no delays are incurred when the
fault status is unchanging and reconfiguration complete.
The effects of delay are more pronounced in the two fault
case. This is because two faults now have to be detected
and communicated, and the active agents will step through
the control algorithms as the fault messages spread through
the system. Both faults were detected at t=0.06s, but the full
communication of faults and reconfiguration took longer than
previously, and is completed by 0.125s. The control algorithm
changes during this period cause the ’bend’ present in the
response, and some overshoot occurs. It can be observed that
the response after this first transient is that of the ideal case.
If the overshoot induced was critical, then the agent’s control
reconfiguration could be adjusted to slow down the control
algorithm changes, or reduce control gains until the fault state
is stable. The affects of delays would also be lessened if the
faults did not occur simultaneously, which is likely to be the
case in a real situation.
Simulation Conclusions
The simulation results show that both robust control and
MAC provide fault tolerance to lock-up faults within a HRA.
The robust control is simple to implement, however there
is a slight difference in closed loop behaviour between the
performance under nominal and one fault conditions. This
deviation may be tolerable in a real application. However, in
the case of two lock-up faults, the difference in the closed
loop behaviour becomes more pronounced, and may not be
acceptable. The effects of faults could be reduced by tightening
Figure 11. Response to a square-wave input of robust controlled HRA and
idealised and delayed MAC
the control loop (which would require further and more accurate
sensor readings), but it cannot be eliminated completely.
In contrast, nominal behaviour after faults have occurred
can be restored with MAC (within the mechanical limits of the
system). This advantage is gained in exchange for reliance on
fault detection and a more complex control structure. However,
the control algorithms remain simple and the criticality of fault
detection can be reduced as discussed in [10].
Delays in the MAC scheme cause a deterioration in the
performance during reconfiguration and for a short period after.
These effects are minimal with one fault, but become more
pronounced when there are two. Again, these affects can be
reduced if the number of elements in the HRA is increased.
The suitability of the proposed control approaches to a
given application depends on the dimension of the system, its
performance requirements under nominal and fault conditions
and the required extent of fault tolerance. The passive robust
control approach is attractive in its simplicity and constancy,
allowing it to be easily verifiable for high integrity applications.
However, nominal performance levels will not be achievable
in the presence of faults, and the extent to which faults are
tolerated may be restricted. Nonetheless, this is sufficient for
HRA, as the concept does not require the actuator to be
fully operational with fault levels above its designed level
of redundancy.
If performance was critical at higher fault levels, then active
control could provide this as well as near nominal performance
at low fault levels. This adds complexity and makes verification
more difficult however. Although, with an agent approach, high
levels of modular redundancy in the HRA will reduce some
of the negative effects produced by control reconfiguration.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Two approaches to controlling a High Redundancy Actuator
have been described: a passive, robust control approach and an
active, Multi-Agent inspired control scheme. These approaches
were applied to an example 4×4 HRA, and simulations showed
that both methods can provide fault tolerance. However, the
level of fault tolerance provided differs as does their level of
complexity.
The trade-off between complexity and control performance
under faults does not just include these two options, but it
is almost a continuous field of increasingly complex control
structures. An adaptive controller for example could be used
as an active fault tolerant approach. This would compensate
for most of the behavioural differences introduced by the fault,
without requiring a decentralised control or fault detection.
Further research will continue to explore this compromise,
especially for higher order systems (such as a 10×10 config-
uration), and from the perspective of health monitoring.
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